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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Andrew Hugine  
President  
Alabama A&M

Dear Dr. Hugine,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Mark Zupan  
President  
Alfred University

Dear Dr. Zupan,

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<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer\\_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*



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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Mitchel Wallerstein  
President  
Baruch University

Dear Dr. Wallerstein,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Harvey Stenger  
President  
Binghamton University

Dear Dr. Stenger,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Robert Runcie  
Superintendent  
Broward County Public Schools

Dear Mr. Runcie,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

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Charles E. Grassley  
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Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Ronald Machtley  
President  
Bryant University

Dear Mr. Machtley,

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<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 5 (statement of E.W. "Bill" Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Priestap%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, "Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions."<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of "properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research."<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers' money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution's relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Zulma Toro  
President  
Central Connecticut State University

Dear Dr. Toro,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>8</sup> Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>.

<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

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Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Janice Jackson  
CEO  
Chicago Public Schools

Dear Dr. Jackson,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. James Heimowitz  
President  
China Institute

Dear Mr. Heimowitz,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Harlan Sands  
President  
Cleveland State University

Dear Mr. Sands,

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Katherine Rowe  
President  
College of William and Mary

Dear Dr. Rowe,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mrs. Joyce McConnell  
President  
Colorado State University

Dear Mrs. McConnell,

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Lee Bollinger  
President  
Columbia University

Dear Mr. Bollinger,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Everette Freeman  
President  
Community College of Denver

Dear Dr. Freeman,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Reid Newey  
Superintendent  
Davis School District

Dear Mr. Newey,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Randy Lucas  
CEO  
East Central Ohio Educational Service Center

Dear Mr. Lucas,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Claire Sterk  
President  
Emory University

Dear Dr. Sterk,

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Ms. Anne Holton  
President  
George Mason University

Dear Ms. Holton,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Thomas LeBlanc  
President  
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Dear Dr. LeBlanc,

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Mark Becker  
President  
Georgia State University

Dear Dr. Becker,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Grenita Lathan  
Superintendent  
Houston Independent School District

Dear Dr. Lathan,

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer\\_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Richard Myers  
President  
Kansas State University

Dear Mr. Myers,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* See also Marshall Sahlins, *Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware*, *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Volume 12, Issue 46 (Nov. 16, 2014), available at <https://apjif.org/2014/12/46/Marshall-Sahlins/4220.html>.

In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Pamela Whitten  
President  
Kennesaw State University

Dear Dr. Whitten,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Rudy Crew  
President  
Medgar Evers College

Dear Dr. Crew,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



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Charles E. Grassley  
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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Gregory Crawford  
President  
Miami University (Ohio)

Dear Dr. Crawford,

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Samuel Stanley  
President  
Michigan State University

Dear Dr. Stanley,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

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Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Sydney McPhee  
President  
Middle Tennessee State University

Dear Dr. McPhee,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

<sup>10</sup> *China's Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 115<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2018), available at <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states-the-threat-and-potential-policy-responses>.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 8 (statement of John Demers, Assistant Att'y Gen., Department of Justice), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Demers%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 5 (statement of E.W. "Bill" Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Priestap%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Sue Henderson  
President  
New Jersey City University

Dear Dr. Henderson,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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Charles E. Grassley  
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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Joel Pearsall  
President  
Northwest Nazarene University

Dear Mr. Pearsall,

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. John Broderick  
President  
Old Dominion University

Dear Mr. Broderick,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ethan Epstein, *How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms*, Politico (Jan. 17, 2018), available at <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327>.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Stephen Percy  
President  
Portland State University

Dear Dr. Percy,

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Bob Staton  
President  
Presbyterian College

Dear Mr. Staton,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Robert Barchi  
President  
Rutgers University

Dear Dr. Barchi,

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Ms. Kimberly Ballard-Washington  
President  
Savannah State University

Dear Ms. Ballard-Washington,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Tim Schlosser  
Superintendent  
Simpson County Schools

Dear Mr. Schlosser,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Scott Wyatt  
President  
Southern Utah University

Dear Mr. Wyatt,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Robbyn Wacker  
President  
St. Cloud State University

Dear Dr. Wacker,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Marc Tessier-Lavigne  
President  
Stanford University

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. David Heath  
President  
State College of Optometry, State University of New York

Dear Dr. Heath,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
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CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA, CHAIRMAN

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Michael Bernstein  
President  
Stony Brook University

Dear Dr. Bernstein,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Richard Englert  
President  
Temple University

Dear Dr. Englert,

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<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer\\_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*



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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Kenneth Huewitt  
President  
Texas Southern University

Dear Dr. Huewitt,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Kristina Johnson  
Chancellor  
The State University of New York

Dear Dr. Johnson,

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Gary Miller  
President  
The University of Akron

Dear Dr. Miller,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

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Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Gary May  
Chancellor  
The University of California, Davis

Dear Dr. May,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 5 (statement of E.W. "Bill" Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Priestap%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Gene Block  
Chancellor  
The University of California, Los Angeles

Dear Dr. Block,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>8</sup> Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>.

<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

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Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Henry Yang  
Chancellor  
The University of California, Santa Barbara

Dear Dr. Yang,

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. C. Scott Green  
President  
The University of Idaho

Dear Mr. Green,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. M. David Rudd  
President  
The University of Memphis

Dear Dr. Rudd,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Joseph Harroz  
President  
The University of Oklahoma

Dear Mr. Harroz,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Bob Caslen  
President  
The University of South Carolina

Dear Mr. Caslen,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Glenn Cummings  
President  
The University of Southern Maine

Dear Dr. Cummings,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Richard Benson  
President  
The University of Texas at Dallas

Dear Dr. Benson,

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You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Sharon Gaber  
President  
The University of Toledo

Dear Dr. Gaber,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Ruth Watkins  
President  
The University of Utah

Dear Dr. Watkins,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Mr. Dennis Shields  
Chancellor  
The University of Wisconsin-Platteville

Dear Mr. Shields,

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Jack Hawkins  
Chancellor  
Troy University

Dear Dr. Hawkins,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA, CHAIRMAN

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Anthony Monaco  
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Tufts University

Dear Dr. Monaco,

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Havidán Rodríguez  
President  
University at Albany, State University of New York

Dear Dr. Rodríguez,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer\\_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Cathy Sandeen  
Chancellor  
University of Alaska Anchorage

Dear Dr. Sandeen,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer\\_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer_funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Houston Davis  
President  
University of Central Arkansas

Dear Dr. Davis,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Eli Capilouto  
President  
University of Kentucky

Dear Dr. Capilouto,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>18</sup> *Id.*

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Ronnie Green  
Chancellor  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Dear Dr. Green,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>



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Charles E. Grassley  
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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. James Dean  
President  
University of New Hampshire

Dear Dr. Dean,

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Philip Dubois  
Chancellor  
University of North Carolina Charlotte

Dear Dr. Dubois,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Patrick Gallagher  
Chancellor  
University of Pittsburgh

Dear Dr. Gallagher,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>9</sup> Press Release (June 10, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-boost-disclosure-foreign-lobbying>.

<sup>10</sup> *China's Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 115<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2018), available at <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states-the-threat-and-potential-policy-responses>.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 8 (statement of John Demers, Assistant Att'y Gen., Department of Justice), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Demers%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 5 (statement of E.W. "Bill" Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-12-18%20Priestap%20Testimony.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Mark Heckler  
President  
Valparaiso University

Dear Dr. Heckler,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. M. Roy Wilson  
President  
Wayne State University

Dear Dr. Wilson,

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Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

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<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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<sup>16</sup> *How many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?*, National Association of Scholars (Dec. 18, 2019) available at [https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how\\_many\\_confucius\\_institutes\\_are\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states](https://www.nas.org/blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states); Mike Ottone & Sunyu Kang, *Confucius Institute Set to Close in Early 2020*, The Review (Oct. 8, 2019), available at <http://udreview.com/confucius-institute-set-to-close-in-early-2020/>; Elizabeth Redden, *Closing Confucius Institutes*, Inside Higher Ed (Jan. 9, 2019), available at <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing>.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Julian Schuster  
President  
Webster University

Dear Dr. Schuster,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

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The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ethan Epstein, *How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms*, Politico (Jan. 17, 2018), available at <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327>.

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KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Vivian Fowler  
President  
Wesleyan College

Dear Dr. Fowler,

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In light of these concerns, I wrote to DOJ in September 2018 asking why it had yet to require officials connected to Confucius Institutes to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>8</sup> That law is critical to identifying agents operating within the United States on behalf of foreign principals, and I recently reintroduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the law, the Foreign Agents Disclosure and Registration Enhancement Act (S.1762).<sup>9</sup> In addition, in December 2018, I convened a hearing as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee regarding China's non-traditional espionage against the United States.<sup>10</sup> In that hearing, DOJ and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our universities and taxpayer-funded research from foreign governments is known and ongoing. For example, the DOJ witness, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers, stated, "we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and conflicted loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The FBI witness, then-Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division Bill Priestap, stated that China's talent recruitment programs are effectively "brain gain programs" that "encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions."<sup>12</sup>

You may also be aware that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 included a provision that addresses Congress' distrust of China's role within Confucius Institutes on American campuses.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, it prohibits federal funds from being spent for Chinese language instruction provided by a Confucius Institute.<sup>14</sup>

Concerns are echoed by academic associations and many institutions that have already discontinued their affiliation with Confucius Institutes. Both the American Association of University Professors and the National Association of Scholars have independently detailed how Confucius Institutes restrict academic freedom and promote an agenda tailored by the Chinese Government for the benefit of the Chinese Communist party.<sup>15</sup> In response to a variety of concerns over affronts to academic freedom, and the direct control of Confucius Institutes by the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 PL 115-232, August 13, 2018, 132 Stat 1636, available at <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Section 1091.

<sup>15</sup> Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, *On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, American Association of University Professors available at <https://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes>; Rachelle Peterson, *Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*, National Association of Scholars (April 2017) at 22, available at <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580866.pdf>

Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Finance

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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. E. Gordon Gee  
President  
West Virginia University

Dear Dr. Gee,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/foreign-threats-to-taxpayer-funded-research-oversight-opportunities-and-policy-solutions>; *China's Impact on the U.S. Education System Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2019), available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chinas-impact-on-the-us-education-system>; Letter from Senator Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 19, 2018), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-presses-doj-fara-and-china-s-activity-us-education-system>; Senator Grassley, *Iowa not immune to foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research*, (June 3, 2019), available at <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/commentary/grassley-op-ed-iowa-not-immune-foreign-threats-taxpayer-funded-research>.

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My staff have received classified and unclassified briefings outlining the threats posed by the Chinese Government generally, and Confucius Institutes specifically. Based upon information gathered from unclassified briefings, we know that Confucius Institutes are an arm of the Chinese Government and are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language International (Hanban), which is part of the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Hanban is composed of members from twelve state ministries including its propaganda outlets.<sup>3</sup> Confucius Institutes are also reportedly funded by the United Front Work Department, a Chinese Government agency that coordinates foreign influence operations.<sup>4</sup> The activities of Confucius Institutes are inherently political in nature and intended to influence U.S. policy and public opinion.

As a government entity, Confucius Institutes are controlled and managed by government officials and act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Government. In 2011, Li Changchun, a member of the Chinese Government, stated:

The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding our culture abroad. It has made an important contribution toward improving our soft power. The ‘Confucius’ brand has a natural attractiveness. Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical.<sup>5</sup>

That same individual also said that Confucius Institutes are an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, a member of China’s propaganda ministry reportedly said:

Coordinate the efforts overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favorable international environment for us...[w]ith regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad...[w]e should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centers and Confucius Institutes.<sup>7</sup>

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JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Edward Montgomery  
President  
Western Michigan University

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Government, over twenty Confucius Institutes within the United States have been expelled from institutions of higher education.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken serious steps toward stealing our intellectual property from taxpayer-funded research projects. We must ensure that our universities and taxpayer-funded research projects remain at the forefront of the global market and free from malicious foreign influence.<sup>17</sup> On June 5, 2019, I convened a Senate hearing titled, “Foreign Threats to Taxpayer-Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions.”<sup>18</sup> This hearing laid out the importance of “properly balancing the robust development and exchange of ideas in the research field with reasonable and proportionate common-sense efforts to protect the integrity of [academic] research.”<sup>19</sup> Such efforts must be a whole-of-government approach and every department and agency must take all necessary and reasonable steps to be proper stewards of the taxpayers’ money. That requires government to protect its research projects from any foreign interference or influence that could result in damage to or theft of American intellectual property. The private sector has the same responsibility.

Your institution’s relationship with Confucius Institutes should be based on a clear understanding of the risks. To that end, meeting with federal law enforcement experts and receiving additional information from the FBI is imperative for a full understanding of the risks to both your institution and our national security. Please inform me when your relevant officials have requested and received an FBI briefing on this critical national security matter. If I have not heard from you by March 31, 2020, I will follow up with you.

Should you have questions, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at 202-224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6200

KOLAN DAVIS, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL  
JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

March 10, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Dr. Reynold Verret  
President  
Xavier University of Louisiana

Dear Dr. Verret,

I write to you today to express my concern about Confucius Institutes within our academic system, including colleges and universities.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Government agencies, including within the Intelligence Community, assert that the Communist Chinese Government uses Confucius Institutes embedded in our academic institutions as a propaganda tool within the United States.<sup>2</sup> Despite these concerns, your institution's website indicates that a Confucius Institute is active on your campus. I am writing to encourage you and key members of your staff to request and schedule a briefing with your local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office and become proactively involved in better understanding the national security threats posed by Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Government to our Nation's academic and research institutions.

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<sup>2</sup> See Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Security Government, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., Rep. on China's Impact on the U.S. Education System (Comm. Print 2019) available at <https://www.portman.senate.gov/sites/default/files/PSI%20Report%20China%27s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf>; Thomas Lum, Cong. Research Serv., IF11180, *Confucius Institutes in the United States: Selected Issues* (2019), available at <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180>; Ethan Epstein, *How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms*, Politico (Jan. 17, 2018), available at <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327>; Eric Shawn, *China trying to infiltrate US colleges to recruit spies, indoctrinate students, intelligence agencies say*, Fox News (Feb. 7, 2019), available at <https://www.foxnews.com/us/china-infiltrating-us-colleges-to-recruit-spies-indoctrinate-students-intelligence-agencies-say>; Rachele Peterson, *American Universities Are Welcoming China's Trojan Horse*, Foreign Policy (May 9, 2017), available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/09/american-universities-are-welcoming-chinas-trojan-horse-confucius-institutes/>.

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