


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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	No. CR 87-422(G)-ER
)	
12 Plaintiff,)	<u>GOVERNMENT'S PROFFER RE:</u>
)	<u>WITNESS GUILLERMO FLORES;</u>
13 v.)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND</u>
)	<u>AUTHORITIES</u>
14 RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, et al.,)	
)	
15 Defendants.)	
)	

16
17 Plaintiff, United States of America, through its counsel of
18 record, hereby files, as requested by the court, a proffer
19 regarding the anticipated testimony of witness Guillermo Flores.
20 This proffer is based upon the attached Memorandum Of Points and
21 Authorities, the files and records in this case, and such other

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1 matter as may properly be considered by the court at the time of
2 the hearing on this motion.

3 DATED: December 9, 1992.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 [REDACTED]
6 United States Attorney

7 [REDACTED]
8 Assistant United States Attorney
9 Chief, Criminal Division

10 [REDACTED]
11 Assistant United States Attorney
12 Chief, Asset Forfeiture Section

13 [REDACTED]
14 Assistant United States Attorney
15 Deputy Chief, Narcotics Section

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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I

3 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

4 On December 3, 1992, the court ordered the government to
5 submit a written proffer of the anticipated testimony of witness
6 Guillermo Flores. Described below is a summary of the witness'
7 anticipated testimony, as well as the government's theories of
8 admissibility for any statements that the defense may endeavor
9 to characterize as hearsay.

10 II

11 SUMMARY OF WITNESS GUILLERMO FLORES

12 Guillermo Flores is 29 years old and a Mexican national. He
13 was member of the Mexican army from 1980 until early 1992.

14 Flores will testify that in approximately October, 1984, he
15 and other soldiers traveled to the state of Jalisco to
16 participate in one week of military olympics. Approximately
17 fourteen squads from all over Mexico participated in the
18 olympics. At the end of the olympics, Flores and other soldiers
19 received orders directing all squads to participate in a
20 marijuana eradication program called "Operation Jaguar." Flores
21 was one of two lieutenants in charge of a squad; he and a second
22 lieutenant reported to Captain Francisco Rodrigo Rodriguez-
23 Galindo. Flores' squad was assigned to eradicate marijuana in
24 the region of Mascota.

25 Flores' squad arrived in Mascota in early November, 1984.
26 Flores' orders were to find and eradicate marijuana fields,
27 arrest and question those involved, and attempt to ascertain the
28

1 ownership of the marijuana fields. Upon arrival in Mascota,
2 Flores and his squad immediately discovered large fields of
3 marijuana. The squad arrested workers in the fields and
4 questioned them regarding ownership of the marijuana fields.
5 The workers stated that the fields belonged to Ruben Zuno-Arce
6 ("Zuno"). One of the individuals arrested and questioned was a
7 local village mayor, who also stated that the land and marijuana
8 fields belonged to Zuno.

9 Thereafter, Captain Rodriguez, Flores and several soldiers
10 went to Zuno's ranch in Mascota to talk to Zuno. Flores advised
11 Captain Rodriguez that Zuno was the brother-in-law of ex-
12 president Luis Echeverria, and that the matter should be handled
13 delicately. Zuno was not present when Flores and Rodriguez
14 arrived, and Rodriguez ordered Flores to continue eradicating
15 marijuana fields.

16 Flores took some soldiers and returned to the area around
17 Mascota, and continued searching for and eradicating marijuana
18 fields. The soldiers and Flores also continued arresting and
19 questioning field workers, who uniformly continued to state that
20 the fields belonged to Zuno. Approximately two days later,
21 Flores returned to the town of Mascota and saw Captain Rodriguez
22 speaking to Zuno. Zuno appeared tense. Afterwards Flores asked
23 Captain Rodriguez why he had not yet arrested Zuno. Rodriguez
24 said that he was awaiting orders, and was continuing to
25 investigate the matter. The next day Flores observed the local
26 village mayor, whom he had previously arrested, walking in
27 Mascota. Flores again asked Captain Rodriguez why he had not

1 arrested Zuno. Rodriguez angrily responded that he had been
2 ordered from higher up that there were to be no problems with
3 Zuno. Rodriguez admonished Flores to just go about his business
4 and he [Flores] also would receive a little gift. Rodriguez
5 then showed Flores an unknown quantity of bills.

6 Later that same day, Flores saw Zuno with Captain Rodriguez
7 at an airplane hangar. Zuno offered to Captain Rodriguez the
8 use of Zuno's plane to see if there were anymore marijuana
9 fields around Mascota. Rodriguez accepted Zuno's offer. This
10 seemed odd to Flores because army personnel generally were only
11 allowed to fly when authorized by Mexico City, and even then
12 only in Mexican military planes. Thereafter, Rodriguez ordered
13 Flores to take some men and continue to look for more marijuana
14 fields.

15 While out eradicating more marijuana fields, the previously
16 arrested field workers told Flores that the military in Mascota
17 was on the traffickers' payroll. While eradicating a large
18 marijuana field, Flores received radio orders from Captain
19 Rodriguez to return immediately to Mascota because everyone was
20 to return to Guadalajara. Flores complained to Rodriguez that
21 he was not yet finished destroying a giant marijuana field, and
22 that if he returned he would not be able to complete his
23 mission. Captain Rodriguez angrily replied that that did not
24 matter and that Flores was to return immediately. Flores left
25 the area with his men and left numerous fields of marijuana
26 behind.

1 1. The Workers Statements Are Admissions

2 The statements of the workers in the marijuana fields to
3 Flores are non-hearsay in that they are admissions of a party-
4 opponent. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) provides in relevant part:
5 "A statement is not hearsay if -- * * * (2) The statement is
6 offered against a party and is * * * (D) a statement by the
7 party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
8 the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
9 relationship"

10 Here, Flores' orders were to find and eradicate marijuana
11 fields, arrest and question those involved, and attempt to
12 ascertain the ownership of the marijuana fields. Flores
13 questioned workers in the fields as part of his official duties.
14 In response to Flores' questions about who owned the marijuana
15 fields, worker after worker responded "Zuno." The workers'
16 statements were corroborated by the village mayor who also
17 stated that Zuno owned the fields.

18 The workers' statements were made during the course of their
19 employment. They were tending to the marijuana fields when
20 Flores arrived; Flores arrested and questioned them there. The
21 workers statements concern a matter within the scope of their
22 employment, i.e., the identity of their employer.

23 "The fact of agency may not be proved by the alleged agent's
24 extrajudicial statements." United States v. Jones 766 F.2d 412,
25 415 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, the agency is established by
26 independent non-hearsay: Flores observed the workers tending to
27 the marijuana fields, cultivating the soil and caring for the

1 plants. The worker's statements implicating defendant Zuno
2 aside, there is no question that the workers were at the fields
3 performing work.

4 Flores' observations and the workers' statements other than
5 those identifying their employer, suffice to establish agency.

6 In United States v. Jones, a victim making a ransom drop in
7 response to defendant's extortion threats was allowed to testify
8 about the statements made by two strangers who approached her
9 and demanded the money. United States v. Jones, supra, 766 F.2d
10 at 415 (9th Cir. 1985). The court found that "[t]his
11 independent non-hearsay evidence strongly suggests that [the two
12 strangers] had been in contact with the extortionist and were
13 performing functions on his behalf, namely, the pick-up of the
14 ransom money." Ibid. The court concluded that this constituted
15 "'substantial' evidence indicating that [the two strangers] were
16 agents of [defendant] and that their statements were made during
17 the existence of their agencies concerning matters within the
18 scope of their agencies." Ibid. The agents' statements were
19 therefore properly admitted as admissions of a party-opponent,
20 notwithstanding that the two strangers could not be located at
21 the time of trial. Ibid.

22 Flores' testimony is no different than that admitted into
23 evidence in Jones. The agency is established by Flores'
24 observations of who was at the marijuana fields, and what he saw
25 them doing. The worker's statements are therefore admissible as
26 admissions of a party-opponent.

1 Indeed, even if the field workers' statements were made
2 without personal knowledge of their accuracy, they are
3 admissible. FDIC v. First Interstate Bank of Des Moines, 885
4 F.2d 423, 435 (8th Cir. 1989) (Employee's statement that another
5 employee was stealing bonds admissible against employer sued for
6 loss regardless of declarant's personal knowledge of accuracy of
7 statement.) "As a general matter, employee statements made
8 against the interest of an employer are representative
9 admissions and are admissible [under] Fed. R. Evid.
10 801(d)(2)(D)." Id.

11 Thus, the workers' statements to Flores are admissible under
12 the general proposition that: "Evidence of statements by an
13 agent introduced in order to show the purpose for which he did
14 an act or to show his knowledge or state of mind is admissible
15 in favor of and against the principal under the rules relating
16 to the introduction of evidence for this purpose. Statements by
17 an agent are not excluded because made by an agent. If his
18 knowledge or condition of mind or purpose is relevant to the
19 cause of action which is being brought, either party may
20 introduce evidence relevant to show this." Garford Trucking
21 Corp v. Mann 163 F.2d 71, 71 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 68
22 S.Ct 112, 332 U.S. 810 (1947), citing Restatement of Agency
23 §289, comment c.

24 Here, the workers' knowledge, condition of mind and purpose
25 in tending to the marijuana fields are relevant in that they
26 evidence defendant Zuno's involvement in the drug cartel. The
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1 workers' statements reinforce other evidence that defendant Zuno
2 was a member of the cartel.

3 2. The Workers' and Village Mayor's Statements Were
4 Made Against Their Penal Interest And Are
5 Therefore Admissible

6 The marijuana field workers' and village mayor's statements
7 to Flores were made at the time of their respective arrests.
8 The statements were against penal interests in that they showed
9 knowledge of involvement in illegal activities. The statements
10 are therefore admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b), which
11 provides in relevant part: "The following are not excluded by
12 the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
13 * * * (3) **Statement against interest.** A statement which was at
14 the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
15 pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
16 the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a
17 reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
18 made the statement unless believing it to be true."

19 The workers and village mayor are unavailable as required by
20 Fed. R. Evid 804(a)(5). They are absent from the trial, and the
21 government has been unable to procure their attendance or
22 testimony by process or other reasonable means. In United
23 States v. Winn, 767 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1985), the court held
24 that the government established unavailability of two Mexican
25 foreign nationals who were released after interrogation, because
26 the government had no reasonable means of locating the foreign
27 nationals who had been returned to Mexico by the INS. Id. at

1 530. Indeed, the court held that because "the government had no
2 addresses or any other information that would help locate [the
3 witnesses] . . . it was reasonable for the government to make no
4 effort to find the two aliens." Ibid, (emphasis added).

5 The Winn court held that the foreign nationals' statements
6 were admissible, and did not violate the confrontation clause
7 because the individuals were unavailable, and because the
8 statements were not unreliable. Ibid. The court considered
9 four factors to determine whether a statement is unreliable: "1)
10 the statement contains an assertion of past fact; 2) the
11 declarant did not have personal knowledge of the facts asserted;
12 3) there is a possibility of faulty recollection, and 4) the
13 circumstances suggest that the declarant misrepresented
14 defendant's role." Ibid, citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
15 88-89; 91 S.Ct. 210, 219-220 (1970).

16 Here, the government has no way to identify the marijuana
17 field workers or the village mayor. They are therefore
18 unavailable. Neither are their statements unreliable when
19 judged by the above four-part test. None of the witnesses made
20 statements about past facts. The workers who tended to the
21 marijuana fields certainly knew for whom they were working, and
22 it is unlikely that the small village mayor would not also know
23 this information. Finally, there are no circumstances
24 suggesting that worker after worker misrepresented defendant's
25 role. They had no motive to do so, neither did the village
26 mayor.

1 The declarant' statements to Flores were thus made under
2 circumstances that guarantee their trustworthiness. The
3 individuals were facing arrest by Mexican military personnel;
4 they were interrogated as to their knowledge about the marijuana
5 fields, and the extent of their own involvement in the fields.
6 The workers knew who owned fields. Over and over the workers
7 gave the same name to Flores: defendant Zuno. The village
8 mayor also pointed to defendant Zuno as the owner of the
9 marijuana fields. It stretches credibility to believe that
10 everyone could have been wrong, and yet everyone pointed to the
11 same person: defendant Zuno. These circumstances guarantee the
12 trustworthiness of the statements. Flores should therefore be
13 allowed to testify about what the workers told him at the time
14 of their interrogation and arrest.

15 3. The Statements Are Not Offered For The Truth Of
16 The Matter Asserted

17 The marijuana field workers' and village mayor's statements
18 are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of
19 the matter asserted. Whether defendant Zuno owned these
20 particular marijuana fields is irrelevant. The fact that the
21 workers connected defendant Zuno to owning vast marijuana fields
22 is the important point.

23 The workers' and village mayor's statements have independent
24 probative value to prove defendant Zuno's involvement in drug
25 trafficking, regardless of whether defendant Zuno in fact owned
26 these particular marijuana fields. That individuals repeatedly
27 implicated defendant Zuno in the context of owning marijuana

1 fields has independent relevance, making the statements
2 admissible. United States v. Candoli, 496 F.2d 496, 508
3 ("Because [unavailable witness'] statement was not admitted for
4 the truth of the matter asserted, it was not hearsay. It was
5 properly admitted by the district court if it was relevant.")
6 These statements reinforce other evidence that defendant Zuno
7 was a member of the drug cartel that blamed DEA for forcing the
8 Mexican military to destroy the traffickers' marijuana fields.
9 The drug cartel retaliated against DEA by kidnapping and
10 murdering Agent Camarena. Relevance is therefore established.
11 Furthermore, because the statements are not admitted for the
12 truth of the matter asserted, there is no confrontation clause
13 problem. United States v. Kirk, 844 F.2d 660, 663 (9th Cir.
14 1988) ("Because the statements were not offered for the truth of
15 the matter asserted, no confrontation clause violation
16 occurred."); United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 1000 (9th
17 Cir. 1989) (credit reports not hearsay because not introduced
18 for truth of their contents, and there was therefore no
19 violation of confrontation rights).
20 Moreover, regardless of the truth of the field worker's and
21 village mayor's statements, the Mexican army had independent
22 information connecting defendant Zuno to the marijuana fields.
23 To stay in line with their mission, the army should have
24 arrested defendant Zuno for his involvement in the marijuana
25 fields. They did not. Instead, the army captain in charge of
26 the mission reacted angrily when Flores pursued the issue, and
27 later the captain told Flores that he, too, would be generously

1 compensated for 'going along.' Ultimately, the Mexican army
2 shirked its mission by pulling out of Mascota, rather than
3 arresting defendant Zuno and destroying the marijuana fields.

4 The deliberate inaction of the Mexican army, the reaction of
5 the army captain to Flores' insistence that they destroy all of
6 the marijuana fields, and Flores' observations of defendant Zuno
7 with the captain all show that defendant Zuno exercised powerful
8 influence to protect the marijuana fields. These facts evidence
9 that defendant Zuno was a leader in the drug cartel who
10 exercised influence at the highest levels to protect his vast
11 marijuana fields.

12 In light of this independent evidence, the workers' and
13 village mayor's statements should be admitted as non-hearsay,
14 because they are not offered for the truth of the matter
15 asserted. The statements are relevant regardless of truth, in
16 that they are part of the web of evidence tying defendant Zuno
17 to drug trafficking and the drug cartel.

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1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should allow Flores to
2 testify as to the statements made by the marijuana field workers
3 and the village mayor.

4 DATED: December 9, 1992.

5 Respectfully submitted

6 [REDACTED]
United States Attorney

7 [REDACTED]
8 Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]
12 Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Narcotics Section

13 Attorney for Plaintiff
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, , declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by hand described in this Certificate was made; that on December 9, 1992, I hand delivered, in the above-entitled action, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S PROFFER RE: WITNESS GUILLERMO FLORES:
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

addressed to SEE ATTACHED LIST

This Certificate is executed on December 9, 1992 at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.



SERVICE LIST
CR 87-422 (G) -ER

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2 **Attorneys for Defendant Ruben Zuno-Arce:**

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Attorneys for Defendant Humbert Alvarez-Machain:

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1 Q. WERE ANY OTHER SOURCES RELIED UPON FOR YOU TO COME TO THE
2 CONCLUSION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED AS A MAJOR TRAFFICKER?

3 A. YES.

4 Q. WHAT OTHER SERVICES WERE THOSE?

5 A. THE MEXICAN FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE.

6 Q. AS FAR AS YOU'RE CONCERNED THE MEXICAN FEDERAL JUDICIAL
7 POLICE WERE LIKE A SIEVE; ISN'T THAT RIGHT?

8 ANYTHING THAT THEY KNEW, THE TRAFFICKERS KNEW?

9 A. IT HAPPENED SOMETIMES.

10 Q. AND THE MEXICAN ARMY WAS LIKE THAT ALSO; WAS IT NOT?

11 A. IT HAPPENED SOMETIMES.

12 Q. THERE WAS AN INCIDENT ONCE WHERE YOU GAVE THE MEXICAN ARMY
13 INFORMATION ABOUT A MARIJUANA FIELD AND THEY REPORTED BACK TO
14 YOU THAT THEY HAD TAKEN DOWN AND BURNED THE FIELD, BUT IT
15 TURNED OUT THEY HARVESTED THE MARIJUANA INSTEAD; ISN'T THAT
16 CORRECT?

17 A. THAT IS RIGHT.

18 MR. [REDACTED]: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER.

19 THE COURT: ANY OTHER RECROSS-EXAMINATION?

20 MR. [REDACTED]: YES. THANK YOU.

21

22 RECROSS-EXAMINATION +

23 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

24 Q. I HAVE A FEW LIMITED AREA QUESTIONS, SOME OF WHICH WAS
25 RAISED IN CO-COUNSEL'S CROSS-EXAMINATION IF I COULD JUST BE

1 A (COMPLIES.)

2 Q THANK YOU. NOW, DURING THE PERIOD THAT YOU WERE ASSIGNED
3 TO THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE, YOU WERE IN CHARGE OF THAT OFFICE?

4 A YES, SIR; I WAS.

5 Q WHAT WAS YOUR TITLE, ACTUALLY?

6 A THE RESIDENT AGENT IN CHARGE.

7 Q AND DURING THAT PERIOD, WHAT WAS THE STAFFING AT THAT
8 OFFICE? WHO REPORTED TO YOU?

9 THE COURT: THAT'S TWO QUESTIONS.

10 MR. [REDACTED]: YES. LET ME REPHRASE THAT.

11 Q WHO REPORTED TO YOU DURING YOUR PERIOD IN THE GUADALAJARA
12 OFFICE? I'M NOT REFERRING TO NAMES, BUT THE POSITIONS.

13 A THE SECRETARIES AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS THAT WERE
14 ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE.

15 Q AND ARE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS ALSO REFERRED TO AS AGENTS?

16 A YES, SIR.

17 Q TO WHOM DID YOU REPORT AS THE HEAD OF THAT OFFICE?

18 A I REPORTED TO THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, IN MEXICO CITY,
19 THROUGH HIS ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE.

20 Q NOW, DURING THE PERIOD THAT YOU WERE THE RESIDENT AGENT IN
21 CHARGE OF THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE, HOW MANY AGENTS WERE ASSIGNED
22 TO THAT OFFICE?

23 A THERE WERE AS MANY AS SIX AND AS FEW AS THREE.

24 Q HOW MANY WERE THERE IN FEBRUARY OF 1985, THE FIRST WEEK OF
25 FEBRUARY 1985?

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6
1 A THERE WERE FOUR AGENTS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE
2 AND ONE PERSON THERE ON A 60-DAY TEMPORARY DETAIL.

3 Q WHO WERE THE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THAT OFFICE AT THAT TIME?

4 A MYSELF, SPECIAL AGENT ENRIQUE CAMARENA, SPECIAL AGENT
5 VICTOR WALLACE, SPECIAL AGENT ALLEN BACHELIER, AND THE
6 TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED AGENT WAS FIDEL SANCHEZ.

7 Q CAN YOU DESCRIBE GENERALLY WHAT THE AGENTS' DUTIES IN THAT
8 OFFICE WERE?

9 A WELL, AN AGENT WAS TASKED WITH RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FROM
10 OTHER D.E.A. OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, THROUGHOUT
11 THE WORLD; HE WAS RESPONSIBLE TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS ON
12 CASES THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM, WHATEVER THAT MIGHT
13 NECESSITATE; AND HE WAS TASKED WITH DEVELOPING AND CONTROLLING
14 INFORMANTS.

15 Q NOW, WHEN YOU REFER TO "INFORMANTS," IS THAT THE SAME --
16 DOES THAT TERM HAVE THE SAME MEANING IN YOUR MIND AS THE TERM
17 "CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT"?

18 A YES, IT DOES.

19 Q DO YOU KNOW WHEN AGENT CAMARENA WAS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE?

20 A I BELIEVE HE ARRIVED THE SUMMER OF 1980.

21 Q DID HE REPORT DIRECTLY TO YOU DURING THE PERIOD THAT YOU
22 WERE THE RESIDENT AGENT IN CHARGE THERE?

23 A YES, HE DID.

24 Q DO YOU KNOW WHETHER HE WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THAT OFFICE
25 AT SOME POINT?

1 Q. WHICH, AS I RECALL, YESTERDAY YOU TOLD US WAS ROUGHLY THE
2 EQUIVALENT OF THE D.E.A. IN MEXICO; IS THAT RIGHT?

3 A. YES, IT IS.

4 Q. NOW, YOU TOLD US THAT THERE WERE LIMITATIONS ON THE
5 D.E.A.'S ROLE, RIGHT?

6 A. YES.

7 Q. WOULD YOU REPEAT SOME OF THOSE LIMITATIONS AGAIN?

8 A. WE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARRESTS, TO CONDUCT SEARCHES
9 OR TO MAKE SEIZURES.

10 Q. OKAY. YOU WEREN'T PERMITTED TO CARRY WEAPONS EITHER, WERE
11 YOU?

12 A. NO.

13 Q. YOU WEREN'T PERMITTED TO ACT INDEPENDENT OF MEXICAN LAW
14 ENFORCEMENT EITHER; WERE YOU?

15 A. WE COULD TAKE NO UNILATERAL ACTION, THAT IS CORRECT.

16 Q. IN OTHER WORDS, BASICALLY EVERYTHING THAT YOU, MEANING THE
17 D.E.A., DID IN MEXICO WAS SUPPOSED TO BE COORDINATED WITH THE
18 M.F.J.P., RIGHT?

19 A. YES.

20 Q. NOW, D.E.A. DID CONDUCT SEARCHES IN MEXICO; DID IT NOT?

21 A. NOT UNILATERALLY.

22 Q. EVERY TIME THERE WAS A SEARCH BY D.E.A., YOU'RE SAYING IT
23 WAS DONE WITH M.F.J.P. APPROVAL?

24 A. AS FAR AS I KNOW.

25 Q. YOU CARRIED WEAPONS; DID YOU NOT?

1 Q. WERE THERE TIMES WHEN YOU ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE HIGHER
2 D.E.A. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE AMOUNTS OF MARIJUANA
3 THAT WERE BEING GROWN WERE SO BIG THAT THEY HAD TO DO SOMETHING
4 ABOUT IT, BUT THAT YOU WERE BASICALLY PUT DOWN AND THEY SAID
5 "CONCENTRATE ON MAKING ARRESTS OR HELPING TO MAKE ARRESTS FOR
6 STATISTICS"?

7 A. WELL, I WAS CONSTANTLY ATTEMPTING TO CONVINCE WASHINGTON,
8 D.C. OR MY SUPERIORS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS BIGGER THAN THEY
9 BELIEVED IT WAS.

10 Q. AND YOU HAD TROUBLE CONVINCING THEM TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT
11 IT; DIDN'T YOU?

12 A. YES.

13 Q. IN FACT, YOU HAD TO TAKE A PICTURE TO WASHINGTON
14 SHOWING -- IN 1983, YOU SHOWED THEM, TOOK A PICTURE TO
15 WASHINGTON TO SHOW AGENT CAMARENA IN A HUGE MARIJUANA FIELD TO
16 CONVINCE THEM THAT IT REALLY EXISTED; DIDN'T YOU DO THAT?

17 A. IT WAS 1983 AND '82, AND IT REALLY WAS JUST PICTURES OF
18 THE FIELDS. I DON'T RECALL THAT AGENT CAMARENA WAS STANDING IN
19 THE PICTURE, BUT YES.

20 Q. AND AND YOU TOLD US YESTERDAY, I BELIEVE, THAT MR. IBARRA
21 HERRERA, WHO WAS THE M.F.J.P. HEAD, KNEW AND WAS INVOLVED IN
22 PLANNING FOR THE ZACATECAS RAID; IS THAT CORRECT?

23 A. HE WAS THE HEAD.

24 Q. HE WAS THE HEAD.

25 A. AND HE WAS INVOLVED IN PLANNING, YES.

1-18

1 HAVE COME TO THE POINT IN THE TRIAL NOW WHERE COUNSEL WILL BE
2 GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT TO THE JURY.

3 I WANT TO CAUTION YOU FIRST THAT WHAT COUNSEL SAYS
4 DURING THE OPENING STATEMENT IS NOT EVIDENCE THAT YOU MAY
5 CONSIDER FOR THE PURPOSE OF REACHING A VERDICT. THE PURPOSE OF
6 THE OPENING STATEMENT IS TO ALLOW COUNSEL TO GIVE THE JURY AN
7 OVERVIEW OF THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE THAT WILL BE PRESENTED DURING
8 THE TRIAL, WHAT THEY'LL TRY TO PROVE DURING THE TRIAL.

9 IT IS NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, EVIDENCE; IT IS TO HELP
10 YOU FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE THAT WILL BE PRESENTED DURING THE
11 TRIAL, BECAUSE SOMETIMES EVIDENCE IS BROUGHT IN OUT OF
12 SEQUENCE. SO IT'S KIND OF AN OVERVIEW OF WHERE THE CASE WILL
13 BE GOING.

14 COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY
15 TO PRESENT HIS OPENING STATEMENT. MR. [REDACTED], ARE YOU
16 PRESENTING THE OPENING STATEMENT?

17 MR. [REDACTED]: YES, I AM, YOUR HONOR.

18 THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED.

19

20 OPENING STATEMENT + ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT

21

22 MR. [REDACTED]: GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. AS
23 THE JUDGE HAS NOTED, MY NAME IS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND I AM ONE OF
24 TWO ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS WHO WILL BE PRESENTING
25 THIS CASE TO YOU, AND I SHARE THAT RESPONSIBILITY WITH [REDACTED]

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1 ██████. MR. ██████ IS SITTING DOWN HERE IN THE RED TIE WITH
2 THE DARK BEARD.

3 YOU WILL NOTICE DURING THE PRESENTATION OF THE CASE
4 THAT THERE ARE ONE OR TWO OTHER PEOPLE SITTING AT THE COUNSEL
5 TABLE HERE WITH US. ONE OF THOSE PEOPLE IS HECTOR BERRELLEZ
6 AND THE OTHER IS DOUGLAS KUEHL. MR. KUEHL IS SITTING THERE
7 WITH THE GRAY HAIR AND NAVY BLUE COAT.

8 MR. KUEHL AND MR. BERRELLEZ ARE BOTH SPECIAL AGENTS
9 WITH THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, AND THEY'LL BE
10 ASSISTING IN THE PRESENTATION OF THIS CASE.

11 NOW, THIS CASE IS ABOUT TWO INNOCENT PEOPLE, TWO
12 TOURISTS, WHO WERE BRUTALLY BEATEN AND MURDERED IN GUADALAJARA,
13 MEXICO BECAUSE THEY WERE MISTAKEN FOR D.E.A. AGENTS. IT ALSO
14 ABOUT A D.E.A. AGENT AND A MEXICAN CITIZEN WHO WAS COOPERATING
15 WITH HIM WHO WERE KIDNAPPED, TORTURED AND MURDERED IN
16 GUADALAJARA BECAUSE THEY DID THEIR WORK TOO WELL.

17 NOW, LET ME INTRODUCE YOU TO THESE PEOPLE AND TELL
18 YOU WHAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WILL
19 PROVE.

20 THIS IS JOHN WALKER. AT THE END OF JANUARY 1985,
21 JOHN WALKER WAS 36 YEARS OLD. HE WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, A
22 VIETNAM VETERAN. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHILE SERVING IN VIETNAM
23 IN 1969, HE STEPPED ON A LAND MINE WHICH SHATTERED HIS LEGS AND
24 LEFT HIM DISABLED. HE RECEIVED TWO PURPLE HEARTS FOR THAT.

25 IN THE EARLY PART OF 1984, JOHN WALKER AND HIS WIFE

1-20

1 EVE AND THEIR DAUGHTERS MOVED FROM MINNESOTA TO GUADALAJARA,
2 MEXICO SO THAT JOHN COULD WRITE A BOOK THAT HE INTENDED TO
3 WRITE.

4 NOW, LATER ON IN THE YEAR MRS. WALKER AND HER
5 DAUGHTERS MOVED BACK TO MINNESOTA BECAUSE THEY WERE WEREN'T
6 SATISFIED WITH THE GUADALAJARA SCHOOLS, BUT JOHN REMAINED IN
7 GUADALAJARA UNTIL HE COMPLETED HIS WORK. HIS TOURIST VISA WAS
8 DUE TO EXPIRE ON FEBRUARY 15, 1985, BUT JOHN WALKER NEVER
9 RETURNED TO THE U.S. ALIVE.

10 THIS IS ALBERTO RADELAT. IN JANUARY OF 1985, ALBERTO
11 RADELAT WAS 32 YEARS OLD. HE WAS A NATIVE OF CUBA. HIS FAMILY
12 HAD FLED FROM CUBA WHEN CASTRO CAME TO POWER. DR. PHILLIPE
13 RADELAT, HIS FATHER, WAS A DOCTOR. AND HIS FAMILY MOVED TO
14 TEXAS IN 1961, WHERE DR. RADELAT OPENED A PRACTICE AND ALBERTO
15 WAS RAISED THERE.

16 IN JANUARY 1985, HE WAS IN GUADALAJARA AS WELL,
17 VISITING HIS FRIEND JOHN WALKER WHO WAS ON VACATION THERE. ON
18 JANUARY 29TH OF 1985, ALBERTO RADELAT CALLED HIS FATHER
19 PHILLIPE AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PHILLIPE TO PICK HIM UP AT
20 THE FORT WORTH AIRPORT ON FEBRUARY 1ST.

21 NOW, DR. RADELAT WAS AT THE FORT WORTH AIRPORT ON
22 FEBRUARY 1ST, BUT ALBERTO RADELAT NEVER ARRIVED. HIS FAMILY
23 AND FRIENDS NEVER AGAIN SAW HIM ALIVE. JOHN WALKER AND ALBERTO
24 RADELAT WERE LAST SEEN ALIVE IN GUADALAJARA, MEXICO ON JANUARY
25 30, 1985. THEIR BODIES WERE IDENTIFIED IN GUADALAJARA NEARLY

1-21

1 FIVE MONTHS LATER, IN JUNE OF THAT YEAR.

2 THIS IS ENRIQUE CAMARENA SALAZAR. IN FEBRUARY OF
3 1985, MR. SALAZAR WAS 37 YEARS OLD, HE HAD BEEN A D.E.A. AGENT
4 FOR OVER TEN YEARS BY THAT TIME. HE WAS RAISED IN THE AREA
5 AROUND CALEXICO, CALIFORNIA AND SPENT SOME TIME IN THE IMPERIAL
6 COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND JOINED THE D.E.A. IN 1974.

7 HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE OF D.E.A.
8 IN 1980 AND LIVED THERE WITH HIS WIFE AND SONS. IN FEBRUARY OF
9 1985, AGENT CAMARENA WAS IN THE PROCESS OF CLEARING HIS
10 CASELOAD BECAUSE HE WAS DUE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SAN DIEGO
11 OFFICE OF THE D.E.A. AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH, JUST A FEW
12 WEEKS LATER.

13 ON FEBRUARY 7 OF 1985, AGENT CAMARENA MADE
14 ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET HIS WIFE, MIKA, FOR LUNCH AT A GUADALAJARA
15 RESTAURANT. HE NEVER MADE THAT APPOINTMENT.

16 THIS IS ALFREDO ZAVALA, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN ZAVALA.
17 NOW, IN FEBRUARY OF 1985, CAPTAIN ZAVALA, WHO WAS A MEXICAN
18 CITIZEN LIVING IN GUADALAJARA, WAS 57 YEARS OLD.

19 HE WORKED FOR A MEXICAN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY KNOWN AS
20 THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES, AND WORKED
21 AS A PILOT. IN THE COURSE OF THAT WORK, HE FLEW OVER VARIOUS
22 PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. AND FOR YEARS HE HAD BEEN PROVIDING
23 INFORMATION TO THE D.E.A., WHICH HE GATHERED IN THE COURSE OF
24 HIS FLIGHTS, AND HE WORKED PARTICULARLY CLOSELY WITH KIKI
25 CAMARENA.

1-22

1 ON FEBRUARY 6 OF 1985, CAPTAIN ZAVALA FLEW TO THE
2 NEIGHBORING STATE OF DURANGO IN MEXICO ON BUSINESS RELATED TO
3 HIS JOB WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES.
4 HIS FAMILY EXPECTED HIM TO RETURN ON FEBRUARY 7TH, BUT HE NEVER
5 DID RETURN. THEY NEVER GAIN SAW HIM ALIVE. 2

6 ABOUT A MONTH LATER, ON MARCH 5TH 1985, THE TORTURED
7 BODIES OF KIKI CAMARENA AND ALFREDO ZAVALA WERE FOUND NEAR A
8 SMALL TOWN ABOUT 60 MILES FROM GUADALAJARA.

9 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT ALL
10 FOUR OF THESE MEN, JOHN WALKER, ALBERTO RADELAT, KIKI CAMARENA
11 AND ALFREDO ZAVALA WERE MURDERED, AND THEY WERE MURDERED FOR
12 THE SAME REASON. I'M GOING TO TELL YOU WHAT THAT REASON IS AND
13 SUMMARIZE FOR YOU WHAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE EVIDENCE WILL
14 SHOW.

15 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1980'S UNTIL THE PERIOD
16 THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE, THERE EXISTED IN GUADALAJARA,
17 MEXICO, BASED IN GUADALAJARA, MEXICO, A HUGE INTERNATIONAL
18 NARCOTIC ENTERPRISE.

19 NOW THIS NARCOTIC ENTERPRISE, WHICH IS IDENTIFIED IN
20 THE INDICTMENT AS THE GUADALAJARA NARCOTICS CARTEL, WAS
21 IMMENSE. IT CULTIVATED AND DISTRIBUTED MARIJUANA ON HUGE
22 DESERT PLANTATIONS, EMPLOYING THOUSANDS OF WORKERS IN THAT
23 PROCESS. IT IMPORTED AND DISTRIBUTED IN THE UNITED STATES
24 THOUSANDS OF POUNDS OF COCAINE, AND IMPORTED AND DISTRIBUTED
25 HEROIN, AS WELL.

1-23

1 DURING 1984 AND THE FIRST PART OF 1985, THIS CARTEL,
2 AS A RESULT OF INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED BY THE D.E.A. AND AS A
3 RESULT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS HERE IN THE UNITED STATES,
4 SUFFERED A SERIES OF DEVASTATING LOSSES AMOUNTING TO LITERALLY
5 BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, THOUSANDS OF TONS OF MARIJUANA, THOUSANDS
6 OF POUNDS OF COCAINE, AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF CASH, WHICH
7 WERE SEIZED.

8 THE CARTEL BLAMED THE D.E.A. FOR THESE LOSSES; AND IN
9 PARTICULAR, THEY BLAMED THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE OF THE D.E.A.,
10 AND EVENTUALLY, ONE PARTICULAR AGENT, KIKI CAMARENA.

11 IN THE FALL OF 1984, THE CARTEL LASHED OUT IN A
12 SERIES OF ACTIONS INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE THE D.E.A. AND PEOPLE
13 COOPERATING WITH IT, TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE D.E.A. AND PEOPLE
14 COOPERATING WITH IT, AND TO FIND OUT WHAT SOURCES OF
15 INFORMATION THE D.E.A. HAD ABOUT THE CARTEL AND ITS ACTIVITIES.

16 YOU WILL HEAR THAT IN SEPTEMBER OF 1984 A
17 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT - THAT IS A PRIVATE CITIZEN WORKING WITH
18 THE D.E.A. - IN MEXICO, AND IN THIS CASE, A CONFIDENTIAL
19 INFORMANT WHO WAS WORKING WITH KIKI CAMARENA, WAS GUNNED DOWN
20 IN A RESTAURANT IN GUADALAJARA.

21 JUST A FEW WEEKS LATER AN AUTOMOBILE - AN AUTOMOBILE
22 BELONGING TO A D.E.A. AGENT IN THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE, WAS
23 MACHINE GUNNED IN FRONT OF HIS GUADALAJARA HOME.

24 ON JANUARY 30TH 1985, A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BEING
25 HOSTED IN A GUADALAJARA RESTAURANT KNOWN AS LA LANGOSTA. INTO

1-24

1 THAT PRIVATE PARTY, WHICH WAS BEING HOSTED FOR RING LEADERS OF
2 THIS CARTEL, INCLUDING TWO INDIVIDUALS I'LL TALK A BIT MORE
3 ABOUT IN A FEW MINUTES, RAFAEL CARO QUINTERO AND ERNESTO
4 FONSECA.

5 INTO THAT PRIVATE PARTY WALKED JOHN WALKER AND
6 ALBERTO RADELAT. MISTAKENLY. AND THEY WERE MISTAKEN BY THE
7 TRAFFICKERS IN THE RESTAURANT AS D.E.A. AGENTS AND WERE
8 SAVAGELY BEATEN AND KILLED.

9 ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS COURTROOM, DEFENDANT
10 JAVIER VASQUEZ VELASCO -- I DON'T BELIEVE YOU CAN SEE HIM, BUT
11 HE SITS DIRECTLY BEHIND THE PODIUM -- BEAT AND KILLED JOHN
12 WALKER AND ALBERTO RADELAT, ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER
13 PEOPLE.

14 ON FEBRUARY 7 OF 1985, ABOUT A WEEK AFTER WALKER AND
15 RADELAT WERE KILLED, KIKI CAMARENA AND ALFREDO SAVALA WERE
16 KIDNAPPED, THEY WERE TORTURED, AND BETWEEN FEBRUARY 7TH AND
17 FEBRUARY 9TH OF 1985 THEY WERE MURDERED.

18 NOW, THE PLANNING OF THE KIDNAPPING OF AGENT CAMARENA
19 HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR MONTHS. AND TWO OF THE PEOPLE WHO
20 PARTICIPATED IN THAT PLANNING ARE IN THE COURTROOM TODAY. ONE
21 OF THEM SITS HERE IN THE DARK SUIT WITH THE MAROON TIE. THAT
22 IS DEFENDANT JUAN RAMON MATTA BALLESTEROS.

23 THE OTHER DEFENDANT WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE PLANNING
24 OF THIS KIDNAPPING SITS AT THE BACK TABLE IN THE LIGHT BLUE
25 COAT. HIS NAME IS RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE.

1 NOW, THERE IS ONE MORE DEFENDANT IN COURT HERE TODAY
2 AND AGAIN, I DON'T BELIEVE ALL OF YOU CAN SEE HIM, BUT HE SITS
3 THERE IN THE LIGHT-COLORED SHIRT AT THE BACK TABLE. HIS NAME
4 IS JUAN JOSE BERNABE RAMIREZ.

5 DEFENDANT BERNABE, AS I'LL REFER TO HIM, WAS ONE OF
6 THE BODYGUARDS, ONE OF THE PEOPLE AT THE HOUSE WHO PARTICIPATED
7 IN CONFINING KIKI CAMARENA WHILE HE WAS BEING BEATEN AND
8 INTERROGATED. AND DEFENDANT BERNABE ALSO ASSISTED ONE OF THE
9 RING LEADERS OF THE CARTEL, CARO QUINTERO, TWO DAYS LATER IN
10 FLEEING FROM GUADALAJARA, FROM THE GUADALAJARA AIRPORT.

11 LET ME TELL YOU NOW ABOUT - A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE
12 RING LEADERS OF THIS CARTEL. THESE ARE BY NO MEANS EVERYONE
13 WHO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARTEL. FOR INSTANCE, EVERY ONE OF
14 THESE DEFENDANTS WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARTEL IN ONE WAY OR
15 ANOTHER. AND I'LL GET TO THAT LATER, BUT THE NAMES I'M GOING
16 TO MENTION TO YOU NOW ARE SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PEOPLE
17 ASSOCIATED WITH THE CARTEL, AND THEY'RE NAMES THAT WILL COME UP
18 OVER AND OVER AGAIN THROUGHOUT THIS CASE, AND IT WILL PAY TO
19 BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THEM.

20 FIRST, RAFAEL CARO QUINTERO, WHO I WILL REFER TO AS
21 CARO. IN THE BEGINNING OF 1985, CARO WAS IN HIS LATE TWENTIES.
22 HE WAS A MAN WITH A TEMPER AND A TASTE FOR FLASHY JEWELRY, AS
23 YOU WILL HEAR. HE WAS GIVEN TO BEING ACCOMPANIED WHEREVER HE
24 WENT BY A LARGE ENTOURAGE OF BODY GUARDS.

25 YOU'LL HEAR THAT MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THE BODYGUARDS

1 WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON HIS TRAVELS WERE AGENTS OF VARIOUS
2 MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

3 ERNESTO FONSECA CARRILLO, WHO I'LL REFER TO AS
4 FONSECA. FONSECA WAS AN OLDER MAN. ACTUALLY, HE WAS CARO'S
5 MENTOR IN THE DRUG BUSINESS. AND LIKE CARO, HE WAS ACCOMPANIED
6 MOST EVERYWHERE HE WENT BY AN ENTOURAGE OF BODYGUARDS; AGAIN,
7 MANY OF WHOM WERE AGENTS IN VARIOUS MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
8 AGENCIES.

9 AS YOU WILL HEAR, FONSECA OWNED A NUMBER OF HOUSES IN
10 THE GUADALAJARA AREA AND HE TENDED TO MOVE FROM ONE TO THE
11 OTHER.

12 MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX GALLARDO, WHO I WILL REFER TO AS
13 FELIX. HE WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM CARO AND FONSECA IN THAT
14 HE WAS A MAN NOT QUITE AS FLASHY AS CARO, OR WELL CONNECTED.
15 HE OWNED A SERIES OR A NUMBER OF HOTELS IN GUADALAJARA,
16 INCLUDING THE LAS AMERICAS HOTEL.

17 JAVIER BARBA HERNANDEZ, WHO I WILL REFER TO AS BARBA.
18 BARBA WAS A FORMER STUDENT LEADER, A MEXICAN STUDENT LEADER WHO
19 BECAME A LAWYER, AND EVENTUALLY THE RIGHTHAND MAN, ESSENTIALLY,
20 OF ERNESTO FONSECA AND A POWERFUL FORCE IN THE CARTEL.

21 NOW THIS CARTEL, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WAS A MANY
22 HEADED ENTERPRISE. SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THIS
23 CARTEL WERE PRIMARILY MARIJUANA TRAFFICKERS, SOME OF THEM WERE
24 PRIMARILY COCAINE TRAFFICKERS, BUT THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THEY
25 ALL WORKED TOGETHER.

1-27

1 THEY SOCIALIZED TOGETHER, THEY MADE BUSINESS
2 DECISIONS TOGETHER, THEY WORKED - THEY WORKED IN CONCERT AND
3 NOT IN COMPETITION FOR ONE OVERRIDING PURPOSE, AND THAT WAS TO
4 MAKE VAST AMOUNTS OF MONEY TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS.

5 AND DURING 1984 AND EARLY 1985, AS A RESULT OF THE
6 EFFORTS OF THE D.E.A. AND OTHER AGENCIES, SERIOUS INTERFERENCE
7 IN THIS PURPOSE WAS HAD.

8 LET ME TALK NOW ABOUT A FEW OF THE SIGNIFICANT
9 ACTIONS DURING THIS PERIOD THAT RESULTED IN ENORMOUS LOSSES TO
10 THE CARTEL. FIRST OF ALL, YOU'LL HEAR ABOUT AN INVESTIGATION
11 THAT BEGAN IN SEPTEMBER OF 1983, AN INVESTIGATION BY AGENT
12 CAMARENA HIMSELF. AND THIS INVESTIGATION INITIALLY BEGAN AS AN
13 ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE SOME HEROIN FROM AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED MANUEL
14 CHAVEZ.

15 AND WORKING WITH AGENT CAMARENA ON THIS INVESTIGATION
16 WAS ANOTHER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT
17 WHO AT AGENT CAMARENA'S INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL HEAR ACTUALLY
18 BECAME THE RIGHTHAND MAN OF THIS MANUEL CHAVEZ.

19 CHAVEZ, AS IT TURNED OUT, WAS THE SUPERVISOR OF 30 TO
20 40 MARIJUANA PLANTATIONS THAT WERE OPERATED IN THE MEXICAN
21 STATE OF ZACATECAS BY THE CARTEL AND, IN PARTICULAR, BY CARO
22 AND FONSECA.

23 THE SCOPE OF THESE MARIJUANA GROWING OPERATIONS WAS
24 HUGE. ZACATECAS, YOU WILL HEAR, IS A DRY DESERT CLIMATE.
25 THESE PLANTATIONS WERE ALL -- ALL OF THEM IRRIGATED FROM DEEP

1 WELLS. MACHINERY, HUGE MACHINERY OR AGRICULTURE MACHINERY WAS
2 USED TO CULTIVATE THE FIELDS. THOUSANDS OF WORKERS WERE TO BE
3 EMPLOYED AT THESE FIELDS.

4 AND YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT IN
5 ORDER TO PROTECT ITS INVESTMENT IN THESE FIELDS, THE CARTEL
6 PAID OFF VIRTUALLY EVERY LEVEL OF MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT.
7 PAYOFFS WERE MADE TO AN AGENCY WHICH I WILL REFER TO AS THE
8 M.F.J.P., THE MEXICAN FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE.

9 THE M.F.J.P. IS THE EQUIVALENT IN MEXICO OF THE
10 D.E.A. IT'S THE ONE FEDERAL AGENCY CHARGED WITH THE
11 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THE NARCOTICS LAWS IN MEXICO.
12 THE LOCAL COMANDANTES OF THE M.F.J.P. WERE ON THE PAYROLL OF
13 THE CARTEL.

14 YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT ANOTHER AGENCY OF THE MEXICAN
15 GOVERNMENT KNOWN AS THE D.F.S. NOW, THE FUNCTION OF THE
16 D.F.S. MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY CLEAR. IT'S KNOWN AS THE DIRECCION
17 FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD, AND WAS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL
18 INVESTIGATION AGENCY.

19 YOU WILL HEAR THAT D.F.S. AGENTS ACCOMPANIED CARO ON
20 HIS TRIPS TO THE BASE OF OPERATIONS HERE, AND THAT THE LOCAL
21 COMANDANTE OF THE D.F.S. WAS ON THE CARTEL'S PAYROLL.

22 AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT THE COMANDANTE OF THE STATE
23 JUDICIAL POLICE, THE ZACATECAS STATE JUDICIAL POLICE, WAS ON
24 THE CARTEL'S PAYROLL. AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, CARO PAID
25 BONUSES TO SOME OF THESE COMANDANTES FOR JOBS WELL DONE.

1-29

1 YOU WILL HEAR ALSO, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT IN THE
2 COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION CAPTAIN ZAVALA WAS HIRED BY THE
3 D.E.A. OFFICE IN GUADALAJARA TO FLY AGENT CAMARENA AND HIS
4 SUPERVISOR, AGENT KUYKENDALL, OVER THE FIELDS TO CONFIRM WHAT
5 THE C.I. WAS SAYING.

6 AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT AGENT KUYKENDALL ACTUALLY WENT
7 TO SOME OF THESE AREAS TO SEE WHAT WAS GOING ON AND TO CONFIRM
8 THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE C.I., THE CONFIDENTIAL
9 INFORMANT.

10 BUT YOU WILL ALSO HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT IN
11 LATE MAY OF 1984 A DECISION WAS MADE TO RAID THESE FIELDS, AND
12 THAT THE INFORMATION THAT THE D.E.A. INVESTIGATORS HAD OBTAINED
13 WAS PROVIDED TO THE M.F.J.P. BECAUSE IT WAS ONLY THROUGH THE
14 M.F.J.P. THAT ANY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.

15 AND ALTHOUGH PLANS FOR THE RAID WERE TO BE KEPT IN
16 THE UTMOST SECRECY, YOU WILL HEAR THAT WHEN THE D.E.A. AND THE
17 M.F.J.P. ARRIVED IN THE AREA OF THE FIELDS, ALMOST EVERYONE
18 ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARIJUANA GROWING WAS GONE, INCLUDING THE
19 LOCAL COMANDANTES OF THE M.F.J.P. AND THE D.F.S.

20 NEVERTHELESS, A SUBSTANTIAL BLOW WAS DEALT TO THE
21 CARTEL. OVER 100 ACRES OF GROWING MARIJUANA WAS DESTROYED.
22 TEN TONS OF MANICURED MARIJUANA WAS DESTROYED. 6,500 POUNDS OF
23 MARIJUANA SEEDS WERE SEIZED. AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT THAT IS
24 SUFFICIENT TO PLANT 6,500 ACRES OF MARIJUANA. AND FINALLY,
25 APPROXIMATELY 200 LITERS OF HASHISH OIL WERE SEIZED.

1-30

1 FINALLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN RELATION TO THIS
2 INVESTIGATION, YOU WILL HEAR THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THIS
3 INVESTIGATION, AGENT CAMARENA WAS INTRODUCED TO MANUEL CHAVEZ
4 IN AN UNDERCOVER CAPACITY AS A NARCOTICS DEALER. AND AGENT
5 CAMARENA MADE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A HEROIN PURCHASE FROM
6 MANUEL CHAVEZ, AND ACTUALLY DID THAT.

7 AND YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT WHEN
8 THE FIELDS WERE RAIDED, MANUEL CHAVEZ WAS ARRESTED AND FLOWN TO
9 ZACATECAS BY THE M.F.J.P., WHERE HE SAW AGENT CAMARENA
10 PARTICIPATING IN THE ERADICATION OF THE FIELDS WITH THE OTHER
11 D.E.A. AGENTS.

12 YOU WILL ALSO HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ABOUT
13 ANOTHER INVESTIGATION, AN INVESTIGATION THAT INVOLVED MANY
14 COUNTRIES BUT EVENTUALLY CAME TO FOCUS ON TWO PARTICULAR
15 INDIVIDUALS; FELIX -- MIGUEL FELIX GALLARDO AND A DEFENDANT IN
16 THIS COURTROOM, JUAN MATTA BALLESTEROS.

17 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT
18 LARGE AMOUNTS OF COCAINE WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED, DELIVERED INTO
19 THE UNITED STATES THROUGH MEXICO. COLOMBIA WAS THE SOURCE OF
20 THAT COCAINE.

21 DEFENDANT JUAN MATTA BALLESTEROS WAS THE CONNECTION
22 BETWEEN THE COLOMBIAN SOURCE OF THE COCAINE AND THE MEXICANS.
23 FELIX GALLARDO, WHO WAS HIS PARTNER, ASSISTED IN THE
24 TRANSPORTATION OF THE COCAINE THROUGH MEXICO AND INTO THE
25 UNITED STATES INTO THE SOUTHWESTERN UNITED STATES AND INTO

1-31

1 CALIFORNIA.

2 YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT THE IMMENSE SCOPE OF THIS COCAINE
3 SMUGGLING OPERATION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. YOU WILL HEAR
4 TESTIMONY THAT BETWEEN 1984 AND FEBRUARY OF 1985, APPROXIMATELY
5 \$150 MILLION IN DRUG PROFITS WERE DELIVERED TO MATTA AND FELIX
6 FROM THEIR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA OPERATIONS. AND YOU WILL HEAR,
7 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN PARTICULAR DETAIL ABOUT ONE ASPECT OF
8 THIS COCAINE SMUGGLING OPERATION.

9 DURING 1983 AND '84, MATTA AND FELIX HAD
10 REPRESENTATIVES HERE IN THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THEIR
11 COCAINE SMUGGLING. ONE OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WAS A MAN NAMED
12 JOSE MELO, M E L O.

13 NOW, IN LATE 1983, JOSE MELO, ALONG WITH TWO
14 UNWITTING ASSOCIATES, FORMED A FLORIDA CORPORATION CALLED
15 ATLANTIC IMPORT AND EXPORT COMPANY.

16 ON THE DAY THAT THAT CORPORATION WAS FORMED, AN
17 AIRCRAFT, AN AERO COMMANDER 640 AIRCRAFT, TO BE PRECISE, WAS
18 DEEDED TO ATLANTIC IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY, IT WAS GIVEN TO THAT
19 COMPANY.

20 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN TO
21 THAT COMPANY BY DEFENDANT MATTA, USING AN ALIAS. THE EVIDENCE
22 WILL ALSO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT MATTA AND HIS PARTNER FELIX
23 PARTICIPATED IN BUYING YET ANOTHER AIRCRAFT FOR ATLANTIC IMPORT
24 EXPORT, AN AERO COMMANDER 1000, FOR WHICH THE ONE MILLION
25 DOLLAR PURCHASE PRICE WAS PAID IN CASH.

1-32

1 ON AUGUST 14 OF 1984, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
2 APPROXIMATELY 1,700 POUNDS OF COCAINE WAS SEIZED BY LAW
3 ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE AREA AROUND YOUNG, ARIZONA.
4 THAT COCAINE HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THAT LOCATION BY THE VERY
5 SAME AERO COMMANDER 640 AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN DEEDED TO
6 ATLANTIC IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY BY DEFENDANT MATTA. AND THAT
7 AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DISPATCHED ON ITS MISSION BY MATTA'S
8 ASSOCIATE, JOSE MELO.

9 LET'S TALK ABOUT A THIRD INVESTIGATION. YOU'LL HEAR,
10 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT IN NOVEMBER OF 1984 AS A RESULT OF
11 EFFORTS BY THE D.E.A., THE D.E.A. CAUSED THE LARGEST MARIJUANA
12 BUST IN HISTORY.

13 NOW, THIS WAS AN INVESTIGATION NOT CENTERED IN THE
14 GUADALAJARA OFFICE OF THE D.E.A., BUT IN ANOTHER OFFICE OF THE
15 D.E.A. IN MEXICO. AND IT BEGAN AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION
16 PROVIDED BY A NUMBER OF C.I.'S THAT VAST TRACTS OF LAND WERE
17 BEING CULTIVATED WITH MARIJUANA IN THE DESERT STATE OF
18 CHIHUAHUA.

19 THE D.E.A. WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION
20 PROVIDED BY THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND PRESENTED THIS
21 INFORMATION TO THE M.F.J.P. AGAIN, PLANS WERE MADE TO RAID
22 THE FIELDS. BUT YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT
23 ALTHOUGH THESE PLANS WERE ALSO TO BE KEPT IN THE UTMOST
24 SECRECY, THE PEOPLE WHO WORKED IN THE FIELDS WERE NOTIFIED
25 SEVERAL DAYS IN ADVANCE TO GET OUT BECAUSE SOMETHING BAD WAS

1 GOING TO HAPPEN.

2 NOW, DESPITE THIS, THE EVENTUAL BLOW TO THE CARTEL
3 WAS ENORMOUS, UNPRECEDENTED. YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT THE IMMENSE
4 SIZE OF THE OPERATIONS AT THESE CHIHUAHUA FIELDS; THAT AGAIN,
5 THESE FIELDS WERE IRRIGATED. THERE WERE HUGE BUILDINGS THAT
6 WERE ERECTED AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS TO SORT THE MARIJUANA, TO
7 SIFT IT, TO PREPARE IT FOR PACKAGING, TO PACKAGE IT, TO HOUSE
8 THE WORKERS AND TO FEED THE WORKERS. ALL OF THESE WERE
9 DESTROYED. YOU WILL HEAR THAT APPROXIMATELY 6,000 WORKERS WERE
10 DETAINED.

11 AND LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT
12 AS A RESULT OF THESE RAIDS INITIATED BY THE D.E.A., OVER 10,000
13 TONS OF MARIJUANA WERE SEIZED AND DESTROYED. THAT MARIJUANA
14 WAS WORTH AT THE WHOLESALE LEVEL APPROXIMATELY \$5 BILLION.

15 LASTLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ON THE HEELS OF THE
16 LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE CARTEL IN 1984, YOU WILL HEAR THAT IT
17 SUFFERED YET ANOTHER LOSS IN EARLY 1985.

18 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT DURING 1984 AND UP UNTIL
19 FEBRUARY OF 1985, THE CARTEL IMPORTED INTO SOUTHERN ARIZONA
20 FROM MEXICO APPROXIMATELY 60 TONS OF MARIJUANA. AND THIS WAS
21 DONE THROUGH THE USE OF A HELICOPTER, WHICH WOULD FLY FROM
22 MEXICO AND LAND AT A REMOTE DESERT SITE IN ARIZONA, WHERE IT
23 WOULD BE OFF LOADED IN A MATTER OF MINUTES BY A HIGHLY-TRAINED
24 GROUND CREW.

25 AND THE MARIJUANA WOULD THEN BE PUT INTO PICKUP

1-34

1 TRUCKS AND DELIVERED TO A STASH HOUSE IN TUCSON, AND EVENTUALLY
2 DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE SOUTHWESTERN UNITED STATES AND
3 CALIFORNIA. THE SOURCE OF THAT MARIJUANA, LADIES AND
4 GENTLEMEN, WAS CARO. BUT THE MAN WHO WAS IMMEDIATELY
5 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HELICOPTER OPERATION WAS ANOTHER
6 INDIVIDUAL, RENE VERDUGO. AND THAT'S A NAME THAT I'LL COME
7 BACK TO LATER.

8 ON FEBRUARY 5TH OF 1985, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LAW
9 ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN ARIZONA INTERCEPTED THOSE PICKUP
10 TRUCKS JUST AFTER A DELIVERY HAD BEEN MADE BY THE HELICOPTER.
11 NOW, THE HELICOPTER WAS ABLE TO GET AWAY, BUT INSIDE THE PICKUP
12 TRUCKS WERE FOUND APPROXIMATELY TWO TONS OF MANICURED
13 MARIJUANA.

14 LET'S REVIEW THIS FOR A MINUTE. BETWEEN MAY OF 1984
15 AND FEBRUARY OF 1985, WHICH WAS A PERIOD OF JUST ABOUT 8
16 MONTHS, THE CARTEL SUFFERED A SERIES OF DEVASTATING LOSSES,
17 LOSSES WHICH IT BLAMED ON THE D.E.A. AND FOR GOOD REASON.
18 THE ZACATECAS AND BUFALO SEIZURES, BY THEMSELVES, COST THE
19 CARTEL OVER \$5 BILLION.

20 IN THE FALL OF 1984, THE CARTEL EMBARKED ON A SERIES
21 OF RETALIATORY ACTIONS, ACTIONS INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE THE
22 D.E.A. AND THOSE PEOPLE WHO WERE WORKING WITH IT, AND ACTIONS
23 INTENDED TO FIND OUT WHAT THE D.E.A. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
24 WERE.

25 THE FIRST OF THESE ACTIONS OCCURRED ON SEPTEMBER 30,

1-35

1 OF 1984. NOW, ON THAT DATE, A MEXICAN LAWYER NAMED CESAR
2 GARCIA BUENO WALKED INTO A RESTAURANT IN GUADALAJARA. MR.
3 GARCIA BUENO, WHO WAS A LAWYER HIMSELF, HAD BEEN WORKING WITH
4 KIKI CAMARENA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. DURING THE PRECEDING MONTH HE
5 HAD BEEN WORKING WITH AGENT CAMARENA ON A PARTICULAR
6 INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE FAMILY OF CARO.

7 AND ON THIS NIGHT, SEPTEMBER 30TH, AS HE WALKED INTO
8 THE RESTAURANT, HE WAS WAITING TO MEET WITH A MAN WHO CLAIMED
9 TO BE WORKING WITH FELIX, AND WHO WAS TO PROVIDE MR. GARCIA
10 BUENO WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AN UNCLE OF CARO.

11 AS MR. GARCIA BUENO SAT IN THE RESTAURANT, THE MAN
12 THAT HE WAS WAITING TO SEE WALKED UP BEHIND HIM AND SHOT HIM IN
13 THE BACK, THEN SHOT HIM REPEATEDLY AS HE FELL TO THE FLOOR. AS
14 HE LAY ON THE FLOOR, THIS MAN SAID "YOU'RE DYING BECAUSE YOU'RE
15 A SNITCH", OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT.

16 AND MR. GARCIA BUENO, FORTUNATELY, DID NOT DIE. HE
17 WAS EVACUATED TO THE UNITED STATES AND IS NOW A PARAPLEGIC.

18 LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, A
19 D.E.A. AGENT IN THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE NAMED ROGER KNAPP, WAS
20 AWAKENED AT ABOUT SEVEN IN THE MORNING BY A BLAST OF MACHINE
21 GUN FIRE. HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE IN THE FRONT OF THE HOUSE
22 AT THE TIME AND WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN LEAVING FOR SCHOOL.

23 AFTER THE BLAST WAS COMPLETED, AGENT KNAPP RAN TO THE
24 FRONT OF HIS HOUSE AND FOUND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT VEHICLE, WHICH
25 WAS PARKED OUT IN FRONT, HAD BEEN RIDDLED WITH MACHINE GUN

1-36

1 BULLETS IN A VERY TIGHT PATTERN.

2 NOW LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ROGER KNAPP WAS THE AGENT
3 IN THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING
4 THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF FELIX AND DEFENDANT
5 MATTA.

6 THE CAR THAT HAD BEEN MACHINE GUNNED WAS THE VERY CAR
7 THAT AGENT KNAPP HAD USED FOR MONTHS ON A DAILY BASIS TO PICK
8 UP TAPE RECORDINGS OF WIRE TAPS, WIRE TAPS ON THE OFFICES OF
9 DEFENDANT FELIX.

10 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS CAR WAS ALSO A CAR WHICH
11 HAD BEEN DRIVEN BY ROGER KNAPP SEVERAL MONTHS PREVIOUSLY WHEN
12 HE WAS CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF FELIX'S OFFICE, WHEN HE HAD
13 BEEN SPOTTED BY FELIX'S BODYGUARDS, STOPPED AND QUESTIONED.
14 NOW, AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT, ROGER KNAPP AND HIS FAMILY
15 WERE ALSO EVACUATED OUT OF MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES.

16 NOW, THE SHOOTING OF HIS CAR WAS NOT THE ONLY
17 INDICATION THAT FELIX WAS AWARE OF THE D.E.A.'S SURVEILLANCE OF
18 HIM AND DIDN'T LIKE IT. IN NOVEMBER OF 1984, TWO D.E.A. AGENTS
19 WERE DISPATCHED TO THE GUADALAJARA AIRPORT TO PHOTOGRAPH
20 AIRCRAFT THAT WERE THOUGHT TO BELONG TO FELIX AND HIS
21 ASSOCIATES.

22 AS THEY DROVE PAST THE HANGAR AT THE GUADALAJARA
23 AIRPORT, TAKING PICTURES, THEY SAW FELIX STANDING IN THE HANGAR
24 AND HE SAW THEM. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY A CAR CONTAINING FELIX'S
25 BODYGUARDS CAME OUT AND FOLLOWED THE AGENTS AND EVENTUALLY

1-37

1 BLOCKED THE AGENTS' EXIT FROM THE AIRPORT. THEY HAD TO BE
2 EXCORTE OUT OF THE AIRPORT BY OTHER D.E.A. AGENTS AND BY THE
3 M.F.J.P.

4 WHILE ALL OF THIS WAS GOING ON, YOU WILL HEAR THAT
5 THE CARTEL'S ANGER AND FRUSTRATION BECAME INCREASINGLY FOCUSED
6 ON ONE D.E.A. AGENT. THE EVIDENCE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WILL
7 SHOW AND YOU WILL HEAR EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY TO DESCRIBE TWO
8 MEETINGS IN OCTOBER OF 1984, BOTH OF WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE
9 SAME DAY AT THE GUADALAJARA HOUSE OF BARBA.

10 THE FIRST OF THESE MEETINGS, WHICH TOOK PLACE EARLY
11 IN THE DAY, WAS ATTENDED BY A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WERE VERY
12 IMPORTANT IN THE CARTEL, AND WHOSE NAMES YOU WILL HEAR
13 FREQUENTLY, INCLUDING CARO AND FONSECA.

14 BUT ALSO PRESENT AT THIS MEETING WERE TWO DEFENDANTS
15 IN THIS COURTROOM, DEFENDANT MATTA AND DEFENDANT ZUNO. AND YOU
16 WILL HEAR THAT AT THIS MEETING IN THE EARLY PART OF THIS DAY IN
17 OCTOBER OF 1984, THE PARTICIPANTS TALKED ABOUT A PERSON WHO HAD
18 CAUSED THEM PROBLEMS AT ZACATECAS, AND THEY TALKED ABOUT
19 ABDUCTING THIS PERSON.

20 NOW, AN EYEWITNESS WILL ALSO TELL YOU, LADIES AND
21 GENTLEMEN, ABOUT A SECOND MEETING AT BARBA'S HOUSE ON THE SAME
22 DAY, ALSO ATTENDED BY DEFENDANT MATTA AND DEFENDANT ZUNO. AND
23 AT THAT MEETING, FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS HELD ABOUT ABDUCTING
24 THE PERSON WHO HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THE DAY.

25 AND IT CAME OUT THAT THE PERSON TO BE ABDUCTED WAS A

1-38

1 D.E.A. AGENT. NOW, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR
2 EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY ABOUT A THIRD MEETING THAT ALSO TOOK PLACE
3 AT BARBA'S HOUSE APPROXIMATELY A WEEK AFTER THE FIRST TWO.

4 THIS THIRD MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY DEFENDANT ZUNO,
5 AMONG OTHERS. AND AT THIS THIRD MEETING, THERE WAS FURTHER
6 DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ABDUCTION OF THE D.E.A. AGENT.

7 THERE WAS YET A FOURTH MEETING, AND AGAIN, YOU WILL
8 HEAR EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY ABOUT THIS FOURTH MEETING WHICH TOOK
9 PLACE IN DECEMBER 1984 AT ONE OF FONSECA'S GUADALAJARA HOUSES,
10 KNOWN AS LA BAJADITA.

11 NOW AGAIN, THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY SOME OF THE
12 MOST IMPORTANT TRAFFICKERS IN GUADALAJARA, INCLUDING CARO AND
13 FONSECA. AND AT THIS MEETING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL
14 HEAR THAT A PHOTOGRAPH WAS PASSED AROUND TO THE PARTICIPANTS, A
15 PHOTOGRAPH OF KIKI CAMARENA. AND THE PARTICIPANTS AT THIS
16 MEETING TALKED ABOUT TAKING CARE OF AGENT CAMARENA.

17 AND LASTLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR THAT
18 PLANNING OF THE KIDNAPPING OF AGENT CAMARENA WAS FINALIZED AT
19 YET ANOTHER MEETING AT BARBA'S HOUSE IN GUADALAJARA, THIS TIME
20 DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY, 1985. THIS MEETING WAS
21 ATTENDED BY CARO, FONSECA, DEFENDANT ZUNO, AND BARBA, HIMSELF.

22 BARBA WAS INSTRUCTED TO PICK UP AGENT CAMARENA, AND
23 DEFENDANT ZUNO GAVE HIM SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS AS TO HOW THE
24 AGENT SHOULD BE QUESTIONED.

25 WHILE ALL OF THIS PLANNING WAS GOING ON, THE

1-39

1 GUADALAJARA TRAFFICKERS DID NOT SCRIMP ON THEIR EXTRAVAGANT
2 LIFE STYLES AT ALL. AND ON JANUARY 30, 1985, YOU WILL HEAR
3 THAT A PRIVATE PARTY WAS HOSTED FOR SOME OF THEM, FOR CARO AND
4 FONSECA AND OTHERS AT A RESTAURANT IN GUADALAJARA KNOWN AS LA
5 LANGOSTA.

6 INTO THIS PRIVATE PARTY CAME TWO GRINGOS, TWO
7 AMERICANS. AN EYEWITNESS WILL TELL YOU THIS. THE EVIDENCE
8 WILL SHOW THAT THESE TWO AMERICANS WERE JOHN WALKER AND ALBERTO
9 RADELAT. AND ALTHOUGH THEY IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO LEAVE THE
10 RESTAURANT, THEY WERE MISTAKEN FOR D.E.A. AGENTS AND WERE
11 GRABBED AND PULLED INTO THE RESTAURANT AND WERE BEATEN
12 MERCILESSLY.

13 DEFENDANT JAVIER VASQUEZ, WHO SITS BACK THERE, BEAT
14 AND POUNDED JOHN WALKER AND ALBERTO RADELAT WITH THE REST.
15 JOHN WALKER AND ALBERTO RADELAT WERE MURDERED.

16 FINALLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ON FEBRUARY 7 OF 1985,
17 APPROXIMATELY A WEEK AFTER JOHN WALKER AND ALBERTO RADELAT WERE
18 MURDERED, THE KIDNAPPING OF AGENT CAMARENA WAS CARRIED OUT.

19 ON THAT MORNING, AGENT CAMARENA HAD GONE TO THE
20 D.E.A. OFFICE IN GUADALAJARA AND HAD WORKED THROUGH THE
21 MORNING. HE MADE ARRANGEMENTS, YOU WILL HEAR, TO MEET WITH HIS
22 WIFE MIKA FOR LUNCH AT A GUADALAJARA RESTAURANT FOR LUNCH AT
23 ABOUT TWO O'CLOCK, BUT YOU WILL ALSO HEAR THAT HE NEVER GOT
24 THERE.

25 AT ABOUT 6:30 THE FOLLOWING MORNING ANOTHER D.E.A.

1-40

1 AGENT IN THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE NAMED VICTOR WALLACE RECEIVED A
2 TELEPHONE CALL FROM AGENT CAMARENA'S WIFE. SHE ASKED HIM
3 WHETHER HE KNEW WHERE KIKI CAMARENA WAS; HE HADN'T COME HOME
4 THE NIGHT PREVIOUSLY.

5 NOW, VICTOR WALLACE WAS AN OLD FRIEND OF AGENT
6 CAMARENA AND HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE JUST A
7 FEW MONTHS EARLIER, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHERE KIKI CAMARENA WAS.
8 AND FROM THAT MOMENT ON, THE D.E.A. BEGAN A FRANTIC EFFORT TO
9 FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO HIM.

10 THE FIRST THING THEY FOUND, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WAS
11 THAT AGENT CAMARENA'S TRUCK REMAINED PARKED ACROSS THE STREET
12 FROM THE D.E.A.'S OFFICE IN GUADALAJARA IN EXACTLY THE SAME
13 SPOT THAT IT HAD BEEN PARKED THE DAY BEFORE.

14 AND IT WAS ALSO FOUND THAT THE TRUCK WAS UNLOCKED AND
15 THAT THE ALARM HAD BEEN TURNED OFF. IT WAS FOUND THAT AGENT
16 CAMARENA HAD NOT, UNLIKE HIS USUAL PRACTICE, STRAIGHTENED HIS
17 DESK. IT WAS A MESS. HIS CREDENTIAL AND HIS GUN REMAINED IN
18 THE DESK DRAWERS.

19 SO THE D.E.A. MADE IMMEDIATE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE
20 ASSISTANCE OF THE M.F.J.P. IN TRYING TO LOCATE AGENT CAMARENA.
21 UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WERE ONLY TWO M.F.J.P. AGENTS IN THE LOCAL
22 OFFICE OF THE M.F.J.P. AT THE TIME AND THEY COULDN'T PROVIDE
23 MUCH ASSISTANCE. AND IT WASN'T UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY,
24 FEBRUARY 9, THAT ANY REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE M.F.J.P. WERE
25 OBTAINED. SO THE D.E.A. AGENTS WENT TO THE STATE POLICE AND

1-41

1 WERE SIMPLY TURNED DOWN.

2 YOU WILL HEAR THAT BY THE TIME ASSISTANCE ARRIVED THE
3 FOLLOWING MORNING, ON FEBRUARY 9TH, THE D.E.A. IN GUADALAJARA
4 HAD LEARNED THAT CAPTAIN ZAVALA HAD ALSO BEEN ABDUCTED.
5 CAPTAIN ZAVALA, WHO HAD BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH AGENT
6 CAMARENA ON THE ZACATECAS INVESTIGATION AND OTHER
7 INVESTIGATIONS, HAD NOT RETURNED HOME AS EXPECTED FROM HIS TRIP
8 TO DURANGO ON FEBRUARY 6TH.

9 NOW, THIS INFORMATION THAT A D.E.A. AGENT AND A
10 D.E.A. COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL WHO WERE WORKING TOGETHER WERE
11 BOTH MISSING, CONFIRMED SUSPICIONS THAT IT WAS NARCOTICS
12 TRAFFICKERS WHO HAD ABDUCTED THESE INDIVIDUALS. AND FROM THAT
13 POINT ON, THE INVESTIGATION FOCUSED ON THE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS IN
14 GUADALAJARA.

15 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR THAT THE M.F.J.P.
16 INVESTIGATION, WHICH REALLY BEGAN ON FEBRUARY 9TH, WAS HEADED
17 BY AN INDIVIDUAL OUT OF MEXICO CITY NAMED ARMANDO PAVON REYES.
18 I'LL CALL HIM PAVON. HE ARRIVED IN GUADALAJARA ON THE MORNING
19 OF FEBRUARY 9TH WITH ABOUT 50 M.F.J.P. AGENTS.

20 LATER THAT DAY THE D.E.A. INTERCEPTED A RADIO
21 TRANSMISSION, WHICH APPEARED TO BE A RADIO TRANSMISSION FROM
22 FELIX INDICATING THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE THE GUADALAJARA
23 AIRPORT. SO COMANDANTE PAVON, THE M.F.J.P. AGENTS AND SEVERAL
24 D.E.A. AGENTS WERE IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO THE GUADALAJARA
25 AIRPORT TO INTERCEPT HIM.

1-42

1 NOW, WHAT THEY FOUND WHEN THEY GOT THERE WAS NOT
2 FELIX ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE, BUT RATHER, CARO ABOUT TO BOARD A
3 JET TO LEAVE THE GUADALAJARA AIRPORT. AND THIS JET WAS GUARDED
4 BY A NUMBER OF ARMED BODYGUARDS, HEAVILY-ARMED BODYGUARDS.

5 I SHOULD POINT OUT TO YOU, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT
6 AS OF THAT MOMENT, THERE WAS NOT A D.E.A. AGENT IN MEXICO WHO
7 KNEW WHAT CARO LOOKED LIKE. NO ONE HAD EVER SEEN HIM AND NO
8 ONE HAD EVER SEEN A PHOTOGRAPH OF HIM.

9 IN ANY EVENT, THERE WAS AN INTENSE STAND-OFF BETWEEN
10 CARO'S ARMED BODYGUARDS AND THE ARMED M.F.J.P. AGENTS AS THEY
11 FACED EACH OTHER WITH THEIR WEAPONS DRAWN. AT THAT MOMENT,
12 COMANDANTE PAVON MET WITH AN INDIVIDUAL WHO THE EVIDENCE WILL
13 SHOW WAS CARO, AND WALKED BEHIND THE JET PLANE INTO A NEARBY
14 HANGAR. THEY TALKED FOR A FEW MOMENTS.

15 THEREAFTER, PAVON WALKED ACROSS TO ANOTHER HANGAR AND
16 MADE A PHONE CALL, AND THEN CAME BACK AND TALKED AGAIN WITH
17 CARO. AND AFTER THAT CONVERSATION WAS FINISHED, PAVON
18 ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM. THE ARMED BODYGUARDS WERE
19 D.F.S. AGENTS, AND HE LET THEM GO.

20 CARO ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD A GIFT FOR THE M.F.J.P.
21 HE BOARDED THE AIRCRAFT AND STOOD IN THE OPEN DOORWAY AS THE
22 PLAN TAXIED AWAY, TOASTING THE PEOPLE THERE WITH CHAMPAGNE, AND
23 ANNOUNCING THAT IF THEY WANTED TO COME AFTER HIM AGAIN, THEY'D
24 BETTER COME AFTER HIM ARMED WITH SOMETHING MORE THAN TOYS.

25 ON MARCH 5, 1985, ABOUT A MONTH LATER, THE D.E.A.

1-43

1 RECEIVED WORD THAT TWO BODIES HAD BEEN FOUND IN A SMALL VILLAGE
2 ABOUT 60 MILES FROM GUADALAJARA, A VILLAGE NAMED ZAMORA. AND
3 D.E.A. AGENTS WERE DISPATCHED TO THE GUADALAJARA MORGUE TO
4 REVIEW THOSE BODIES. THEY WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS BEING
5 THE BODIES OF KIKI CAMARENA AND ALFREDO ZAVALA.

6 THE BODIES WERE TRANSFERRED SHORTLY AFTER THAT TO THE
7 GUADALAJARA MORGUE WHERE A TEAM OF F.B.I. FORENSIC AGENTS WENT
8 TO VIEW THEM.

9 AND YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT NEAR
10 THESE BODIES WERE PILES OF VARIOUS THINGS: CLOTHING, BINDING
11 ROPES, A SHEET IN WHICH ONE OF THE BODIES HAD BEEN WRAPPED.
12 ACTUALLY, A BURIAL SHROUD.

13 THE F.B.I. AGENTS WERE ABLE TO TAKE SAMPLES OF A
14 NUMBER OF THINGS. THEY TOOK SAMPLES OF HAIR FROM EACH OF THE
15 BODIES AND THEY TOOK SAMPLES OF THE VARIOUS ITEMS THAT WERE
16 ASSOCIATED WITH THE BODIES, CLOTHING, BINDING CORDS AND THE
17 BURIAL SHROUDS. AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT I WILL MAKE MORE
18 APPARENT IN A SHORT WHILE.

19 YOU WILL HEAR FROM A DR. SPENCER. DR. SPENCER
20 CONDUCTED AN AUTOPSY ON THE BODY OF AGENT CAMARENA, AND HE WILL
21 TELL YOU THAT AGENT CAMARENA'S SKULL WAS FRACTURED MANY TIMES;
22 THE TOP OF HIS SKULL, THE FRONT OF HIS SKULL, THE CHEEK BONES
23 IN THREE PLACES SEVERELY FRACTURED, LIKE AN EGG SHELL.

24 YOU WILL HEAR THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF SEVERE BRUISING
25 ON THE BACK OF HIS HEAD, SEVERE BRUISING CAUSED BY A BLUNT

1 INSTRUMENT. AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT THERE WAS ACTUALLY A HOLE
2 DRIVEN THROUGH THE TOP OF AGENT CAMARENA'S SKULL BY A BLUNT
3 INSTRUMENT. DR. SPENCER WILL ALSO TELL YOU THAT HE EXAMINED
4 THE BODY OF CAPTAIN ZAVALA AND THAT HE SAW EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR
5 TRAUMA, A FRACTURED SKULL AND BROKEN ARM.

6 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR THAT IN JUNE OF
7 1985, JOHN WALKER'S WIFE EVE AND ALBERTO RADELAT'S FATHER
8 PHILLIPE HAD BEEN NOTIFIED THAT TWO BODIES WERE FOUND IN A PARK
9 OUTSIDE OF GUADALAJARA, AND THEY WERE ABLE TO VIEW THESE BODIES
10 AT THE GUADALAJARA MORGUE.

11 EVE WALKER WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY ONE OF THEM AS THE
12 BODY OF HER HUSBAND, JOHN WALKER, AND DR. RADELAT WAS, I
13 BELIEVE, TO IDENTIFY THE OTHER BODY AS THAT OF HIS SON ALBERTO.

14 NOW, AT THIS POINT IN THE TRIAL, LADIES AND
15 GENTLEMEN, WE'LL BE PRESENTING WHAT IS KNOWN AS FORENSIC
16 EVIDENCE, PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CRIME. AND YOU
17 WILL HEAR FIRST THAT IN APRIL OF 1985 AND AGAIN IN JUNE OF
18 1985, F.B.I. AGENTS AND D.E.A. AGENTS WERE ALLOWED TO GO INTO A
19 HOUSE IN GUADALAJARA, A HOUSE ABOUT WHICH YOU'LL BE HEARING
20 QUITE A BIT THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THIS CASE.

21 THAT HOUSE WAS LOCATED AT THE ADDRESS 881 LOPE DE
22 VEGA IN GUADALAJARA. YOU'LL HEAR THAT THE F.B.I. AGENTS WERE
23 ABLE TO CONDUCT A VERY THOROUGH VACUUM SWEEPING OF THIS
24 LOCATION AND AN EXAMINATION OF THIS LOCATION AND THEY WERE ABLE
25 TO FIND CERTAIN ITEMS OF EVIDENCE.

1-45

1 AMONG THE ITEMS WHICH WERE FOUND, LADIES AND
2 GENTLEMEN, WERE HAIRS, HAIRS THAT WERE FOUND IN VARIOUS
3 LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE HOUSE, BUT PARTICULARLY, HAIRS LOCATED
4 IN WHAT WE WILL REFER TO AS THE GUEST HOUSE, WHICH WAS REALLY A
5 SEPARATE BUILDING OUT BEHIND THE MAIN HOUSE, MADE OF CONCRETE
6 BLOCKS, WITH REALLY NO WINDOW LARGE ENOUGH TO GET OUT, A STEEL
7 DOOR, AND NOT MUCH ELSE. THERE WAS A BATHROOM IN ONE ROOM IN
8 THIS PARTICULAR PART OF THE GUEST HOUSE. AND IN THE GUEST
9 HOUSE, AS WELL AS IN OTHER LOCATIONS IN THE MAIN HOUSE, WERE
10 FOUND HAIRS, HAIRS THAT MATCH IN EVERY COMPARABLE RESPECT THE
11 HAIRS OF AGENT CAMARENA.

12 YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT CARPET
13 SAMPLES WERE ALSO TAKEN FROM THIS GUEST HOUSE AND FROM VARIOUS
14 OTHER LOCATIONS IN THE MAIN HOUSE AT LOPE DE VEGA, AND THAT
15 CARPET FIBERS FROM THESE CARPETS MATCH IN EVERY COMPARABLE
16 RESPECT CARPET FIBERS THAT WERE SCRAPED OFF OF THE CLOTHING OF
17 CAPTAIN ZAVALA THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE GUADALAJARA MORGUE,
18 AND FIBERS THAT WERE SCRAPED OFF OF THE BURIAL SHROUD THAT HAD
19 BEEN TAKEN AT THE MORGUE.

20 YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT THE BURIAL
21 SHROUD ITSELF MATCHED IN EVERY COMPARABLE RESPECT A PILLOW CASE
22 THAT HAD BEEN FOUND BY F.B.I. AGENTS IN ONE OF THE BEDROOMS AT
23 THE HOUSE. AND IT MATCHED IN EVERY COMPARABLE RESPECT A PILLOW
24 CASE THAT MEXICAN FORENSIC AGENTS HAD TAKEN FROM THE HOUSE.

25 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT ROPE

1-46

1 BINDINGS. A SAMPLE OF ROPE WAS TAKEN FROM UNDERNEATH THE
2 COVERED PATIO AT THE LOPE DE VEGA ADDRESS, AND THAT MATCHED IN
3 ALL COMPARABLE RESPECTS A SAMPLE OF ROPE BINDING THAT WAS TAKEN
4 FROM THE GUADALAJARA MORGUE.

5 AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT HAIR STUCK TO THE TAPE
6 BLINDFOLD THAT MATCHED IN EVERY RESPECT AGENT CAMARENA'S HAIR.
7 AND ALL OF THIS INFORMATION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, SHOWS THAT
8 AGENT CAMARENA WAS AT THIS LOCATION, AND CAPTAIN ZAVALA WAS AT
9 THIS LOCATION, 881 LOPE DE VEGA, AND WAS IN THE GUEST HOUSE,
10 WHICH WE REALLY BELIEVE AND WILL SHOW TO YOU WAS THE TORTURE
11 CHAMBER WHERE AGENT CAMARENA WAS BEATEN AND INTERROGATED.

12 THERE WAS OTHER FORENSIC EVIDENCE, LADIES AND
13 GENTLEMEN. OTHER HAIR MATCHES WERE MADE. YOU WILL HEAR THAT
14 HAIR MATCHING THAT OF RENE VERDUGO WAS FOUND IN THE GUEST
15 HOUSE. RENE VERDUGO IS THE INDIVIDUAL, YOU MAY RECALL, IS THE
16 INDIVIDUAL WHO RAN THE HELICOPTER OPERATION IMPORTING MARIJUANA
17 INTO ARIZONA, WHICH SUFFERED A SEIZURE TWO DAYS BEFORE AGENT
18 CAMARENA WAS ABDUCTED.

19 AND YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ABOUT HAIR
20 MATCHED TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO'S NAME YOU HAVEN'T YET HEARD,
21 SERGIO ESPINO VERDIN.

22 NOW, I'LL EXPLAIN THAT JUST A BIT MORE RIGHT NOW. I
23 EXPECT YOU'LL BE HEARING SEVERAL TAPE RECORDINGS, TAPE
24 RECORDINGS THAT WERE MADE WHILE AGENT CAMARENA WAS BEING
25 INTERROGATED. YOU WILL HEAR THAT AGENT CAMARENA WAS QUESTIONED

1-47

1 ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT THE CARTEL AND ITS ACTIVITIES AND WHAT
2 HIS SOURCES OF INFORMATION WERE.

3 AND THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT THREE OF THE VOICES
4 ON THE TAPES CAN IDENTIFIED. ONE OF THOSE VOICES WAS AGENT
5 CAMARENA HIMSELF BEING BEATEN AND INTERROGATED.

6 ONE OF THE OTHER VOICES WAS ONE OF THE RING LEADERS
7 OF THE CARTEL, CARO. AND THE THIRD VOICE IS THE VOICE OF
8 ESPINO, WHO'S HAIR WAS FOUND IN THE GUEST HOUSE AT LOPE DE
9 VEGA. AND THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT
10 ESPINO VERDIN WAS THE CHIEF INTERROGATOR OF AGENT CAMARENA.

11 THE EVIDENCE WILL ALSO SHOW THAT AS HE WAS BEING
12 INTERROGATED, AGENT CAMARENA KNEW WHERE HE WAS. HE KNEW THAT
13 HE WAS AT 881 LOPE DE VEGA BECAUSE THE INFORMATION THAT HE
14 PROVIDES ON THESE TAPES THAT YOU WILL HEAR WILL PROVE THAT.

15 WHAT WERE THE ROLES OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS
16 COURTROOM IN THESE HEINOUS CRIMES? NOW, THEY WEREN'T THE ONLY
17 PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THESE CRIMES, BUT THEY'RE THE ONLY PEOPLE
18 PRESENT FOR THIS TRIAL. I WANT TO DESCRIBE FOR YOU NOW THE
19 ROLE THAT EACH OF THEM HAD IN THE CARTEL AND THE ROLE THAT EACH
20 OF THEM HAD IN THE CRIMES THAT THEY ARE CHARGED WITH COMMITTING
21 HERE TODAY.

22 JUAN MATTA. WHAT WAS HIS ROLE IN THE ENTERPRISE? HE
23 WAS FELIX'S PARTNER, HE WAS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MEXICANS
24 AND THE COLOMBIAN SOURCES OF COCAINE. WHAT WAS HIS ROLE IN
25 THESE CRIMES?

1-48

1 WELL, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU WILL HEAR FROM AN
2 EYEWITNESS THAT HE WAS PRESENT AT THE FIRST TWO MEETINGS IN
3 OCTOBER OF 1984. HE PARTICIPATED IN THOSE TWO MEETINGS AT
4 WHICH THE ABDUCTION OF A D.E.A. AGENT WAS FIRST DISCUSSED.

5 YOU WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT
6 IMMEDIATELY -- OH, I WANT TO POINT OUT ONE FACT, AS WELL. THAT
7 AT THE FIRST OF THOSE MEETINGS, DEFENDANT MATTA MADE A
8 PARTICULAR COMMENT WHICH HAD SOME FLAVOR TO IT: "NO FLIES
9 ENTER A CLOSED MOUTH" -- IN REFERENCE TO THE DECISION TO ABDUCT
10 THE D.E.A. AGENT.

11 YOU WILL HEAR THAT IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING AGENT
12 CAMARENA'S ABDUCTION, A NUMBER OF LOCATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
13 TRAFFICKERS WERE RAIDED IN GUADALAJARA BY THE D.E.A. WITH
14 INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE D.E.A. AND BY THE M.F.J.P. ONE OF
15 THOSE LOCATIONS WAS A HOUSE OF MATTA'S PARTNER FELIX.

16 AND YOU WILL HEAR THAT IN A CLOSET OF THAT HOUSE A
17 PHOTOGRAPH WAS FOUND AND THAT PHOTOGRAPH WAS A PHOTOGRAPH OF
18 KIKI CAMARENA TAKEN IN THE GUADALAJARA OFFICE OF THE M.F.J.P.

19 NOW, YOU WILL ALSO HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT
20 IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING AGENT CAMARENA'S ABDUCTION, THERE WAS A
21 SEARCH BEING MADE BY THE D.E.A. FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL, FOR
22 DEFENDANT MATTA. AND A SURVEILLANCE WAS PLACED ON A HOTEL IN
23 GUADALAJARA, AND ACTUALLY, DEFENDANT MATTA WAS SEEN THERE JUST
24 THREE DAYS AFTER CARO FLED THE GUADALAJARA AIRPORT, AND THIS
25 WAS ON SEPTEMBER 12TH OF 1985.

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1 DEFENDANT MATTA WAS SEEN AT A HOTEL IN GUADALAJARA,
2 LEAVING THE HOTEL WITH ARMED BODYGUARDS.

3 AND LASTLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THERE WAS ONE FINAL
4 MATCH AFTER HAIRS WHICH I HAVEN'T YET DISCUSSED WITH YOU. IN A
5 BATHROOM ADJOINING A BEDROOM OF THE MAIN HOUSE AT LOPE DE VEGA
6 WAS FOUND A HAIR WHICH MATCHES IN EVERY COMPARABLE RESPECT THE
7 KNOWN HAIR OF DEFENDANT JUAN MATTA.

8 MR. S [REDACTED] I OBJECT AND MOVE TO STRIKE. WE
9 DISCUSSED THIS AN FRIDAY AND WE HAVE A PENDING MOTION.

10 THE COURT: OVERRULED.

11 MR. [REDACTED] A HAIR WAS FOUND IN THE ADJOINING
12 BEDROOM, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WHICH MATCHES IN EVERY
13 COMPARABLE RESPECT THE KNOWN HAIR OF AGENT CAMARENA. AND YOU
14 WILL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT ANOTHER HAIR WAS FOUND,
15 ANOTHER HAIR FOUND IN THE GUEST HOUSE, THE TORTURE ROOM, A HAIR
16 THAT MATCHES IN EVERY COMPARABLE RESPECT THE KNOWN HAIR OF
17 DEFENDANT MATTA.

18 AND LIKEWISE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE HAIRS OF
19 AGENT CAMARENA WERE FOUND IN THAT GUEST HOUSE, AND THAT
20 EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT NOT ONLY WAS DEFENDANT MATTA IN
21 GUADALAJARA AT AROUND THIS TIME, HE WAS AT LOPE DE VEGA.

22 RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE. WHAT WAS HIS ROLE IN THIS
23 ENTERPRISE. YOU WILL HEAR THAT HE WAS THE CONNECTION TO THE
24 HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. MR. ZUNO ARCE WAS A
25 WEALTHY MAN, A WELL-CONNECTED MAN. HE IS THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF

1-50

1 A FORMER PRESIDENT OF MEXICO.

2 WHAT WAS HIS ROLE IN THESE CRIMES? WELL, HE DIRECTLY
3 PARTICIPATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS IN THE PLANNING OF THE
4 KIDNAPPING OF AGENT CAMARENA.

5 YOU WILL HEAR FROM AN EYEWITNESS THAT HE WAS PRESENT
6 AT THE TWO MEETINGS IN OCTOBER OF 1984 WHERE THE KIDNAPPING OF
7 THE D.E.A. AGENT WAS FIRST DISCUSSED. HE PARTICIPATED IN THESE
8 TWO MEETINGS. DEFENDANT MATTA WAS ALSO IN THESE TWO MEETINGS.

9 YOU WILL HEAR FROM AN EYEWITNESS THAT DEFENDANT ZUNO
10 PARTICIPATED IN A THIRD MEETING AT DEFENDANT BARBA'S HOUSE, OF
11 JAVIER BARBA'S HOUSE IN GUADALAJARA, ABOUT A WEEK LATER AT
12 WHICH THE ABDUCTION OF A D.E.A. AGENT WAS AGAIN DISCUSSED.

13 AND YOU'LL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT DEFENDANT
14 ZUNO PARTICIPATED IN THE FINAL MEETINGS AT WHICH THE ABDUCTION
15 OF AGENT CAMARENA WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF
16 FEBRUARY OF 1985. YOU WILL HEAR FROM AN EYEWITNESS THAT HE
17 PARTICIPATED IN THAT MEETING AND THAT HE GAVE SPECIFIC
18 INSTRUCTIONS AS TO HOW THE AGENT SHOULD BE QUESTIONED.

19 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU'LL HEAR THAT BY HIS OWN
20 ADMISSION, UNTIL AT LEAST THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY OF 1985,
21 DEFENDANT ZUNO OWNED THE HOUSE AT 881 LOPE DE VEGA. AND YOU
22 WILL HEAR THAT THAT HOUSE WAS BEING USED BY ONE OF THE RING
23 LEADERS OF THE CARTEL, CARO, DURING 1984, DURING THE PERIOD
24 THAT IT WAS OWNED BY DEFENDANT RUBEN ZUNO ARCE.

25 NOW, WHAT ARE THE CHARGES AGAINST THESE TWO

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16
1 DEFENDANTS, JUAN MATTA AND RUBEN ZUNO ARCE? WELL, IN RELATION
2 TO THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE KIDNAPPING OF AGENT CAMARENA,
3 EACH OF THESE DEFENDANTS HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH A VIOLATION OF A
4 STATUTE KNOWN AS TITLE 18 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1959,
5 WHICH I'LL REFER TO AS THE COMMISSION OFFER VIOLENT CRIMES IN
6 AID OF A RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE.

7 EACH OF THEM HAS BEEN CHARGED, ALSO, WITH CONSPIRACY
8 TO KIDNAP A FEDERAL AGENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
9 OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND THEY'VE ALSO BEEN CHARGED WITH THE ACTUAL
10 KIDNAPPING OF A FEDERAL AGENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF
11 HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.

12 LASTLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, DEFENDANT MATTA, BUT NOT
13 DEFENDANT ZUNA, HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH MURDER BECAUSE AGENT
14 CAMARENA DIED IN THE COURSE OF HIS KIDNAPPING, TORTURE AND
15 INTERROGATION.

16 DEFENDANT JUAN JOSE BERNABE RAMIREZ, WHAT IS HIS ROLE
17 IN THIS ENTERPRISE? LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE WILL
18 SHOW THAT DEFENDANT BERNABE WAS A BODYGUARD FOR FONSECA AND
19 SOMETIMES FOR CARO. HE WAS MUSCLE, ESSENTIALLY.

20 WHAT WAS HIS ROLE IN THESE CRIMES? YOU WILL HEAR,
21 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1985 -- I'M
22 SORRY -- 1989, JUST LAST YEAR, DEFENDANT BERNABE MET WITH A
23 D.E.A. AGENT HERE IN CALIFORNIA, A D.E.A. AGENT WHO WAS
24 UNDERCOVER, IMPERSONATING A DRUG DEALER; AND IN THE COURSE OF A
25 SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THIS AND OTHER AGENTS AND DEFENDANT

1 BERNABE, BERNABE MADE SOME INTERESTING STATEMENTS ABOUT HIS
2 PAST.

3 YOU'LL HEAR THAT HE WAS A BODYGUARD AT THE LOCATION
4 WHERE AGENT CAMARENA WAS BEING BEATEN AND INTERROGATED. HE
5 WENT THERE WITH ERNESTO FONSECA. YOU'LL HEAR THAT EVERYONE
6 PARTICIPATED IN THIS BEATING.

7 AND YOU'LL HEAR DEFENDANT BERNABE DESCRIBE IN GREAT
8 DETAIL HIS PARTICIPATION IN ASSISTING CARO TO FLEE FROM THE
9 GUADALAJARA AIRPORT ON FEBRUARY 9TH. BERNABE WAS ONE OF THE
10 ARMED BODYGUARDS PROTECTING THE AIRCRAFT BEFORE IT WAS ALLOWED
11 TO FLY OUT OF THE GUADALAJARA AIRPORT. HE WAS ONE OF THE
12 PEOPLE WITH THE GUNS, FACING OFF THE M.F.J.P. AGENTS.

13 YOU'LL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ABOUT THE CRIMES
14 WHICH DEFENDANT BERNABE IS CHARGED WITH COMMITTING AS A RESULT
15 OF THESE ACTIVITIES. HE IS CHARGED WITH TWO COUNTS OF
16 COMMITTING VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING IN
17 RELATIONSHIP TO THE KIDNAPPING, BEATING AND MURDER OF AGENT
18 CAMARENA AND CAPTAIN ZAVALA.

19 HE IS CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY TO KIDNAP A FEDERAL
20 AGENT AND WITH KIDNAPPING OF A FEDERAL AGENT AND, LASTLY,
21 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, BECAUSE OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN ASSISTING
22 CARO TO FLEE FROM GUADALAJARA, HE IS CHARGED AS AN ACCESSORY
23 AFTER THE FACT.

24 FINALLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, JAVIER VASQUEZ VELASCO,
25 WHAT IS HIS ROLE IN THE ENTERPRISE, IN THE CARTEL? THE

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1 EVIDENCE WILL SHOW DEFENDANT JAVIER VASQUEZ WAS ONE OF A GROUP
2 OF BROTHERS KNOWN AS THE TIERRA LIBRE BROTHERS. AND YOU'LL
3 HEAR THAT REFERENCE FREQUENTLY.

4 BUT VASQUEZ HIMSELF, ALONG WITH SEVERAL OF HIS
5 BROTHERS, WAS A BODYGUARD FOR MEMBERS OF THE CARTEL AND A
6 HELPER, A DOER OF ODD JOBS, IN PARTICULAR FOR JAVIER BARBA,
7 ERNESTO FONSECA'S RIGHT-HAND MAN AND THE MAN AT WHOSE HOUSE
8 MANY OF THE MEETINGS WERE HELD AT WHICH THE ABDUCTION OF AGENT
9 CAMARENA WAS PLANNED.

10 YOU'LL HEAR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FROM AN EYE
11 WITNESS, THAT IN JANUARY OF 1985, JAVIER VASQUEZ DEPARTED FROM
12 BARBA'S HOUSE WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER PEOPLE, INCLUDING BARBA
13 HIMSELF, FOR THE LA LANGOSTA RESTAURANT IN GUADALAJARA. AND
14 YOU'LL HEAR FROM AN EYE WITNESS THAT AT THAT RESTAURANT JAVIER
15 VASQUEZ BEAT AND KILLED JOHN WALKER AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE
16 AND AS THEY WERE BEING DRAGGED TO THE REAR OF THE RESTAURANT.

17 FOR THESE CRIMES, JAVIER VASQUEZ HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH
18 TWO COUNTS OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING, ONE IN
19 RELATION TO THE MURDER OF JOHN WALKER AND ONE IN RELATION TO
20 THE MURDER OF ALBERTO RADELAT.

21 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS WILL BE A LENGTHY CASE.
22 YOU WILL BE HEARING FROM A GREAT NUMBER OF WITNESSES. YOU WILL
23 BE SEEING MANY PIECES OF EVIDENCE.

24 SOME OF THE WITNESSES THAT YOU'LL BE HEARING FROM ARE
25 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS THEMSELVES, OR HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST.

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1 SOME OF THEM HAVE RECEIVED MONEY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. SOME OF
2 THEM HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES THEMSELVES.

3 I WANT TO THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR PATIENCE, FOR
4 YOUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT IS
5 PRESENTED TO YOU.

6 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE, WE, THE GOVERNMENT,
7 MYSELF AND MR. [REDACTED], WILL BE ALLOWED TO DISCUSS THE EVIDENCE
8 WITH YOU IN LIGHT OF THE LAW AS YOU ARE INSTRUCTED IN THE LAW
9 BY JUDGE RAFEEDIE. AND AT THAT TIME, WE WILL ASK YOU TO RETURN
10 THE ONLY VERDICT THAT JUSTICE AND THAT THE EVIDENCE WILL
11 PERMIT. AND THAT, AS TO EACH OF THESE DEFENDANTS, IS GUILTY AS
12 CHARGED.

13 THANK YOU.

14 THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, WE'RE
15 GOING TO TAKE OUR MORNING RECESS AT THIS TIME. I WANT TO
16 REMIND THE JURY OF ITS DUTY NOT DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH EACH
17 OTHER OR WITH ANYONE ELSE AND NOT TO FORM OR EXPRESS ANY
18 OPINION OR CONCLUSION ABOUT THIS CASE UNTIL IT HAS BEEN
19 SUBMITTED TO YOU.

20 I WANT TO ALSO REMIND YOU THAT YOU ARE TO AVOID THE
21 EXPOSURE TO ANY PUBLICITY ABOUT THIS CASE. THEREFORE, YOU
22 SHOULD NOT READ ABOUT IT, YOU SHOULD NOT LISTEN TO ANY
23 BROADCASTS REGARDING IT OR WATCH ANY TELEVISION PROGRAM THAT
24 MAY REGARD IT.

25 I SUGGEST TO YOU THAT IF YOU SUBSCRIBE TO A REGULAR

CC TO CC

FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JAN 21 1990

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June, 1989 Grand Jury

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO,

aka "Rafael",

aka "El Grenas",

aka "Rafa",

ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO,

aka "Don Neto",

JUAN RAMON MATA-BALLESTEROS,

aka "El Negro",

aka "El Colombiano",

aka "Negro Jose",

MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO,

MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA,

MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA,

RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE,

JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ,

ARMANDO PAVON-REYES,

JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA,

SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN,

HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN,

JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ,

JAVIER VASQUEZ-VELASCO,

ANTONIO VASQUEZ-VELASCO,

ANTONIO VASQUEZ-OCHOA,

EZEQUIEL GODINEZ-CERVANTES,

INES CALDERON-QUINTERO,

aka "Rolando Cervantes",

ALBINO BAZAN-PADILLA,

Defendants.

CR 87-422(F)-ER

SIXTH SUPERSEDING
INDICTMENT

[18 U.S.C. § 1959: Violent
Crimes in Aid of Racketeering;
18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959:
Conspiracy to Commit Violent
Crimes in Aid of Racketeering;
18 U.S.C. § 1201(c): Conspiracy
to Kidnap a Federal Agent;
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5):
Kidnapping of a Federal Agent;
18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114: Felony
Murder of a Federal Agent;
18 U.S.C. § 2: Aiding and
Abetting; 18 U.S.C. § 3:
Accessory After the Fact]

ENTERED ON COURTRAN

FEB 13 1990

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MAM:mic0652j

1 The Grand Jury charges:

2 General Allegations

3 1. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
4 Indictment, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, aka "Rafael", aka "El
5 Grenas", aka "Rafa", ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, aka "Don Neto",
6 JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, aka "El Negro", aka "El Colombiano",
7 aka "Negro Jose", MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL
8 IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER
9 BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, JUAN GILBERTO
10 HERNANDEZ-PARRA, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN,
11 JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, JAVIER VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO
12 VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-OCHOA, EZEQUIEL GODINEZ-CERVANTES
13 INES CALDERON-QUINTERO, aka "Rolando Cervantes", ALBINO
14 BAZAN-PADILLA, and unindicted co-conspirators Rene Martin
15 Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez and Jesus Felix-Gutierrez,
16 were members of an international narcotics enterprise based in
17 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico (hereinafter referred to as the
18 "Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel").

19 2. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
20 Indictment, the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel engaged in
21 racketeering activity, including, but not limited to, the
22 cultivation, importation and distribution of multi-ton quantities
23 of marijuana in Mexico, the Central District of California, and
24 elsewhere.

25 3. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
26 Indictment, the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel also engaged in the
27
28

1 importation and distribution of multi-kilogram quantities of
2 cocaine in Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Central District of
3 California, and elsewhere.

4 4. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
5 Indictment, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO
6 FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATA-BALLESTEROS and MIGUEL ANGEL
7 FELIX-GALLARDO supervised and managed the Guadalajara Narcotics
8 Cartel, and co-conspirator Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a high
9 level lieutenant of defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO in said
10 enterprise.

11 5. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
12 Indictment, defendants RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN,
13 JAVIER VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO
14 VASQUEZ-OCHOA and EZEQUIEL GODINEZ-CERVANTES assisted, aided and
15 abetted the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

16 6. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
17 Indictment, Enrique Camarena-Salazar was a Special Agent employed
18 by the Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter "DEA") and
19 assigned to the DEA office in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

20 7. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
21 Indictment, Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was responsible
22 for investigating the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

23 8. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
24 Indictment, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar was a pilot who assisted the DEA
25 and Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in locating marijuana
26 fields in Mexico.

1 9. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
2 Indictment, John Walker was a United States citizen temporarily
3 residing in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

4 10. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
5 Indictment, Alberto Radelat was a United States permanent resident
6 alien temporarily residing in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

7 11. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
8 Indictment, defendant MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA was the Director of
9 the Mexican Federal Judicial Police.

10 12. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
11 Indictment, defendant MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA was the Director of
12 Interpol in Mexico.

13 13. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
14 Indictment, defendant ARMANDO PAVON-REYES was a Comandante with
15 the Mexican Federal Judicial Police and assigned by the Mexican
16 government to head the investigation into the kidnapping and
17 murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

18 14. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
19 Indictment, defendant SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, a Comandante with the
20 Directorate of Federal Security in Mexico, worked for the
21 Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

22 15. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
23 Indictment, defendant JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, a State Judicial
24 Police Officer assigned to the homicide investigation squad in
25 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, worked for the Guadalajara Narcotics
26 Cartel.

1 16. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
2 Indictment, co-conspirator Raul Lopez-Alvarez, a State Judicial
3 Police officer assigned to the homicide investigation squad in
4 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, worked for the Guadalajara Narcotics
5 Cartel.

6 17. At all times referred to in this Sixth Superseding
7 Indictment, defendant JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, an agent with
8 the Mexican Federal Judicial Police assigned to Guadalajara,
9 Jalisco, Mexico, worked for the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

10 18. Commencing in 1984, members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
11 Cartel engaged in a series of actions the purpose and intent of
12 which was to retaliate against the DEA, its agents and informants,
13 in Mexico, and to learn the nature and extent of the DEA's
14 knowledge of the membership and operations of the cartel. Such
15 actions included, but were not limited to, the following:

16 a. On or about September 30, 1984, a confidential
17 informant working for the DEA was shot in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
18 Mexico, by members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

19 b. On or about October 10, 1984, in Guadalajara,
20 Jalisco, Mexico, members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel
21 machine-gunned a DEA automobile assigned to a DEA agent.

22 c. On or about January 30, 1985, John Walker and
23 Alberto Radelat were murdered by members of the Guadalajara
24 Narcotics Cartel.

1 d. On or about February 7, 1985, Special Agent Enrique
2 Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar were kidnapped by
3 members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.

4 e. On or about February 7, 1985, Special Agent Enrique
5 Camarena-Salazar was taken to defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO's
6 residence at 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

7 f. Between on or about February 7, 1985, and February
8 9, 1985, Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo
9 Zavala-Avelar were tortured, interrogated and murdered.

10 19. On or about February 7, 1985, defendant JUAN JOSE
11 BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and other named defendants and co-conspirators,
12 were present at 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

13 20. On or about February 9, 1985, defendant RAFAEL
14 CARO-QUINTERO and co-conspirator Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez fled
15 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

16 21. On or about March 5, 1985, the bodies of Special Agent
17 Enrique Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar were found
18 together in Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico.

19 22. On or about March 17, 1985, defendant RAFAEL
20 CARO-QUINTERO fled Mexico to Costa Rica.

21 23. On or about June 17, 1985, the bodies of John Walker and
22 Alberto Radelat were found together in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
23 Mexico.

COUNT ONE

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1959, 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about January 30, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, JAVIER VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-OCHOA, EZEQUIEL GODINEZ-CERVANTES, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did aid, abet, counsel, induce, procure, cause and otherwise willfully participate in the murder of John Walker, which offense was committed for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the positions of the aforesaid defendants in an enterprise that engaged in racketeering activity, to wit: individuals associated for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana and cocaine, whose activities affected interstate and foreign commerce. The racketeering activity included, but is not limited to, the following substantive narcotics offenses:

1. From in or about November, 1983, through in or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute multi-ton quantities of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields in Zacatecas, Mexico.

2. In or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed

1 with intent to distribute approximately ten (10) tons of
2 harvested marijuana in Zacatecas, Mexico.

3 3. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
4 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
5 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
6 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
7 marijuana.

8 4. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
9 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
10 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
11 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
12 marijuana.

13 5. In or about November, 1984, defendant RAFAEL
14 CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
15 Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute approximately 10,000
16 tons of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields
17 in Chihuahua, Mexico.

18 6. On or about February 5, 1985, co-conspirator Rene Martin
19 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
20 Cartel, possessed two (2) tons of marijuana with intent to
21 distribute.
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COUNT TWO

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1959, 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about January 30, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, JAVIER VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-VELASCO, ANTONIO VASQUEZ-OCHOA, EZEQUIEL GODINEZ-CERVANTES, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did aid, abet, counsel, induce, procure, cause and otherwise willfully participate in the murder of Alberto Radelat, which offense was committed for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the positions of the aforesaid defendants in an enterprise that engaged in racketeering activity, to wit: individuals associated for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana and cocaine, whose activities affected interstate and foreign commerce. The racketeering activity included, but is not limited to, the following substantive narcotics offenses:

1. From in or about November, 1983, through in or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute multi-ton quantities of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields in Zacatecas, Mexico.

1 2. In or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO,
2 and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed
3 with intent to distribute approximately ten (10) tons of
4 harvested marijuana in Zacatecas, Mexico.

5 3. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
6 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
7 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
8 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
9 marijuana.

10 4. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
11 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
12 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
13 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
14 marijuana.

15 5. In or about November, 1984, defendant RAFAEL
16 CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
17 Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute approximately 10,000
18 tons of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields
19 in Chihuahua, Mexico.

20 6. On or about February 5, 1985, co-conspirator Rene Martin
21 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
22 Cartel, possessed two (2) tons of marijuana with intent to
23 distribute.

COUNT THREE

[18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959, 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

A. Objects of the Conspiracy

Beginning on a date unknown and continuing to on or about February 9, 1985, within Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and co-conspirators Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to commit an offense against the United States, namely:

To knowingly and intentionally kidnap, torture, interrogate and murder Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959.

B. Means of the Conspiracy

The foregoing objects of the conspiracy were accomplished as follows:

1. Defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL

1 IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN
2 ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, JUAN
3 GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES,
4 and others both known and unknown, organized
5 and put into operation a scheme to kidnap and
6 murder Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a Special
7 Agent with the United States Drug Enforcement
8 Administration.

- 9 2. Defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO
10 FONSECA-CARRILLO, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN,
11 HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE
12 BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and co-conspirators Rene
13 Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, and Raul
14 Lopez-Alvarez, and other members of the
15 Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, caused Special
16 Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar to be kidnapped,
17 held against his will, tortured, interrogated
18 and murdered.

19 C. Overt Acts

20 The following overt acts, among others, were committed by the
21 defendants and by their co-conspirators in furtherance of the
22 foregoing conspiracy in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico:

- 23 1. In or about October, 1984, defendants RAFAEL
24 CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN
25 RAMON MATTIA-BALLESTEROS, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA,
26 MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER
27 BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES,
28

1 and others, met at a residence of defendant
2 JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
3 Mexico, and discussed the kidnapping of Special
4 Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

5 2. In or about December, 1984, defendants RAFAEL
6 CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JAVIER
7 BARBA-HERNANDEZ, and others, met at a residence
8 of defendant ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO in
9 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, and had a
10 discussion concerning Special Agent Enrique
11 Camarena-Salazar.

12 3. In or about December, 1984, defendant JUAN
13 GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, an agent with the
14 Mexican Federal Judicial Police, was present at
15 this meeting at the residence of defendant
16 ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO in Guadalajara,
17 Jalisco, Mexico.

18 4. In or about the first week of February, 1985,
19 defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO
20 FONSECA-CARRILLO, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE and JAVIER
21 BARBA-HERNANDEZ met at a residence of defendant
22 JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
23 Mexico, and discussed the kidnapping and
24 interrogation of Special Agent Enrique
25 Camarena-Salazar.

- 1 5. On or about February 7, 1985, Special Agent
2 Enrique Camarena-Salazar was abducted by
3 members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel.
- 4 6. From on or about February 7, 1985, to
5 February 9, 1985, defendant RAFAEL CARO-
6 QUINTERO, and others, interrogated Special
7 Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar at 881 Lope de
8 Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
- 9 7. From on or about February 7, 1985, to February
10 9, 1985, defendant SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, a
11 Comandante with the Directorate of Federal
12 Security, and others, interrogated Special
13 Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar at 881 Lope de
14 Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
- 15 8. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant ERNESTO
16 FONSECA-CARRILLO was present at 881 Lope de
17 Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
- 18 9. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant JUAN
19 JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, a State Judicial Police
20 Officer, was present at 881 Lope de Vega in
21 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
- 22 10. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant
23 HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN was present at 881
24 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
- 25 11. On or about February 8, 1985, co-conspirator
26 Raul Lopez-Alvarez, a State Judicial Police

Officer, was present at 881 Lope de Vega in
Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

12. On or about February 8, 1985, co-conspirator
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was present at 881
Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

13. On or about February 10, 1985, defendant MIGUEL
ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO possessed at his residence
in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, a photograph
of Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

COUNT FOUR

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1959, 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about February 7, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATA-BALLESTEROS, MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ and co-conspirators René Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raúl Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did aid, abet, counsel, induce, procure, cause and otherwise willfully participate in the kidnapping and murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar, which offenses were committed for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the positions of the aforesaid defendants in an enterprise that engaged in racketeering activity, to wit: individuals associated for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana and cocaine, whose activities affected interstate and foreign commerce. The racketeering activity included, but is not limited to, the following substantive narcotics offenses:

1. From in or about November, 1983, through in or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute multi-ton quantities of marijuana, which were being cultivated in marijuana fields in Zacatecas, Mexico.

1 2. In or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO,
2 and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed
3 with intent to distribute approximately ten (10) tons of
4 harvested marijuana in Zacatecas, Mexico.

5 3. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
6 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
7 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
8 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
9 marijuana.

10 4. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
11 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
12 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
13 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
14 marijuana.

15 5. In or about November, 1984, defendant RAFAEL
16 CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
17 Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute approximately 10,000
18 tons of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields
19 in Chihuahua, Mexico.

20 6. On or about February 5, 1985, co-conspirator Rene Martin
21 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
22 Cartel, possessed two (2) tons of marijuana with intent to
23 distribute.

COUNT FIVE

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1959, 21]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about February 7, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ and co-conspirators Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did aid, abet, counsel, induce, procure, cause and otherwise willfully participate in the kidnapping and murder of Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, which offenses were committed for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the positions of the aforesaid defendants in an enterprise that engaged in racketeering activity, to wit: individuals associated for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana and cocaine, whose activities affected interstate and foreign commerce. The racketeering activity included, but is not limited to, the following substantive narcotics offenses:

1. From in or about November, 1983, through in or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute multi-ton quantities of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields in Zacatecas, Mexico.

2. In or about June, 1984, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel, possessed

1 with intent to distribute approximately ten (10) tons of
2 harvested marijuana in Zacatecas, Mexico.

3 3. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
4 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
5 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
6 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
7 marijuana.

8 4. In or about April, 1984, co-conspirator Rene Martin
9 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
10 Cartel, in the Central District of California and elsewhere,
11 possessed with intent to distribute approximately two (2) tons of
12 marijuana.

13 5. In or about November, 1984, defendant RAFAEL
14 CARO-QUINTERO, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
15 Cartel, possessed with intent to distribute approximately 10,000
16 tons of marijuana which were being cultivated in marijuana fields
17 in Chihuahua, Mexico.

18 6. On or about February 5, 1985, co-conspirator Rene Martin
19 Verdugo-Urquidez, and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
20 Cartel, possessed two (2) tons of marijuana with intent to
21 distribute.

COUNT SIX

[18 U.S.C. § 1201(c)]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

A. Objects of the Conspiracy

Beginning on a date unknown and continuing to on or about February 9, 1985, within Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and co-conspirators Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to commit an offense against the United States, namely:

To knowingly and intentionally kidnap and hold for the purpose of interrogation, a Special Agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, on account of the performance of his official duties, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1201(a)(5) and 1201(c).

B. Means of the Conspiracy

The foregoing objects of the conspiracy were accomplished as follows:

1. Defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO
FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS,
MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL
IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN
ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, JUAN
GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES,
and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
Cartel, developed a scheme and plan to kidnap,
torture and interrogate Enrique
Camarena-Salazar, a Special Agent with the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
2. Defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO
FONSECA-CARRILLO, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN,
HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE
BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and co-conspirators Rene
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez and Raul Lopez-Alvarez
and other members of the Guadalajara Narcotics
Cartel, caused Special Agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar to be held against his will at
881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
Mexico.

C. Overt Acts

The following overt acts, among others, were committed by the
defendants and by their co-conspirators in furtherance of the
foregoing conspiracy in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico:

1. In or about October, 1984, in a meeting at a residence of defendant JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, and others, discussed the kidnapping of Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.
2. In or about December, 1984, in a meeting at a residence of defendant ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, and others, had a discussion concerning Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.
3. In or about December, 1984, defendant JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, an agent with the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, was present at this meeting at defendant ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO's residence in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
4. In or about the first week of February, 1985, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE and JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ met at a residence of defendant JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ in Guadalajara, Jalisco,

1 Mexico, and discussed the kidnapping and
2 interrogation of Special Agent Enrique
3 Camarena-Salazar.

4 5. On or about February 7, 1985, members of the
5 Guadalajara Narcotics Cartel abducted Special
6 Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

7 6. Between on or about February 7, 1985, and
8 February 9, 1985, defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO,
9 and others, interrogated Special Agent Enrique
10 Camarena-Salazar.

11 7. Between on or about February 7, 1985, and
12 February 9, 1985, defendant SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN,
13 a Comandante with the Directorate of Federal
14 Security, and others, interrogated Special Agent
15 Enrique Camarena-Salazar.

16 8. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant ERNESTO
17 FONSECA-CARRILLO went to 881 Lope de Vega in
18 Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

19 9. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant JUAN JOSE
20 BERNABE-RAMIREZ, a State Judicial Police Officer,
21 went to 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
22 Mexico.

1. 10. On or about February 8, 1985, defendant HUMBERTO
2. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN went to 881 Lope de Vega in
3. Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
4. 11. On or about February 8, 1985, co-conspirator Rene
5. Martin Verdugo-Urquidez went to 881 Lope de Vega
6. in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
7. 12. On or about February 8, 1985, co-conspirator Raul
8. Lopez-Alvarez, a State Judicial Police Officer,
9. went to 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara, Jalisco,
10. Mexico.
11. 13. On or about February 10, 1985, defendant MIGUEL
12. ANGEL FERRIX-GALLARDO possessed at his residence
13. in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, a photograph of
14. Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.
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COUNT SEVEN

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(5), 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

Beginning on a date unknown and continuing to on or about February 9, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, MIGUEL ANGEL FELIX-GALLARDO, MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, MIGUEL ALDANA-IBARRA, RUBEN ZUNO-ARCE, JAVIER BARBA-HERNANDEZ, ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, JUAN GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-PARRA, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ, and co-conspirators Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did aid, abet, counsel, induce, procure, cause and otherwise willfully participate in the abduction and holding for the purpose of interrogation of Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration, such acts having been done while Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was engaged in, and on account of, the performance of his official duties, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1201(a)(5) and 2.

COUNT EIGHT

[18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114, 2]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about February 9, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, an officer and employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration, was murdered on account of the performance of his official duties as a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, said murder having taken place in and during the course of the perpetration of his kidnapping.

Defendants RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO, ERNESTO FONSECA-CARRILLO, JUAN RAMON MATTA-BALLESTEROS, SERGIO ESPINO-VERDIN, HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ and co-conspirators Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, willfully perpetrated the kidnapping and holding for interrogation of Enrique Camarena-Salazar, on account of the performance of his official duties as a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, by aiding, abetting, counseling, inducing, procuring, causing and otherwise willfully participating in said kidnapping, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1111, 1114, and 2.

COUNT NINE

[18 U.S.C. § 3]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

On or about February 9, 1985, in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, defendants MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ and ARMANDO PAVON-REYES, and co-conspirator Raul Lopez-Alvarez, knowing that defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured, caused and otherwise willfully participated in the kidnapping and murder of Enrique Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, in violation by defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1111, 1114, 1201(a)(5), 1959 and 2, did knowingly and willfully receive, comfort and assist defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension, trial and punishment, in violation by defendants MANUEL IBARRA-HERRERA, JUAN JOSE BERNABE-RAMIREZ and ARMANDO PAVON-REYES and co-conspirator Raul Lopez-Alvarez, of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3.



COUNT TEN

[18 U.S.C. § 3]

The general allegations of this Sixth Superseding Indictment are realleged in this count and incorporated herein by reference.

From in or about February, 1985, through April 4, 1985, in Mexico, Costa Rica and elsewhere, defendants INES CALDERON-QUINTERO and ALBINO BAZAN-PADILLA, knowing that defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO aided, abetted, counseled, induced, procured, caused and otherwise willfully participated in the kidnapping and murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar in violation by RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1111, 1114, 1201(a)(5), 1959 and 2, did knowingly and willfully receive, comfort and assist defendant RAFAEL CARO-QUINTERO in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension, trial and punishment, in violation by defendants INES CALDERON-QUINTERO and ALBINO BAZAN-PADILLA, of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3.

A TRUE BILL


Foreperson
United States Attorney

DRAFT SALVADOR 274/337
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84 90 000
(E284)

Financing Terrorism in El Salvador:

The Secret Support Network for the FMLN

RELEASED

by J. Michael Waller

Council for Inter-American Security

Washington, D.C.

RELEASED
El Salvador: Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

June 4, 1987

DRAFT

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: LANDFAIR, WILLIAM E.
Date: 05/23/94
Case ID: S940035C

Council for Inter-American Security
122 C Street NW, Suite 330
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UNCLASSIFIED

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SHARE Foundation

26
RELEASED
El Salvador: Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

The SHARE (Salvadoran Humanitarian Aid, Research and Education) Foundation was founded in 1981 ostensibly as a fundraising organization to benefit Salvadoran refugees living inside El Salvador or elsewhere in Central America. Its first fundraising campaign took place in October, 1981, as part of a nationwide "Emergency Action Campaign" sponsored by CISPES to raise \$250,000. Lisa Tarver, a staffer at the national CISPES office, sent local activists letters announcing the campaign and SHARE's function in the solidarity movement.¹²⁰

In letter to activists dated 11 September 1981, Lisa Tarver described the new fundraising campaign, and spelled out how CISPES and SHARE comingle funds to be sent to the FMLN:

"All funds raised in the Emergency Aid campaign will be sent to the [CISPES] national office. The money will then be channeled through SHARE, which will have tax-exempt status that we will be able to utilize. SHARE sends all financial contributions for the refugees to Archbishop Sergio Mendez Arceo in Cuernavaca, Mexico, from where they are distributed to refugee camps throughout Central America. As for making out checks, they can still be made out to 'Emergency Aid to El Salvador' as before. However, [if] an individual or organization wants to receive the tax deduction or feels uneasy about giving money to CISPES, they can make the checks payable directly to SHARE."

SHARE's involvement with CISPES is not surprising; its original six-person board of directors included CISPES national coordinator Heidi Tarver, as well as representatives of two pro-Castro groups: Council on Hemispheric Affairs director Larry Birns, and Isabel Letelier of the Institute for Policy Studies (who helped Farid Handal when he visited Washington in 1980 to set up CISPES).

The FMLN uses refugee camps just over the Salvadoran border in Honduras as sanctuaries between battles.¹²¹ Several of these camps are operated by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, which are tolerant of the FMLN's presence there. When Honduras proposed moving these camps further from the Salvadoran border and out of reach from the FMLN, the guerrillas' support groups in the United States, including SHARE, launched a political campaign against move, charging, "The Honduran and U.S. governments want the camps out of the way in order to carry out their military maneuvers in the vicinity without civilian observers," and adding this pitiful rationale: "The refugees believe that the infrastructure they have built in the camps will be turned into military bases for the U.S. intervention in El Salvador."¹²²

3

MASSACHUSETTS TELEVISION

THE MAIL

Your cover story about American mercenaries in Central America left out a major point: Americans are also serving the Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. There is an extensive apparatus in the United States that channels material aid to the Sandinistas and the FMLN, and the many Americans who serve them constitute a major story that has yet to be told.

J. MICHAEL WALLER

Director of Publications

Council for Inter-American Security

Washington, D.C.

NEWSWEEK: NOVEMBER 24, 1986

RELEASED

El Salvador: Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

Financing Terrorism in El Salvador: The Secret Support Network for the FMLN

Barbara

Introduction. The Salvadoran situation
Support apparatus and how it works

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INTRODUCTION: The Salvadoran guerrillas' support apparatus and how it operates

The core of the political and financial support apparatus in the United States for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador is the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), which was officially founded the day after the FMLN itself was formally inaugurated in October, 1980. CISPES openly states its support for the FMLN and its political branch, the FDR, but is often misperceived as a "peace" group. Over the years, CISPES has been firmly supportive of the FMLN, to the point of defending its assassinations of American businessmen and Marine embassy guards.

CISPES has a multifaceted approach in its FMLN support campaign. Its own propaganda line is completely coincidental with that of the FMLN, suggesting close coordination of political activities. Founded to protest the Carter Administration's policy of cautious support for El Salvador's reformist transitional juntas, CISPES has been consistent in its steadfast opposition to any U.S. government aid of any kind, including humanitarian, to El Salvador. A cutoff U.S. aid, CISPES reasons, would completely undermine El Salvador's economic, military and political infrastructure and therefore enable the FMLN to seize power as the Sandinistas did in Nicaragua.

In an effort to pressure Congress to reduce or end aid to El Salvador, CISPES functions as a component of the "Revolution Lobby," a loose movement of political and educational organizations which support Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements in the Third World. CISPES constantly encourages and mobilizes its activists in more than 400 local chapters to write letters and call their elected officials in Washington, demanding that they vote against aid to El Salvador. In addition, CISPES generates letters to the editor of local newspapers, organizes demonstrations at the grassroots level and in Washington, and holds media events to dramatize opposition to U.S. policy in Central America. The national office sponsors speaking tours for FMLN-FDR representatives, but much of the time, local chapters conceal or downplay their support for the FMLN. CISPES gained further political legitimacy by winning the public support of several celebrities and Members of Congress.

The support group, or "solidarity committee," as it is referred to by the FMLN, works with genuinely pacifist church organizations and exploits their desire to avoid a war in Central America. Taking advantage of concerns for peace and human rights, CISPES uses many mainline Catholic, Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist and other clergymen to give it an appearance of legitimacy and to use their church collection boxes as a source of funds for the FMLN. More radical clergymen, many of whom espouse "liberation theology," work with CISPES out of their ideological support for the FMLN. They use the rhetoric of peace as a weapon for the FMLN's war.

✓
CISPES is a
solidarity committee

Current CISPES national coordinator Angela Sanbrano is recognized by those who matter for her work in promoting the guerrillas. The September 1985 issue of the CISPES newsletter *Alert!* reported that she made an "unprecedented visit with members of the FMLN high command" in El Salvador (including Salvadoran Communist Party leader Shafik Handal), then went to Nicaragua where she and other members of her "peace delegation" accompanied Sandinista Interior Minister Tomas Borge at a mass rally in Leon. From there, Sanbrano went to Cuba, meeting with Fidel Castro. In October the following year, according to Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Soviet Communist Party's "Peace Committee" invited Sanbrano on an all expense-paid trip to Moscow. Although her seat had already been reserved on a New York-Moscow Aeroflot flight, Sanbrano was unable to go.

CISPES is also the core of a "gaggle of humanitarian" groups which raise money for medical aid, developmental and educational projects, and financial assistance ostensibly for El Salvador's poor. These "humanitarian" affiliates, which are recognized as charities by the Internal Revenue Service, likewise support the FMLN politically, but often mask their true position when soliciting funds. Up to seventy percent of the humanitarian funds raised through these organizations are diverted to the FMLN for military purposes, according to a high-level guerrilla defector.

Since 1984, the Council for Inter-American Security has argued that CISPES and its affiliates are agents for the FMLN, and should register with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. However, repeated attempts over a two year period to persuade the Justice Department to act have been rebuffed by the Foreign Agents Registration Office.

While the support network for the anti-Communist resistance fighters in Nicaragua has been thoroughly investigated, exposed, and in some cases shut down by the Justice Department, the news media, and congressional committees, the secret U.S.-based supply network for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador has been virtually unscathed. [While the Soviet bloc provides training, weapons, and logistics to the FMLN, it is unable or unwilling to supply the dollars needed to keep the guerrilla infrastructure alive. Since 1980, the FMLN has relied on private supporters in the United States to fill the gap.

re-writes { House Majority Leader Tom Foley said recently that he would favor a Congressional investigation of the Salvadoran guerrillas' private aid network in the United States if there was sufficient evidence to merit one. This study is only an outline of the FMLN's multimillion-dollar American support operation.

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The Ideology of the FMLN guerrillas

Before discussing the support apparatus for the guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), their ideology must be addressed. While FMLN supporters, skeptics in Congress, and most journalists in the mainstream media balk at referring to the guerrillas as Communists, preferring the euphemistic terms "leftist" or "Marxist-led," the *Washington Post* and the *Miami Herald* have on occasion documented that the FMLN's entire leadership is indeed Marxist-Leninist.¹

Once the origins of the five FMLN factions are traced, it becomes self-evident that all have been ideologically Marxist-Leninist since their inception, putting to rest once and for all the myth that the guerrillas are agrarian reformers who were forced to embrace Communism in the course of their struggle.

The FMLN is an umbrella group composed of five guerrilla/terrorist factions, each of which has a military and political branch. The FMLN General Command is made up of the top commander of each of the five factions. Beneath the FMLN General Command is the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), a panel made up of three representatives of each of the five factions which is considered the actual decision-making body of the FMLN force.²

The first and oldest FMLN faction, from which three of the others are derived, is the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), which was founded by the Comintern in the early 1920s when it was led by the FMLN's namesake, Augusto Farabundo Martí. Shafik Handal is the PCS general secretary, and is the PCS representative on the FMLN General Command, as well as on the DRU. Some accounts identify Handal as leader of the General Command. While the five factions were in the process of uniting under the FMLN umbrella in 1980, Shafik Handal traveled to Vietnam, Ethiopia and the Warsaw Pact nations to procure arms for the guerrillas' anticipated "final offensive." Handal uses the code name "Simon." The PCS' strongest historical international ties are with the Soviet Union.

The second faction is the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), a PCS splinter group founded by Handal's predecessor in the PCS, the late Salvador Cayetano Carpio, known as "Marcial." The split was over the PCS' policy in 1970 which was insufficiently supportive of violence, in line with Brezhnev's peaceful coexistence policy at the time. Marcial, who was then PCS general secretary, stepped down and organized the FPL. (After the Sandinistas' success in 1979, the PCS adopted a policy of armed violence.) Shafik Handal succeeded him as PCS leader. Marcial died under mysterious circumstances in Managua, Nicaragua, in 1981. Currently, the FPL leader is Leonel Gonzalez, who sits on the FMLN General Command. The FPL's strongest historical international ties are with Cuba.

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A third faction in the FMLN is the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), commanded by Joaquin Villalobos. Like the FPL, the ERP is a spinoff of the Salvadoran Communist Party. Villalobos represents the ERP on the FMLN General Command. The ERP's strongest historical international ties were briefly with the People's Republic of China.

RN
political
branch

The National Resistance, or Armed Forces of National Resistance (RN or FARN) is the fourth faction, led by Eduardo Sancho, who calls himself "Ferman Cienfuegos." The FARN is a splinter group which broke from the ERP in 1974. Cienfuegos is the FARN representative on the FMLN General Command.

8 The fifth faction is known as the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), commanded by Francisco Jovel, alias "Roberto Roca." It emphasizes a regional revolution of a single Marxist-Leninist Central American political party/guerrilla movement, and is considered Trotskyist in orientation. Roca represents the PRTC on the FMLN General Command. It is the PRTC faction which led the June 1985 terrorist attack on four U.S. Marines eating dinner at a Salvadoran restaurant, an action which was supported by the entire FMLN. The PRTC's strongest historical international ties are with North Korea.

How these five factions united under the DRU and finally in October, 1980, into the FMLN is documented by R. Bruce McColm in *El Salvador: Peaceful Revolution or Armed Struggle?* published in New York by Freedom House. Further information about the FMLN's ideology, its supply of arms and training by the Soviet bloc, and its relations with other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements in the Americas can be found in the bibliography.

Of all the information on the FMLN's ideology, no single document is more telling than "Fundamental Programs for the Salvadoran Revolution," a guerrilla manifesto captured from Commander Nidia Diaz in April, 1985. A complete facsimile of the original document can be found in Appendix 2. The "fundamental programs" include:

- "1. To end definitively the politico-military-economic and social dependency of the country with respect to Yankee imperialism.
- "2. To liquidate definitively the politico-military and economic, social power of the bourgeois landowning oligarchy allied with imperialism, and to liquidate capitalist exploitation in general.
- "3. To establish economic, political, military, cultural, technical and social bases to build the construction of socialism.
- "4. The construction of socialism and communism.
- "5. Our organization is a working class party. Our ideology is Marxism-Leninism. . . .

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"6. We are militants of Proletarian Internationalism and Solidarity of the peoples.

"7. We struggle definitively against capitalism and dependency of the country, we struggle for victory of the revolution and the popular road of socialism.

"8. Our revolution and the national and international practice of our militancy forms part of and is squared inside the gigantic force of humanity to conquer. . . the edification of socialism and communism in the world."

"10. We recognize the World Socialist Camp, in the struggle of the proletariat and peoples of capitalist and imperialist countries for Social Revolution, as in the struggle for National Liberation, the three fundamental watersheds of the World Revolution.

"11. The World Socialist Camp is the vanguard of the World Revolution and constitutes our friend and fundamental ally. In the first stage embodying the USSR, Cuba and Vietnam as the strongest pillars in a concrete strategic sense.

"12. Fundamental in Marxism-Leninism and Proletarian Internationalism is the duty of the revolutionaries to put all our efforts toward contributing to the consolidation of Unity in the International Revolutionary and Workers' Movement.

"13. Yankee imperialism is the historic fundamental enemy of humanity and the fundamental strategic enemy of our people. In consequence, we condemn and combat the aggressive policies of imperialism and world reaction, in whatever part of the planet, is our duty.

"14. We are unconditionally in solidarity with the anti-colonialist struggles and against neocolonialism of all the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. From there we oppose all forms of class and racial oppression in the world, zionism and apartheid. . . .

"15. Our Revolution is inseparable from the Revolutionary Struggle of the brother peoples in the region, de ahí que contribuir a la Revolution in the Central American region and the support to victorious Nicaragua is our natural historical objective."

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LAYING THE GROUNDWORK OF CISPES

Farid Handal's trip to the United States,
February-March 1980

Fidel Castro had told Salvadoran revolutionary leaders that if they wanted his complete support, they would have to set aside their differences and form a unified "national liberation front," much like the three Sandinista factions had done in 1977.³ While all five paramilitary factions were ideologically Marxist-Leninist, they had different doctrinal differences ranging from Stalinist to Trotskyist.

Only one revolutionary group had the total confidence of the Soviets, and that was the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) headed by Shafik Handal. Formed in 1925 by Salvadoran Comintern agent Augusto Farabundo Marti, the PCS was the only organization in El Salvador officially recognized by the Soviets. Like most Moscow-line Communist Parties, the PCS maintains party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Three other guerrilla factions were splinter groups from the PCS (Popular Liberation Forces [FPL] and People's Revolutionary Army [ERP] broke from the PCS in 1970 and '72; the National Resistance [FARN] split from the ERP in 1975.)⁴ Logically from the Soviets' view, the PCS became the primary organ within the forming Salvadoran national liberation front.

The PCS began laying the groundwork for its military, financial and political support apparatuses in 1979 and knew from the successes of the Vietcong and the Sandinistas that they would fight their war on two fronts: One on the military battleground in El Salvador, and the other on the political battleground in the United States. Neither the Vietcong nor the Sandinistas won militarily, and neither would the Salvadoran revolutionaries.

The Sandinistas' recent victory against General Somoza and his National Guard was not a military one. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had begun setting up its own U.S.-based solidarity apparatus in 1977, officially inaugurating it in February, 1979 with the support of prominent American political leaders.⁵ It promoted the FSLN as the sole legitimate representative of the Nicaraguan people, conducting political activities throughout the U.S. to help ensure that the FSLN and the FSLN alone would be accepted and recognized as the new Nicaraguan government. Washington had already turned its back on Somoza by slapping an arms embargo against his regime, and later engineered

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diplomatic isolation of his government through the Organization of American States.

By June, 1979, the United States had disarmed the National Guard by imposing a veritable blockade of Nicaragua. Two Israeli freighters bound for Nicaragua with a resupply of arms and ammunition for the National Guard were forced to turn back by the Carter Administration. Issuing an ultimatum, the U.S. forced Somoza to flee Nicaragua. Unarmed and leaderless, the National Guard dissolved, and the Sandinistas marched into Managua two days later.⁶

The PCS was working to form the Salvadoran national liberation front in the last year of the Carter presidency, planning a "final offensive" for late December 1980. For its military campaign to be successful, there had to be heavy political pressure in the United States to continue the arms embargo of El Salvador and to promote the emerging FMLN as the sole legitimate representative of the Salvadoran people.

PCS agent sets up support apparatus in United States

Farid Handal, brother of Shafik, was the PCS agent dispatched to set up the Salvadoran guerrillas' political and financial support apparatus in the United States. He arrived in New York in February 1980, just a few months before his brother Shafik was to go on an arms-shopping trip to the Soviet bloc. Farid's objective, according to his diary which was captured by the Salvadoran military, was "the creation of the International Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador."⁷

He wrote that while not an actual member of the PCS, "I accepted their line and collaborated to the extent of my possibilities." As a cover, he presented himself as a representative of the National Democratic Union (UDN), which in reality is a legal front of the PCS. During his two visits to New York, he said he made important contacts: A Cuban intelligence officer based at the United Nations and the leadership of the Communist Party USA.

Contrary to popular opinion, the CPUSA is not simply a leftist political party, but is an agent of the Soviet government for conducting political influence operations in the United States. While numerically very small, the CPUSA provides the Soviets with a disciplined cadre of operatives who receive their political directives from the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, led at the time by Comintern veteran Boris Ponomarev.⁸ Much of the funding for the

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CPUSA comes in the form of cash transfers from the KGB through the Soviet Mission at the U.N. and the Soviet Embassy in Washington.⁹

Meeting with "members of the Directorate of the CPUSA," Farid described the help he needed in setting up the "Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador." He said that the Communist Party leaders had invited him to the meeting (implying that they knew about his visit in advance), and that "in spite of the fact that I insisted that I did not represent the PCS, they insisted that they needed to meet with me, because they wanted information."

At first, the CPUSA leaders were skeptical of him, but after a while, Farid said, they "allowed me to speak and they began to behave more cordially and humanly; now they smiled and listened. . . . The meeting lasted several hours." His specific contact and translator on the CPUSA politburo was Sandy Pollack, an attractive and energetic activist who had been involved in promoting Third World revolutionaries for the Party since her days in Cuba with the Venceremos Brigades. A CPUSA National Council (politburo)-member, Pollack was also active in the United States Peace Council (USPC), a CPUSA front which served as the U.S. chapter of the World Peace Council, the leading Soviet international front organization which organizes and promotes "active measures" campaigns against the West. Farid identified her as the "person responsible for the U.S. Peace Council" and the "solidarity coordinator" for that organization. (See section on the United States Peace Council).

During his New York visit, Farid also met at the home of Alfredo Garcia Almeida, the fourth-ranking official at the Cuban Mission to the U.N. who has been identified as a Cuban intelligence officer under the control of the KGB.⁹ According to the diary, Garcia Almeida "recommended that I should carry out work of an informational nature about the situation in El Salvador with progressive Congressmen for the purpose of making the rest of my work more natural. And in that way to protect my visa. They offered to facilitate contacts in Washington. And they did that."

More on Handal's visit

During his trip to the U.S., Farid Handal apparently passed himself off as a representative of the National Democratic Union (UDN) in order to disguise his appearance as an agent for the PCS. The UDN is the legal front of the PCS. Taking the guidance of Pollack and Garcia Almeida, Farid went to Washington for meetings arranged by the CPUSA. What follows is a verbatim transcript excerpted from Farid's diary:

"Surprise encounter with Veronica (Chilean) of the CPUSA charged by the Directorate of the CPUSA in Washington with arranging a meeting. Meeting with

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Mouris [sic; Maurice Jackson] president of CPUSA in Washington who informed that he had received instructions to give [me] any help that he might desire. . . . Pleasant meeting. The beginning of a valuable collaboration. . . . They played an important role in the arrangements for the meeting with Congressman Ronal Dellums [sic], Congressman from the state of California. Black, but very progressive.

"The comrades of the CP in Washington were the pioneers for the formation of the International Solidarity Committee that I took the advantage of forming in Washington.

"The comrades of the Cuban Mission had recommended Juan Ferreira, from Uruguay. I contacted him at WOLA [Washington Office on Latin America]. He helped me at WOLA and at the National Council of Churches. . . .

"I contacted Isabel Letelier who had prepared a seminar at the Institute for Policy Studies of Washington. The Seminar would be based on a talk by Napoleon Gonzalez, which had already been announced. Gonzalez was in Washington at the invitation of Amnesty International. . . .

"That same Monday at 4:00 PM the meeting with Congressman Dellums and his work team took place. At the beginning of the meeting which took place in the offices of the Congressman located in the Capitol building, his political counselor made known that my visit could not have arrived at a better moment. They were interested in better understanding the situation in El Salvador because they were ready to do battle against the Hawks who have today strengthened their position and influence in the Senate and Congress of the USA. My statement is transcribed in the attached summary. When the meeting was over they asked me to write it in the offices of Dellums and they gave me a typewriter to use. They explained that they needed it to translate into English and make a report to all of the group of black congressmen. . . . They invited me to participate in that report. At that time we agreed that I would let them know my whereabouts so that they could advise me as to the date and time of the meeting and so that they could bring me back to Washington. . . . For this meeting I prepared a folder with the program of the Government of Coordination. . . . The English translation was done by the comrades of the CP [Communist Party] in Washington. . . . All the arrangements and translations for the folders which we would give to the congressmen had to be

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done in Washington because it was there that we received information from WOLA. . . .

"Monday morning the offices of Congressman Dellums were turned into our offices. Everything was done there. the meeting with the [Congressional] Black Caucus took place in the liver of the monster itself, nothing less than the meeting room of the commission of the exterior [Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives]."

Farid's Second Visit to New York

Farid Handal's second visit to New York toward the end of his organizational tour described how CPUSA politburo member Pollack "proposed" a national conference to set up a permanent, centralized political and financial support apparatus for the Salvadoran revolutionaries. His notes state:

"Meeting with Sandy Pollak [sic], Solidarity Coordinator for the U.S. Peace Council. Sandy proposed a national conference under the auspices of the U.S. Peace Council, the National Council of Churches, Amnesty International, WOLA, and various important unions in the U.S. The objective of the conference would be to establish a support mechanism for the solidarity committees in those states where it does not already exist.

"The support that they proposed consisted in financing radio, TV and press programs, under its public patronage. They agreed to the idea of issuing a series of coupons worth one dollar that they would call Credit Bonds from the North American People to the Salvadoran People, as a counterpart to the credits given by the U.S. Government to the Junta of El Salvador. But all of these propositions had the following as conditions:

"1. That they would back the coordinator [the coalition of support groups] as they did not want to appear to be backing one organization in particular.

"2. That the diverse images of the movement should be eliminated and that the image of a Broad Solidarity Movement should be presented, without an ideological label. . . . Each of the representatives should have the power to express a single [political] line. . . .

"3. At this time they felt that it was indispensable that Monsignor Romero be present. . . . I let them know that it would be very difficult to convince the Monsignor to assume that role. [Note: Conveniently for the Left's propaganda purposes, San Salvador's Archbishop, Monsignor Romero, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen weeks

Farid's
/ new info.

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after this meeting. Both the Left and the Right have been blamed for the killing, but the true assassins are unknown. While the Archbishop was mourned by nearly all Salvadorans, he was exploited as a martyr by the FMLN and its support groups.]

"4. That it would be agreed to call for the conference in no less than 30 days. . . ."

Handal Says Congressional Black Caucus Volunteered to Serve as Guerrillas' Mouthpiece in Congress

Farid returned a second time to meet with the Congressional Black Caucus, according to his diary. It was a fruitful get-together. The notes show that he was to meet with a group of 32 Black and Hispanic Members of Congress, and that the Caucus would "Maintain a close contact with us for information. They would be open to concrete petitions," and "were ready to undertake immediate tasks and establish a permanent climate in favor of the struggle in El Salvador."

"It is good to point out," Farid continued, "that these people have influence and prestige. In reality they are able to collaborate even in special promotions where their prestige could mean an effective support."

Also during his second stay in Washington, Farid met with a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization through an individual named Rene Tensen. The PLO member, who is not named, "identified himself as a representative of one of the smallest groups which make up the PLO. He said that it was one of the smallest groups but that it represented the authentic Marxist-Leninist line. . . . At the end I told him that I did not have the authority for representations at the levels which corresponded to a conversation of this type. And that I would limit myself to carrying the news of their good intentions for helping us. He spoke about help in scholarships [training] for use of arms. He spoke of other types of help."

The Handal brothers would quite naturally have an affinity for the PLO, as they are of Palestinian descent. It is believed that the PLO and some Salvadoran communists first met in 1966 at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, where a resulting international network known as the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL) was set up. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) leaders also met the PLO for the first time at the Tricontinental Conference, which led to FSLN members being trained at PLO camps in Lebanon as early as 1969.

Shafik Handal has known ties with various PLO leaders, including Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) chief George Habash, and PLO leader Yasser Arafat. In March 1981,

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Shafik met with Habash in Lebanon, and the two issued a joint communique stating that an arrangement had been made to continue already existing PLO military aid to the FMLN. A month later, Arafat was publicly supporting the FMLN-FDR. He proclaimed,

"We are a great revolution that can never be intimidated. We have connections with all the revolutions throughout the world, in El Salvador, in Nicaragua--and I reiterate Salvador--and elsewhere in the world."¹⁰

Farid's brother shopped for the guns

[show how arms found from Vietnam through C.I.A. & some deliveries]

Backtracking to 1980 as the FMLN was being built: Three months after Farid Handal successfully organized the base for the guerrillas' solidarity committee in the United States, Shafik made a trip to the Soviet bloc in search of weapons and supplies.¹¹ His *first stop* was Hanoi, on 9 June, where he met with Vietnamese Communist Party leader Le Duan and received a "friendly and enthusiastic reception." They agreed to provide him with American-made weapons left behind after the U.S. pulled out of Southeast Asia; the first shipment, Shafik noted, weighed 60 tons. Weapons deliveries were expected to be made from Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon. *(Shafik's report to the...)*

In East Germany, Shafik was notified that that government had already shipped first-aid kits, cameras and other equipment to Nicaragua for the use of the Salvadoran guerrillas. East German leader Erich Honecker personally approved additional aid and military training to the revolutionaries, pending their detailed requests. No weapons were offered, as the East Germans had no western-made arms on hand, and did not want to give the guerrillas any East-bloc guns. Shafik then went to Czechoslovakia, where he learned that the Czech government had already decided "to send a quantity of weapons of Czech manufacture," types already available on the open market, which would be shipped in coordination with the East Germans.

A four-day stop in Bulgaria was next on Shafik's trip, where he met with Bulgarian Communist Party Secretary for International Affairs Stanichiev, who said that the Bulgarian government would give him 300 reconditioned Nazi submachine guns from World War II, as well as 200,000 rounds of ammunition, 10,000 uniforms, and 2000 medical kits. Shafik noted in his diary that the Bulgarians praised the conduct of the Salvadoran Communist Party.

From Bulgaria, Shafik went to Hungary, and met with Communist Party leader Janos Kadar. The Hungarians offered medicines and first aid kits, and 10,000 uniforms, but had no non-Soviet bloc guns. They did say that they "would be willing to participate in a deal with Ethiopia or Angola" for weapons. Shafik Handal met several times with Soviet officials about receiving military training, weapons, explosives, ammunition, and currency. The

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Soviets said that Vietnam would be the best source of weapons, and arranged for higher level meetings with the Salvadoran that autumn.

Shafik's last stop was Ethiopia, in early July, where he was received by dictator Haile-Mariam Mengistu. The Salvadoran was promised "several thousand weapons," including M-1 and M-14 rifles and some 790,000 rounds of ammunition.

The setting in the summer of 1980

Jimmy Carter was in the White House, locked in a bitter primary battle with Ted Kennedy for his party's presidential nomination. Already, an apparatus had been organized to mobilize U.S. public opinion against Carter's controversial policy toward El Salvador: His "human rights" campaign focused excessively on anti-communist military regimes, ignored the crimes of the Castro government in Cuba, and overlooked the hundreds of executions underway by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which were being documented at the time by the State Department.

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The Carter Administration was aware of intelligence reports indicating that the Sandinistas were already sending supplies and other forms of assistance to the guerrillas in El Salvador. Cautious support was given to the transitional civilian-military juntas governing that country, while conservative and anti-communist figures in El Salvador were excoriated by U.S. Ambassador Robert White. Indeed, many Salvadorans as well as Americans believed that White was supporting El Salvador's extreme left. From the viewpoint of the Handals, Ambassador White must have been quite an encouragement.

That spring, Farid had organized a successful base for the guerrillas' support apparatus in the United States, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. With a grass-roots movement underway to terminate all American aid to El Salvador, Shafik must have been confident during his trip to the Soviet bloc in search of military assistance. The first guns would arrive in September. Meanwhile, the difficult and delicate process of unifying the five guerrilla groups into the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was moving along well, with the guidance of Fidel Castro. The new guerrilla alliance would be announced formally in October, coinciding with the unveiling of its American solidarity committee, CISPES.

Things looked good for the guerrillas' planned "Final Offensive," to take place before the inauguration of the next U.S. president in January 1981. The Salvadoran government was so corrupt and inept, its army so poorly motivated, trained and equipped, that the Final Offensive could be a pushover. On the other hand, the guerrillas were prepared to become engaged in a prolonged war, which would be fought on the Salvadoran battlefield, but won or lost in Washington.

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Profile of the "leading architect" of the FMLN support apparatus

According to Farid Handal's journal of his February-March 1980 organizational trip to the United States, it was CPUSA politburo member Sandy Pollack who was his most important contact in setting up the Salvadoran guerrillas' support apparatus that was to be known as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPE).

Scholars of the strategy and tactics of Soviet-financed active measures in the United States can find a wealth of information on how the CPUSA operates to influence American foreign policy in a 90-page volume honoring Pollack's accomplishments published in 1986 by the U.S. Peace Council. Titled *Sandy Pollack: Her Life*,¹² this remarkable little book is a candid story of one of the top CPUSA organizers in the United States, tracing her political career as she developed from a college student to a professional agent who oversaw the implementation of active measures operations under the direction of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. What follows is adapted from that publication.

Those who knew her said that Pollack was a talented and energetic Party organizer who was responsible for building coalitions between the Communist Party and "peace" and religious groups, trade unions, solidarity and human rights organizations, and old New Left activists through the 1970s and early 1980s. Pollack's career was brought to an end in January, 1985, when she was killed in a plane crash near Havana, Cuba.

A native of Queens, New York, Alexandra "Sandy" Pollack was born in 1948 to Cecilia and Harry Pollack, two leftist activists. In 1967, Sandy Pollack joined the Communist Party and was part of a cell at Boston University, where she was a transfer student. At B.U., she got her first experience in coalition building, where she worked with leftists of varying tendencies in the movement against American involvement in Vietnam. She became a leader in the local Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In the words of the U.S. Peace Council biography, "For two years, she met almost daily with her friends in the Communist Party group at B.U. . . . Sandy organized openly as a Communist. She had a fundamental commitment to the mass anti-war movement that defined student and political life in Boston, and to the Communist Party's role within that movement. She maintained this commitment, this *modus operandi*, for the rest of her life."

She was an organizer of a mass demonstration at B.U. the day after Martin Luther King was assassinated on April 4, 1968, and was a participant in the riots at the Democrat National Convention in

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Chicago that summer. In November 1969, Pollack was a participant in the first Venceremos Brigade to Cuba, where she spent a month working in the Aguacate camp cutting sugar cane and experiencing the Castro revolution.

Pollack became a leader of the Venceremos Brigade's New York committee and office manager of the national office of the CPUSA's youth branch, the Young Workers Liberation League. She set up a New York defense committee for Angela Davis, a CPUSA functionary who was arrested for murder in 1970.

In 1971, Pollack went back to Cuba as a national Venceremos Brigade leader. The Venceremos Brigades were created to inculcate revolutionary fervor among American radicals, to train some of them in terrorist and guerrilla tactics, to gather intelligence, and to recruit some participants as agents to operate back in the United States. All Venceremos Brigades activities were overseen by Cuba's DGI intelligence agency, a body under the control of the Soviet KGB. Pollack directed the finances of the Venceremos Brigades.

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Pollack and her husband, fellow CPUSA staffer Terry Cannon, founded the Tricontinental News Service in 1972 to disseminate news about "progressive" movements in the Third World such as the Vietcong. Much of the materials disseminated by TNS were verbatim political tracts and documents from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hanoi and Havana.

When Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende was ousted in a military coup in September, 1973, Pollack "became a seminal figure in the Chile solidarity movement," according to the U.S. Peace Council.

Pollack's mentor in the mid-1970s was Alberto Moreau, who, the USPC said, was "a life-long Communist and had been instrumental in helping to create and nurture several Latin American communist parties."

When the U.S. Peace Council was formed in 1979 as the American chapter of the World Peace Council, Pollack became associate director, in charge of international solidarity. Her biography says that at this time, "she helped sow the seeds of what would soon become the National Network in Solidarity with Nicaragua, the parent organization of most of the Central American solidarity activities today." (This organization is also known as the Nicaragua Network.)¹³ During that year, she was busy at work in other areas: Organizing three national speaking tours for a group from South Africa, for future Sandinista Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal, and for a radical Chilean musical group called Quilapayun. She also organized celebrations during the 20th anniversary of Castro's seizure of power on July 26, helped arrange the CPUSA national convention in Detroit in August, and set up a speaking tour for Cannon who had just returned from Vietnam and Cambodia. Additionally, she laid out the basic plans for an

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international forum, in support of the Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican separatist movement, in Mexico City, "and finally, the practical and political groundwork for the official founding conference of the U.S. Peace Council that year in Philadelphia."

In 1980, the biography said, "she helped to found CISPES, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, sat on its national advisory council, and served as one of two U.S. representatives on the world body in solidarity with El Salvador."

After President Reagan was elected in 1980, Pollack "was instrumental in organizing mass protests against U.S. troops in Lebanon, the Sabra and Shatila massacres of Palestinians, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the [Big] Pine I and [Big] Pine II military exercises in Central America, and U.S. participation in numerous international peace congresses," said her biography. Perhaps the most noteworthy mass protest Pollack helped organize was the June 12, 1982 rally in New York City's Central Park, where some 700,000 people (the biography says "close to a million") gathered to demand a U.S. nuclear freeze. The USPC recalled, "as much as anyone, and more than most, she made it possible."¹⁴

Pollack went to El Salvador in 1983 to go out with the FMLN guerrillas. Her biography stated, "If the government authorities had known of her quiet visit, this leading architect of U.S. support for the Salvadoran guerrillas likely would have been tortured and killed. But she eluded the armed forces and the death squads." (emphasis added)

Pollack's last act was to attend a "peace" conference in Havana, Cuba, in January 1985, where she released an essay called "Reaganomics: Cornerstone of U.S. Aggression." Instead of returning to the United States as she had planned, she decided to fly to Managua instead. The plane crashed just after takeoff, killing all aboard.

She was buried in Cuba. Fidel Castro personally laid a wreath at her grave which said, "To Sandy, from the Commander-In-Chief." Two weeks later, a memorial service was held for Pollack at the Riverside Church in New York. Diplomats and United Nations officials from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as representatives of the FMLN, the PLO, the African National Congress, Communist exile leaders from Chile and Grenada, CPUSA officials and members of the many non-Marxist church groups and trade unions who had formed coalitions with the Party attended the service, which was conducted by the Rev. William Sloane Coffin.

In his eulogy, Coffin noted that Pollack was an atheist, but praised her work as godly: "Sandy may not have believed in God, but God believed in Sandy."

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Eulogies for Pollack at the Riverside Church

Pollack's work was recognized from around the world. Among those sending letters of tribute published in her biography were Sandinista directorate member Bayardo Arce, Cuban Politburo member Jesus Montane Oropesa, Rene Mujica of the Cuban Interests Section at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington, East German Ambassador Gerhard Herder, World Peace Council President Romesh Chandra, Soviet Peace Committee leader Yuri Zhukov, Mfanafuthi Makatini of the African National Congress, and Zehdi Labib Terzi of the PLO.

American citizens sending eulogies included those from Digna Sanchez of the Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican Socialist Party, David Dyson and Paul Filson of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), Dan Cantor of the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, Sr. Marjorie Tuite of Church Women United; CPUSA chairman Henry Winston, CPUSA General Secretary Gus Hall, and CPUSA Secretary of the Central Committee James E. Jackson; Congressman Ronald Dellums (who wrote, "Sandy Pollack accomplished. . . much more than most who shared her vision of a better and more just tomorrow for all."), former Grenadian ambassador Dessima Williams, Isabel Letelier of the Institute for Policy Studies, Leslie Cagan of Mobilization for Survival, Kathy Engel and Digna Sanchez of MADRE, Berkeley mayor and USPC co-chairman Gus Newport, Arnold Braithwaite of the N.Y. Peace Council, Libby Frank of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom, Secretariat of Solidarity with Chile President Victor Frias, and U.S. Peace Council executive director Michael Myerson.

Messages from the FMLN, East Germany and CISPES

The FMLN and its political front, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN-FDR) sent this message:

"Since the struggle began for peace, justice and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador, Sandy worked to give solidarity to our struggle. When the unity was formed and the alliance of the FMLN-FDR started to consolidate, Sandy worked to support the process in every aspect, and to build the non-U.S.intervention struggle. . . .

"In 1982, with the formation of the first worldwide solidarity organization, the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, she became part of the bureau along with representatives of other solidarity movements and worked not only to guarantee its existence but to ensure that it had a strong position against U.S. intervention. . . ."

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East German Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Gerhard Herder left this message:

"Many people in the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and in our Embassy got to know her as a true internationalist, as a dedicated fighter for peace and national liberation. In her work as a founder and a leader of the U.S. Peace Council, Comrade Pollack made an immeasurable contribution to develop, broaden, educate and unify the peace movement in this country and all her short life she was in the front row of the ever growing movement in solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, Grenada and Puerto Rico."

And CISPES national relations coordinator Suzanne Ross had this to say:

"We in CISPES who knew Sandy, and who with her lived through the very stormy early stages of building an El Salvador solidarity movement, came through a rather convoluted path to respect and love her very deeply. . . .

"Our ability to grow together politically, to establish a unified perspective and to collaborate as we have in the past couple of years, was a source of real inspiration to us. . . . Sandy's loss is irreparable. We honor and celebrate her precious life and will remember her for years to come as our companera and sister, a beautiful revolutionary. We also know that the responsibility we now carry, given how few of us there are, is that much greater because she is no longer with us to carry the tremendous weight she did."

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CISPES Founding Conference, October 1980

" . . . do everything possible and even the impossible to reinforce the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie and increase, however feebly, its chances of success at the polls--that is the first task; the second task is to split up the countries united against us--this is our double task. . . . In no way must Communist opinions be elaborated."

--V. I. Lenin
16 February 1922.

The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador was formally founded in October, 1980, just a day after the FMLN announced that it had become the umbrella group of the five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla factions in El Salvador.

There were two founding conferences, one on the east coast, and one on the west. The resulting document from the eastern conference, which was organized by Heidi Tarver and Sandy Pollack, was called the "Work Plan for the Salvadoran Solidarity Movement," part of which is reproduced on the following pages. It resolved to pressure Congress through letter-writing campaigns, visits to the offices and public appearances of elected officials, promotion of local government resolutions concerning El Salvador, demonstrating broad-based opposition to the Carter Administration's policy by taking out newspaper ads, and organizing "fact-finding" trips to El Salvador "which can return and generate publicity and support."

Influencing the media was another objective of CISPES' founding conference, by applying "pressure" on journalists and developing "alternative channels of communication and information sharing." Discrediting U.S. policy meant comparing it to Vietnam, denouncing as a "CIA front" the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which was promoting agrarian reform and free trade unions, and publicizing Salvadoran government human rights violations, as well as aiding refugees and illegal aliens in the U.S. (the beginnings of the Sanctuary Movement).

Making sure the FMLN received material aid was key. On the bottom of the first page of the work plan we find this interesting entry:

"Pressure the governments of the U.S. and El Salvador to assure the neutrality and protection of humanitarian

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relief efforts, including in particular refugee centers and medical relief personnel."

In other words, aid to areas under FMLN-dominated areas or to the FMLN itself should be guaranteed passage to its destination unimpeded by government restraints. Just below this entry, CISPES recommended the establishment of "a nationally coordinated fund-raising campaign to support the people of El Salvador, including sale of 'Free El Salvador' certificates."

The entire second page of the work plan was dedicated to working with religious groups in El Salvador and the United States. These religious organizations would become one of the most important transmission belts for FMLN propaganda, and channels for direct financial and material aid to FMLN forces fighting inside El Salvador.

Within weeks of this meeting, CISPES was putting out a regular newsletter, *El Salvador Alert!*, circulating other literature on El Salvador, including a forgery of a State Department document, working with the news media and church groups, and raising money for "the people."

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Distribution of Forgery of State Department Document

CISPES was a prime distributor of a forged State Department document concerning El Salvador. At times when State Department personnel disagree with official government policy, they may voice their opinions through the "dissent channel" established for that purpose. This serves as a productive mechanism to keep U.S. foreign policy in check within the executive branch. State Department employees differing with official policy often distribute their "dissent papers" throughout the government bureaucracy and the media.

Soon after it was organized, CISPES disseminated a reprint of a State Department "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America." This unsigned document outlined concerns of many "current and former analysts and officials" in the National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency, and admitted that a "key objective" of American foreign policy toward Central America was "to limit Cuban and Soviet bloc influence throughout the region." The paper warned that further military aid to El Salvador would eventually force the United States to intervene militarily in the region. At the same time, however, the dissent paper noted that "a consensus in favor" of the FMLN's political front, the FDR.

The dissent paper considered the FMLN-FDR as "a legitimate and representative political force in El Salvador," and portrayed the FDR as a moderate, non-Marxist organization with wide popular support. It recommended that the United States officially recognize the FDR.

Document a forgery attributed to KGB

However, there was one problem with the document CISPES was circulating: it was pronounced a forgery by the State Department, and attributed by intelligence experts to Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the Soviet KGB. Service A is the division responsible for conducting active measures against the West.¹⁵

CISPES distributed this forgery to the media, and succeeded in getting it accepted as a genuine dissent paper. It first surfaced in an article by the Pacific News Agency on 19 November 1980. Stephen Kinzer of the *Boston Globe* reported on the document in a front-page article on 28 November. The forgery was publicized by small movement publications, like the November-December 1980 newsletter of the Religious Task Force on El Salvador, a pro-FMLN organization which is represented on CISPES' national board; the December 1980 issue of *Revolutionary Worker*, the publication of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP); and the December 1980 issue of *El Salvador Alert*, the CISPES newsletter.

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The first major journalist to report on the forgery as a legitimate document was liberal *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis.¹⁶ A second *New York Times* columnist, Flora Lewis (no relation), quoted from the forgery in her 6 March 1981 column as though it were authentic. The next day, the *Times* reported in a news article that the State Department had denounced the document as a forgery, and Flora Lewis apologized to her readers in her 9 March column, admitting that she had been fooled. Anthony Lewis never recanted.

Despite the wide publicity surrounding the denunciation, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) treated the paper as genuine in the 18 March edition of its publication *In These Times*.

A leader of the FBI's Intelligence Division testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence that "There are certain similarities of this operation with other forgeries. It is known that the Soviets attempted to surface this document in Central America through clandestine means."¹⁷

CISPES continued to distribute forgery

The forgery continued to be advertised for sale from the CISPES national office in El Salvador Alert. Other items sold by CISPES at the same time was the political platform of the FDR, copies of the Philip Agee-related anti-intelligence *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, a publication by EPICA leader and *Counter-Spy* magazine contributor Philip Wheaton on agrarian reform, and issues of *NACLA Report on the Americas*.¹⁸

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CISPES decertification campaign

In compliance with a law passed by Congress in the midst of the aid to El Salvador controversy, the President must certify every six months that El Salvador's government is making progress in the area of human rights. The law states that Congress must receive this certification before it will permit any military aid from being sent to El Salvador. In addition, the law states that the U.S. President must certify that the land reform program is moving forward, and that the Salvadoran military is sufficiently controlled by the civilian government. This law does not apply to Marxist dictatorships such as Zimbabwe, for example, which receives U.S. military aid without any human rights certification.

CISPES anticipates these regular certification reports by holding nationwide "educational" events, press conferences in conjunction with church organizations, and meetings with congressional staffers. Also in anticipation of certification, CISPES organizes letter-writing campaigns to Congress, urging Members to cut off El Salvador as a military aid recipient. For example, the 25 January 1984 *Guardian* reported that CISPES called for a week-long "campaign of letter writing and phone calls urging Congress to vote against military aid to El Salvador."

These decertification activities include acts of civil disobedience, which uniformly received local and national media attention. On 24 January 1983, for instance, CISPES organized a "Decertification Blockade Task Force" in front of the State Department in Washington. Of the more than 700 protestors at the event, 126 were arrested. CISPES national director Heidi Tarver spoke at the beginning of the demonstration, as did a speaker from the pro-ANC South Africa Support Project and from the National Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA), the CISPES equivalent to the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas there. Two U.S. congressmen appeared at a pro-CISPES news conference that evening.

Anti-decertification efforts also took place that day in New York, Tallahassee, Detroit and Boulder. As one observer noted,

"The CISPES demonstrations indicate a shift in both its political and tactical policies. Support for the FMLN in El Salvador has been broadened to a regional concept with the revolutionary movements of Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras presented as 'targets of U.S. imperialism.' Tactically, the demonstration showed that CISPES could mobilize a significant group on a working day (Monday) prepared to take part in a direct illegal, although peaceful, protest. . . . Obviously, fanaticism either by

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U.S. FMLN supporters or by Salvadorean [sic] FMLN members legally or illegally in the U.S. could be escalated to non-peaceful actions."²⁰

When the next certification was due to Congress six months later, a group of "Salvadoran refugees" marched for 17 days from New York to Washington "against repression and war in Central America." A pro-FMLN flyer issued by "Salvadoran Refugees Against Certification," a CISPES front group, cried, "NO to the lie of certification!" and urged people to "Join Salvadoran refugees in protest against U.S. intervention in Central America." On 21 July, a march and rally was held at the White House, followed by an ecumenical service; the next day, the dreaded "Day of Certification," the CISPES-organized "refugees" held a press conference.²¹

One of their flyers blamed "U.S.-sponsored terror" as the culprit of their "refugee" status, and echoed the FMLN line that "elections held during a state of civil war are unacceptable." (Of course, CISPES and its supporters had no such objection to the Sandinista elections which were to be held the following year in the midst of Nicaragua's civil war).

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The FMLN and American Politics:

Changing the Composition of the U.S. Congress for Permanent Change of U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador

Public pressure and lobbying to influence legislation was not enough to increase the chance that Congress would cut or even further restrict aid to El Salvador. CISPES and the other FMLN support groups became actively involved in electoral politics, backing candidates and incumbents who were against aid, and trying to defeat those who were for it.

The first two years of CISPES' existence were spent on building grassroots opposition to American aid to El Salvador, with a focus on lobbying Congress. By 1982, the CISPES leadership saw another opportunity to influence Congress--this time by working for or against congressional candidates or incumbents.

CISPES was especially involved in the 1982 and 1984 campaigns, trying to project the image that President Reagan and the Republicans were warmongers bent on getting the country involved in "another Vietnam." Groping for an issue with which to attack the President, many liberal candidates grabbed the question of U.S. "intervention" in El Salvador. CISPES and the broad coalition of old anti-Vietnam protestors, nuclear freeze activists, pacifists and radicals were there to provide instant cheerleaders and workers for those candidates' campaigns.

In El Salvador and Managua, the FMLN leadership also recognized the need to influence the American electoral process if their war against the Salvadoran government was to succeed. As revealed in captured documents, the FMLN worked to create incidents inside El Salvador which supporters and political opportunists could use in the United States during the heated 1984 campaign.

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The 1982 Electoral Campaign

That summer, the CISPES national office mailed its local chapters an eight-page "Fall Electoral Strategy," accompanied by a detailed two-page questionnaire for congressional candidates. Mobilization of its activists, outreach and fundraising for CISPES itself and the FMLN were the leading items on the fall agenda, but eyes were on the congressional campaign. Nationwide demonstrations were organized for October 16, two weeks before the vote, as part of "a wide variety of tactics to demonstrate the breadth and strength of opposition to U.S. intervention in El Salvador," according to the strategy document.

CISPES committees "targeted the elections as a major area of emphasis," according to the strategy paper. Below is a summary of that document. The first section gave a background to the fall, 1982 campaign in the context of its "overall electoral strategy":

1771 "The electoral campaign is one tactic within the overall approach to mass mobilizations. Traditionally, CISPES has used 'legislative work' as an outreach, movement-building tool, and as a way of helping to limit military and economic aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras."

CISPES wanted to undermine the economic as well as the military strength of those three pro-western countries. The strategy document assessed CISPES' past success at influencing certain Members of Congress. It continued,

1772 "Although we have never seen legislative work as a primary focus, we have always considered it to be important. Our letter-writing, delegations, petitions, etc., have helped make some congresspeople take better positions on some votes than they otherwise would have. The effectiveness of these tactics has depended to a large degree on how we back them up with visible opposition in the streets-- demonstrations, pickets, leafletting, bannering, civil disobedience, etc. We recognize the role of Congress as the primary mechanism for stopping [U.S.] intervention but we are also clear that it is only an increasingly strong and broad mass movement that can force that mechanism to act. The Fall elections provide us with an opportunity to use the fanfare that surrounds the campaigns as a forum for raising our opposition to U.S. intervention in a very public way to very wide audiences." (emphasis in original)

The CISPES strategists then showed how their actions aimed at undermining U.S. support for the Salvadoran government were being done in concert with the FMLN's military actions inside El

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Salvador:

"While our degree of focus on this type of work will vary, it is important to understand its direct relations to the present needs of the war. The popular victory in El Salvador will be won by the Salvadoran people themselves, but as the FMLN continues to make advances, the U.S. is dangerously raising the technical level and regionalization of the conflict. Anything we can do to limit [U.S.] military aid [to the Salvadoran government] in the coming months will have a direct impact on the war." (Emphasis added)

Successfully pressuring Congressman Lantos

Encouraging activists that their work counts, CISPES strategists gave an example of successful direct action by a local chapter. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), they said, was targeted by the Palo Alto CISPES chapter and as a result cosponsored House Joint Resolution 552, declaring President Reagan's certification of progress in El Salvador as "null and void," and calling for suspension of U.S. military aid to that country.

Questioning the candidates

The CISPES national office provided local activists with a detailed two-page questionnaire to be filled out by congressional candidates during the 1982 campaign. The questionnaire's purpose was to get the specifics on the candidates' stance toward various Central America issues, and to "force" the candidate to define any vague positions he may have. Candidates who indicated in their answers that they knew little about Central America were to be given "correct" information so that they would learn "the facts."

Candidates were then to be urged to take a "pledge" on his stance on Central America, to the point where CISPES activists were to "'haunt' the candidate with different people asking questions at every one of his/her public appearances about when he/she will sign the pledge."

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The FMLN's Attempts to Influence the 1984 U.S. Elections

The "1984 CISPES National Administrative Committee Strategy Proposal," took into consideration the Central America policies of the Reagan administration and how those policies could be used against the President and his congressional allies during the campaign. The proposal noted that the President's policy had "worked in Congress--so far. . . . Most sectors of the Democratic Party have avoided the debate for fear it will weaken their possibilities for re-election and divide the Party as the issue of Vietnam did in 1968 and 1972."

At the time, the Administration was trying to forge a bipartisan consensus for a coherent policy to foster democracy and roll back communism in Central America through the special commission headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In the CISPES 1984 agenda proposal, CISPES called this bipartisan commission "an attempt to undercut the remaining Democratic opposition." *(CISPES also provided the illustration, -the agent)*

The most popular theme around which the President's political opponents rallied was that involvement in Central America would result in "another Vietnam." CISPES leaders observed in the 1984 proposal, "People fear prolonged Vietnam-type involvement," a fear which they determined to exploit. CISPES and other leftist groups such as the Institute for Policy Studies had already begun attacking the Kissinger Commission and its findings.²² The 25 January 1984 *Guardian* reported that CISPES called for nationwide protests to coincide with the 11 January release of the Kissinger Commission, saying that the actions were "protesting a panel of millionaires and ex-CIA agents." *(CISPES also provided an illustration of a protest - the illustration shows a group of people holding signs and banners, while back*

CISPES leaders observed, "The Democrats have no apparent strategy around Central America, and are divided internally on the issue. They seem unsure of the strength of public opinion," the strategy proposal continued, noting that most Democrats wanted to combat communism in some way, yet had to be responsive to the highly vocal U.S.-out-of-Central America movement: "A Democratic 'anti-intervention' position would be tactical rather than genuine. It can, however, weaken the support Reagan needs at a critical time for intervention. . . ."

The proposal continued, "We need to make U.S. intervention a high-visibility presence as a key anti-Reagan issue." Six lines further, it was reiterated--"We can use this expanded public opposition to:

"Make opposition to intervention a key issue in the anti-Reagan movement; Pressure Democrats to take a clear position; Isolate Reagan politically and disrupt

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his political alliances."

During the first CISPES national conference, held in Washington on 28-30 January 1984, "intense debate erupted over a proposal from Mid-Atlantic region affiliates that the defeat of Reagan be made a fundamental goal of 1984," according to the *Guardian*. Many conference delegates "argued that CISPES should contribute to removing Reagan through raising consciousness about Reagan's Central American policies." A resolution was passed calling on CISPES to "contribute to the defeat of Reagan and his allies in Congress through focusing on their Central American and Caribbean policy."

A resolution was passed almost unanimously to support Jesse Jackson's "Rainbow Coalition." Jackson was to be utilized by the FMLN to inject its agenda into the mainstream debate of the Democrat party during the campaign.

**Captured FMLN documents show
preoccupation with U.S. election**

Captured FMLN documents reveal that guerrilla leaders were intensely concerned with the outcome of the 1984 U.S. presidential elections. They had good reason to believe that their forces would not be able to survive if President Reagan won a second term. The war in El Salvador was to be won or lost in Washington, and the FMLN knew that its actions on the ground could be used by the President's political opposition against him during the campaign. By projecting an image that the Salvadoran government was unable to govern, that it had lost popular support, that it was systematically abusing the people, or that the U.S. was being dragged into "another Vietnam," the FMLN created situations for propaganda purposes that were utilized by their allies such as CISPES and by President Reagan's political opponents in the United States. The success of these propaganda measures depended heavily on American politicians playing into their hands.

As students of revolutionary history, FMLN strategists drew on successful precedent, most notably on Vietnam. In doing so, they kept in constant contact with their U.S. solidarity committees, through quarterly meetings and at other gatherings. Vietnam was a useful model, as many of those leading the anti-intervention/solidarity movement in the United States at the time did the same thing for the Vietcong a decade earlier. Captured documents from the FMLN leadership provide insight into their methods.

One FMLN document focused on the issue of exploiting the internal divisions of the enemy, in this case, the United States. Their model was the Vietnamese Communist Party (PCV) which, during its war against the U.S.-backed government and the U.S. itself "always sought to win through political work." The FMLN's analysis went as follows:

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"The PCV profits from the enemy's contradictions: One has to combat the enemy in every sense, from front- to rear guard, from outside to inside, one must profit from the individualist and competitive character of the enemy, creating fissures inside, exploiting internal disputes. the revolutionary forces have the obligation to profit from the enemy's internal divisions. . . . Profiting from these contradictions has a tactical value and also a strategic value. . . ."23

The FMLN analysis went on, "To wage an effective diplomatic struggle one must make use of the enemy's contradictions," observing, "The foreign policy of Reagan is the weak flank of his reelection campaign." It also noted that "The White House policy toward El Salvador has been one of the most constant points of rejection by public opinion since 1981. . . ."

"Policy toward El Salvador," it continued, "is one of the areas where the most relevant confrontations [exist] with Congress and the Democrat Party against Reagan, and includes a group of Republican congressmen throughout his presidential term."

Great emphasis was placed on helping President Reagan's opposition in Congress, and utilizing the Democrat national convention in San Francisco. Those actually carrying out the FMLN's policies, the documents show, would be American leftists working within the Democrat party to influence U.S. public opinion. Success depended on political opportunists to seize upon the letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations and other publicity stunts.

However, an unexpected event--the successful and extremely popular U.S. incursion into Grenada in October 1983--boosted Reagan's support among the electorate and dealt a crushing blow to the morale of the FMLN, the Sandinistas, and their American supporters. Fearing a subsequent U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas abruptly cut off all clandestine arms shipments to the FMLN, in order to take away any possible excuse by the Reagan administration to do a repeat performance there.²⁴ Although the action ended up being only for show, the FMLN was very concerned.

In a memorandum from the FMLN General Command to the National Directorate of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Managua dated 24 November 1983, the Salvadoran guerrillas acknowledged the Sandinistas' new diplomatic offensive in the wake of the Grenada operation.²⁵ The memorandum stated that the upcoming presidential campaign was "a favorable moment to meet with the North American [U.S.] electorate," adding, "For this reason we support the current diplomatic initiatives of the FSLN to buy time, to help Reagan's opposition in the United States and to isolate internationally his aggressive plan toward Nicaragua and El Salvador." (Emphasis added.)

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Dialogue would be the tactic to be used to demonstrate the FMLN's flexibility and good faith, and to put the Reagan administration on the defensive. The key phrase here is "to help Reagan's opposition in the United States," a clear reference to the Democrat party which had found the President's Central America policies to be an important political issue. Party leaders in Congress--Robert Byrd in the Senate and Tip O'Neill and Jim Wright in the House--were bitterly denouncing the Administration's policy in El Salvador (demanding that the Salvadoran government negotiate with the FMLN) and in Nicaragua (demanding either a complete U.S. shutoff of aid to the contras or bilateral U.S.-Sandinista negotiations exclusive of either the Soviets or the Nicaraguan resistance).

A 22 November 1983 report on FMLN leaders' talks with the Sandinista directorate states, "We see the urgency of taking political measures. . . to strengthen political opposition to Reagan in the U.S." ²⁶ (Emphasis added.) The objective here was, again, to buy time, given the Sandinistas' fear of a U.S. invasion. Sandinista aid to the FMLN was temporarily halted in order to "put off intervention until February," which was the beginning of the "U.S. electoral campaign."

Also in November 1983, the Salvadoran guerrillas drew up their "Directives for the Political Struggle of the FMLN in This New Phase of the War Process." ²⁷ Part of this document discussed staving off greater U.S. "intervention" in El Salvador. The FMLN directives discussed how the American political system would determine whether the U.S. 'intervened' directly on behalf of El Salvador's government, stressing the upcoming "presidential electoral process in the United States."

The Directives explained that President Reagan had to portray his first term in office as a success in domestic and foreign policies. What the FMLN had to do in the meantime was to deliver harsh blows to the Salvadoran government and thereby undermine the success of the Reagan agenda in Central America. In formulating the FMLN propaganda strategy for 1984, the Directives outlined the use of refugees, human rights, religious groups, and other issues on which to focus. The Directives summarized, "We should extend special interest to North American political personalities, the church, the UCA [Central American University] and the UPD."

An annex to these Directives elaborated on one point: "This situation [Reagan's reelection] obliges him to buy time and to try to profit the most by realizing successes of political character which serve as propagandistic sustenance to his reelection campaign. . . ."

The PRTC faction of the FMLN, from which most of these documents were recovered, held a meeting in April, 1984, and examined the American presidential campaign at great length. The

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guerrilla leaders repeated a common point: "Keep into account that the contradictions between the Democrats and the Republicans are well-centered on U.S. international politics. . . ." They further noted the erosion of American prestige due to the sharp political differences in Washington: "North American imperialism is losing credibility as a strategic ally as much with governments of

underdeveloped countries as with governments of developed countries (Israel, South Africa, Holland, etc.), as important elements of contradiction persist. . . ."

At that meeting, the PRTC resolved to: "Develop a politico-military plan which would force the Reagan government to decide between intervention or for negotiations [with the FMLN] in the most critical months of the electoral campaign in the U.S. (September, October and November). Apart from the development of strategic operations, change to great importance military and political strikes in the metropolitan zone [San Salvador]."²⁸ In other words, make the war more visible by bringing it into El Salvador's capital city, projecting the image that the people had risen up against the government and that it was incapable of maintaining order.

Meanwhile, the FMLN should do all it could to tie up U.S. aid currently in the pipeline. Further during the PRTC meeting, the following was resolved:

"We should work before the U.S. Congress so that it condition the military 'aid' to the Salvadoran regime toward the realization of negotiations as a form of solution to the conflict. . . . In the work plans for the U.S., we should not forget that in November there will be elections for all members of the Lower House and for one-third of the Senate."²⁹

It was agreed that the PRTC would focus on working with the solidarity committees in the United States through 1984 recalling that "solidarity activities produce repercussions in the U.S., especially in Congress." (Emphasis added.)

The PRTC leaders reiterated their strategy again and again: to "intensify propaganda work before the U.S. Congress, with the goal that it not authorize, that it reduce, that it delay and/or condition military aid to the Salvadoran government." It also urged that pressure be brought upon Guatemala and Honduras so that no actions would be taken against FMLN bases in those countries. Additionally, it sought to utilize the Contadora group (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela) to work for a negotiated solution to the El Salvador conflict, to "present motions before the North American Congress," and even to murder Americans in El Salvador for their propaganda value. Such killings doubtlessly would prompt U.S. politicians in Washington to demand a reduction or withdrawal

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of the 55 U.S. military trainers working with the Salvadoran army. Specifically, the idea was to multiply the death of U.S. Navy Commander Albert Schaufelberger, who was assassinated by the FMLN in 1983, by a factor of four. The PRTC did exactly this in June, 1985, when its terrorist Mardoqueo Cruz Urban Guerrilla Command killed four U.S. Marine Embassy guards at a San Salvador restaurant, two American businessmen, and seven other civilian bystanders.³⁰

Jesse Jackson was to play an interesting role in the injection of FMLN positions into the U.S. political campaign. With CISPES taking part in the Rainbow Coalition, the FMLN had a direct voice. In a 5 June 1984 memorandum from the FMLN General Command to the FMLN Managua office, a ceasefire proposal was planned to coincide with the Democrat national convention.³¹ The memorandum indicated that the ceasefire proposal was for purely propagandistic purposes, to be aimed at the U.S. public to show the FMLN's willingness to resolve the war peacefully, and to portray the Reagan administration as intransigent (and therefore, anti-peace).

The ceasefire was to be announced at the San Francisco Democrat convention by Jesse Jackson. The FMLN General Command told the Managua office that a letter would be sent to the convention "in the name of the FMLN-FDR," which would describe the guerrillas' "disposition to realize a real dialogue with the Salvadoran government and army" for a political settlement. Such a settlement would be initiated by an FMLN ceasefire in order to establish a mutual accord, according to the document. The FMLN letter would then ask the Democrats to recognize Guillermo Ungo, the leader of the FMLN's political front, the FDR, to present the peace proposal to the U.S. Congress.

The FMLN General Command memorandum said that the entire campaign would be coordinated with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).

This optimistic plan to get Ungo recognized by mainstream Democrats and have a forum in Congress did not get far, although Jackson and his Rainbow Coalition did what they could to promote the FMLN's cause. Their political work had a marked influence even on the Democrat party candidates' positions, however, probably out of fear of alienating the huge bloc of minority voters who followed Jesse Jackson.

In analyzing the American political scene just weeks before the convention, a 1 June report by the FMLN-FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission referred to "the influence of the North American electoral campaign on U.S. policy toward Central America," and noted "the growing Democratic opposition" to such policy.³² The FMLN (as opposed to the PRTC faction as noted earlier) made what to them was an encouraging notation: "The Democrat candidates have already included the theme of Central America in the electoral

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debate and have distanced themselves from the position of the President."

One American activist working with the FMLN on its ceasefire proposal, according to a captured FMLN document, was Dick McCall, an aide at the time to retiring Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA). McCall and a colleague, retired Army Colonel Ed King, held a secret meeting on 22 June with FMLN leaders after meeting with top Salvadoran army officers. The document indicates that McCall assured the FMLN that he thought El Salvador's democratic elections were a sham, and that there could be no solution aside from power-sharing between the government and the FMLN. It also indicates that he may have passed to the FMLN potentially sensitive political and military intelligence gleaned from his conversations with army leaders, including information on the armed forces of Honduras and CIA activity in Honduras.³³

(After Senator Tsongas retired from politics in 1984, McCall was hired by Tsongas' successor, fellow Democrat John Kerry, who in 1986 began a highly political probe of the Nicaraguan resistance and its private support network. McCall played a key role in that investigation. At the time of this writing, McCall was back working in Democrat party electoral politics as Kerry's staff director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. Also at the time of this writing, King was the Senate Democrats' official representative on a four-person commission to monitor the progress of the Nicaraguan resistance and peace prospects there. King was the personal choice of Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. These secret meetings with the FMLN raise serious constitutional, legal, and ethical questions and merit close investigation by appropriate Senate committees, the Justice Department, and the media).

Recalling what CISPES said

"a campaign of political support is needed. . . . to provide a forum for the FMLN-FDR in the U.S. . . ."

—1984 CISPES National Administrative Strategy Proposal

It is easy to see how CISPES's own strategy for agitation and propaganda inside the United States CISPES's own strategy for agitation and propaganda inside the United States coincided with the FMLN's armed propaganda plans for 1984. With U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras as one of the biggest foreign policy issues, CISPES also integrated anti-contra activism with its anti-El Salvador program.

The "1984 CISPES National Administrative Strategy Proposal" explicitly stated that CISPES would continue to "provide political and material support for the FMLN-FDR in El Salvador," and would "Defend the Sandinista revolution" in Nicaragua.

Diplomatically, the United States was succeeding in isolating

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the FMLN which, just a year or so earlier, had been enjoying international support from much of the world's democratic left. The CISPES strategy document noted that its efforts and those of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador would have to be redoubled: "U.S. attempts internationally to isolate the FMLN-FDR also require a world-wide effort to give political and material support." Ideologically supportive of the Sandinistas and knowing that the demise of that regime would spell the practical end of the FMLN as a successful insurgency, CISPES leaders said,

"Our defense of the Sandinista revolution will directly contribute to the Nicaraguan people's efforts to consolidate their revolution. It will also undermine Reagan's

attempts to build a 'strategic consensus' in the U.S. for intervention in all of Central America."³⁴

To polarize the American public during this important election year was the reasoning behind this strategy. The document continued,

"The administration's key vulnerability in 1984 is its ability to build a bipartisan and popular consensus for long-term intervention. . . . Therefore, we propose as the basic political strategies for 1984:

"1. Disrupt Reagan's alliance for intervention with the Democrats.

"2. Make opposition to intervention in Central America a central anti-Reagan issue.

"3. Prepare for and initiate effective, powerful and popular responses to greater escalations of U.S. intervention in Central America."

In order for this to succeed, CISPES leaders took a chapter from the New Left's anti-Vietnam strategy of building a coalition, or broad front, of ideological, social, ethnic and religious organizations and trade unions disaffected by the Reagan Administration's policies. CISPES planned to "make opposition to intervention a key issue of the anti-Reagan movement, by participating actively in anti-Reagan coalitions" (emphasis in original), to "use emergency situations to mobilize and expand the active participation of new sectors," and to "Develop strategic relations with organizations of the religious sector, Blacks, Latinos, peace movement, etc." (emphasis added) This was the same grouping which formed the "San Francisco Democrats."

CISPES had, of course, been active in politics since it was founded in 1980, and vowed at the time to keep El Salvador a political issue. A *Guardian* article published 9 May 1984, headlined "Intervention as an Election Issue," described "the 1984 political strategy of the Central American anti-interventionist

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solidarity movements" and their different ways and means. The article said, "two main goals are emerging in a national strategy. The first is to organize immediate and effective antiwar protests against the Reagan Administration's step-by-step escalation of the U.S. war in Central America and the Caribbean. The second goal is to put opposition to such U.S. intervention on the agendas of the Democratic and Republican presidential nominating conventions this summer and to make it an issue in national and local election campaigns this fall."

According to the *Guardian*, CISPES (like the FMLN) considered Jesse Jackson as its main ally in the Democrat party. CISPES leader Suzanne Ross was quoted as saying, "Jackson is in a different league from Hart and Mondale, who equivocate about withdrawing all U.S. military personnel from Central America and other key issues." Ross said that CISPES was taking an active part in Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. The *Guardian* reported that Ross "predicted that Jackson would take the movement's peace platform to the Democratic convention." This is in line with the FMLN leadership's plan to use Jackson as a means of injecting its position into the Democrat party.

CISPES then set up its own political action committee, CISPES-PAC, during the summer. Activists were told that the PAC would not contribute directly to candidates, but would produce literature to be used in political campaigns "that call for defeating Reagan."

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The FMLN's International Support Apparatus

Working with and through foreign Communist parties and international Soviet front organizations, the FMLN has a worldwide support apparatus claiming over 300 member organizations in at least 42 countries, including the Soviet bloc. Founded in Mexico City in March, 1982, the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador serves as the international version of CISPES.

The World Front coordinates international events to be conducted simultaneously as part of the solidarity movement for the FMLN, holding meetings every three months. In addition to generating political support for the guerrillas and opposition to the Salvadoran government, the World Front also gathers funds for the FMLN forces which are deposited in a bank account at the Banca Serfin administered by Monsignor Sergio Mendez Arceo, former bishop of Cuernavaca.

The FMLN and FDR maintain offices in Mexico City, which serve as diplomatic headquarters (in contrast to central operational headquarters in the Managua offices). The Mexican government has extended diplomatic support to the FMLN-FDR, and has very close ties to Cuba, enabling Cuban and FMLN-FDR operatives to travel freely between Havana and Mexico City.

The Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military planning center for the five Salvadoran guerrilla factions which evolved into the FMLN in 1980 "called for the establishment of solidarity committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to serve as propaganda outlets, conduits for aid, and organizers of solidarity meetings and demonstrations," according to an interagency intelligence study published in hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1982.³⁵ Those hearings also revealed that the FDR and the DRU "collaborate closely but not always openly with the Soviets, Cubans and East Europeans. Nevertheless they represent themselves as indigenous, independent organizations in an effort to conceal the Soviet and Cuban role in planning and supporting their activities."³⁶

Prior to the formal founding of the World Front, FMLN solidarity committees around the world, "in cooperation with local Communist parties and leftist groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and protests that took place between mid-January and mid-March 1981 in Western Europe, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. The Cubans and some other Communist parties provided significant support to this DRU effort and to some demonstrations," according to the published report. It continued,

"Through front and solidarity groups, the Soviets and Cubans tried to assist the Salvadoran leftists in

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manipulating a range of international operations to gain political legitimacy, support, and humanitarian aid for the insurgents. They specifically targeted the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Non-Aligned Movement, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Catholic Relief Services. The DRU, through the socialist party of El Salvador, also tried to influence the socialist parties in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and other countries to exploit the Socialist International mechanisms as a means of waging a concerted campaign on behalf of the Salvadoran insurgency. The active measures campaign was buttressed by intense diplomatic activity on behalf of the insurgents."

In January, 1981, an "El Salvador Will Win" conference was held in Managua, Nicaragua, where 270 participants--including solidarity committee representatives from over 43 countries--attended. In addition to 70 Americans representing the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People (Nicaragua Network), the Sandinistas' counterpart of CIPSES, "numerous delegations" from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe participated, according to official Sandinista sources, which said that "the central theme of the conference was the solidarity of the progressive peoples of the world with the Salvadoran struggle." A highlight of the event was the appearance of FMLN and FDR representatives."³⁷

On the diplomatic end, the ruling PRI party in Mexico was instrumental in mustering support for the FMLN within the Socialist International. Traditionally very hostile toward the United States in international politics, Mexico has long cooperated with Castro in supporting Soviet-backed insurgencies in Nicaragua and Guatemala, as well as in El Salvador. Mexico was crucial in getting the support of France, the Socialist International, and liberals in the U.S. Congress to support the FMLN initially. Writer Max Singer said that at one point 100 U.S. congressmen urged the State Department to pay greater attention to Mexico's diplomatic initiatives toward El Salvador, and that in the summer of 1980 Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo "reportedly promised Castro that when the [FMLN's] planned final offensive in El Salvador was carried out the following January, the Mexican army would conduct maneuvers near the Guatemalan border to discourage the Guatemalan army from interfering" on behalf of El Salvador.³⁸ A representative of the International Relations Commission of the PRI participated in a World Front event in August, 1983.³⁹ The PRI's foreign policy was enunciated quite bluntly by Mexican Interior Secretary Manuel Bartlett Diaz, who declared upon his arrival to Moscow leading Mexican delegation to Soviet Premier Konstantin Chernenko's funeral, "The policies of Mexico and the Soviet Union toward Central America coincide."⁴⁰

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The World Peace Council: Guardian of the
World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador

The World Peace Council is the major force behind the coordinated international "peace" movement, or in the words of its president, Romesh Chandra, it is the "vanguard of the world peace movement."⁴¹ It was a major force behind the international campaign to extract the United States from Southeast Asia, the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, and the current international active measures campaign to end U.S. "intervention" in Central America.⁴²

The World Peace Council supports every foreign policy position of the Soviet Union, according to Chandra. At its most recent conference, which was held in October, 1986 in Copenhagen, Denmark, World Peace Council leaders endorsed the USSR's nuclear weapons positions, threw its weight behind the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the African National Congress (ANC), the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army, the POLISARIO guerrillas of the Western Sahara, the Puerto Rican Macheteros, and the Salvadoran FMLN. The organization also supports the governments of Libya, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Syria, Cuba, and other revolutionary/communist states.⁴³

In the past, the WPC has influenced, led and often controlled international campaigns against the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Europe and has worked through the democratic systems of NATO nations in an attempt to sow discord within the alliance. The WPC has also publicly supported the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Chairman Chandra is a politburo member of the Communist Party of India who has been described as "slavish" in his loyalty to Moscow. Chandra has publicly stated that "the World Peace Council. . . positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs."⁴⁴

It should come as no surprise, then, that the World Peace Council is funded and controlled by the Soviet government. As one of 13 major international fronts which are directed and financed by the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the KGB, the WPC has chapters in 130 countries. Its 1980 budget was estimated at \$50 million. National WPC chapters are controlled by the local Moscow-line Communist parties.⁴⁵

The U.S. branch of the World Peace Council is the United States Peace Council (USPC), based in New York. The USPC was founded in 1979 and is under the immediate control of the KGB-funded Communist Party USA (CPUSA).⁴⁶ Its co-chairman is Eugene "Gus" Newport, the former mayor of Berkeley, California, who is also a vice president of the World Peace Council.⁴⁷ (For more

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information on Newport's work in support of the FMLN, see the section on New El Salvador Today [NEST], and the section on the May 14, 1986 hearings on El Salvador chaired by Congressman Michael Barnes).

U.S. congressmen who have promoted the World Peace Council in Washington include John Conyers (D-MI), Ron Dellums (D-CA), Don Edwards (D-CA), Charles Rangel (D-NY), George Crockett (D-MI), Mickey Leland (D-TX), and Mervyn Dymally (D-CA). In January 1978, Conyers, Dellums, Edwards and Rangel were part of a WPC leadership meeting in Washington, the first time the WPC had had such open access to the U.S. Capitol. It regarded this access as an "outstanding landmark in WPC history." The WPC delegation included Chandra, Oleg Kharkhardin of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and KGB Colonel Radomir Bogdanov.⁴⁸

Congressman Edward Boland (D-MA), in his capacity as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, covered up for his colleagues in hearings on Soviet active measures in July, 1982.⁴⁹ As evidence of Soviet active measures operations in Washington, the Committee reprinted a 48-page brochure published by the WPC to publicize its visit to Congress. However, before the Intelligence Committee staff reprinted the document, they doctored it to erase any evidence of involvement by Boland's liberal colleagues in Congress and other liberal political leaders and activists. The reprint appeared in the published hearings as Exhibit XI, but pages 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 23, 45, 46, 47 and 48--which mentioned work with Congress--had been omitted. In order to disguise this from the public, Boland's staff cut out the page numbers from the remaining pages.⁵⁰ To someone who had never seen the original document, nothing appeared unusual in the Committee reprint.

In May, 1981, Conyers, Edwards, Crockett, Weiss, Leland and Dymally organized a meeting in the Rayburn House Office Building for WPC Chairman Chandra to lobby Members of Congress.⁵¹ In January, 1982, Conyers flew to Copenhagen for a WPC meeting, and in June, 1983, Leland flew to Prague, Czechoslovakia for another WPC conference.⁵² Congressman Crockett sponsored the WPC's 1986 "People's Peace Treaty" for a Soviet-initiated nuclear test ban proposal.⁵³ In October that year, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Congressman Dellums extended public greetings to the WPC's World Peace Congress in Denmark.⁵⁴ Dellums and Congressman Gus Savage (D-IL) were to have attended that event, but legislative priorities prevented them from going. Dellums' administrative assistant Carlottia Scott did attend as part of the U.S. delegation.⁵⁵

The founding of the World Front

FMLN-FDR leaders and their core of international supporters sponsored a conference in Mexico City to form the World Front in

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Solidarity with the People of El Salvador from March 26-28, 1982, to coincide with the constituent assembly elections in El Salvador.⁵⁶ The FMLN-FDR had refused to participate in those elections. (Note: It is of interest that the founding of the World Front coincided with the date of the elections; the day after the FMLN had been founded in October, 1980, CISPES held its founding conference). In the course of the FMLN-FDR's election boycott, its guerrillas attempted to disrupt the voting process by attacking polling places and intimidating the population.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, over 80 percent of the population participated in the elections in repudiation of the FMLN-FDR, and several people were shot by the FMLN as they stood in line to vote.⁵⁸

CISPES organized a nationwide series of demonstrations against the Salvadoran elections on March 27, 1982, and coincided with the World Front's founding conference. A brochure against the Salvadoran elections captioned, "March 27: At The Crossroads," featured on its cover a group of CISPES demonstrators carrying a banner which proclaimed, "FDR is the only representative of the Salvadoran people." Inside, CISPES called the elections "just one of a series of smokescreens that the U.S. has used to justify its intervention in El Salvador." The other two "smokescreens" were land reform ("more peasants were getting assassinated than receiving titles to land"), and "alleged 'Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan interference,'" which "has turned into a mockery."⁵⁹

The CISPES literature noted the founding of the World Front:

"People all over the world are organizing against U.S. intervention in Central America and in favor of peace and self-determination. Solidarity networks from countries in several continents are meeting this week- and in Mexico City to forge a world-wide front against U.S. intervention and in solidarity with the people of El Salvador."⁶⁰

CISPES used the Mexican position to add credibility to its own propaganda: "Most European countries, and many in Latin America, have criticized Reagan's El Salvador policy, and are supporting Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo's peace plan calling for negotiations with the FMLN-FDR and separate negotiations to defuse U.S. tensions with Cuba and Nicaragua."⁶¹

American CISPES leadership in Mexico City joined with officials from the Cuban Communist Party, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and others to form the core of the World Front. Among the members of the Permanent Bureau of the World Front were, at the time, Alexandra "Sandy" Pollack of the politburo of the Communist Party USA and on the CISPES advisory board, and CISPES national director Heidi Tarver.⁶² It will be recalled that Salvadoran Communist Party agent and CISPES organizer Farid Handal identified Pollack as the "solidarity coordinator of the U.S. Peace Council," and his main contact in New York.

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The founding President of the World Front was Bill Zimmerman,⁶³ who also chairs Medical Aid for El Salvador (MAES), a CISPES affiliate which raises money and medical supplies in the United States which is funneled through Mexico City for the FMLN. (See section on Medical Aid for El Salvador). Zimmerman led a similar group called Medical Aid for Indochina to channel aid to the Vietcong during the Vietnam war.⁶⁴

Other board members of the World Front included Monsignor Sergio Mendez Arceo of Cuernavaca, who manages FMLN bank accounts in Mexico City; Massoun Kassawat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL), a Soviet front based in Cuba which was organized at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana serves as a support apparatus for international terrorist and subversive organizations supported by Cuba; Jorge Gallardo of the Cuban Institute for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), a front for the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party; Jesus Escandel, a Cuban representing another Soviet front, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); Ahmad Zobeh, the PLO's representative in Mexico, as well as Andres Fabregas of Mexico, Josefina Finders of the Netherlands, Antonio Silva of Portugal, Julio Escalona of Venezuela, Lucia Pavletich of Peru, Willy Rosenbaum of France, Hans Aalborg of Denmark, and Bob Morgan of Great Britain.⁶⁵

This meeting marked the creation of the specific international front in support of the FMLN. However, coordination of worldwide activities on behalf of the FMLN predated the Mexico conference, as anti-U.S. and pro-FMLN demonstrations were held around the world on March 27, 1982: In Berlin, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Mexico City, Bern, Stockholm, Luxembourg, Toronto, Calgary, London, Sao Paulo and Tel Aviv, in addition to those organized by CISPES in the United States. All were officially sponsored by local "Committees for Solidarity with the Salvadoran People."⁶⁶ The interagency study published by the House Intelligence Committee concluded, "The decidedly anti-U.S. cast to these demonstrations, their timing, and their international scale suggest that the Soviet Union or one of its fronts was behind the protests."⁶⁷

The World Front executive committee holds quarterly meetings to monitor, organize and coordinate international campaigns. These meetings are attended by the CISPES national coordinator or a personal representative of the coordinator. The World Front's second executive committee meeting was held in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 1982. CISPES activists are urged to send triplicate copies of their literature to the national office so that the national CISPES office can send progress reports and information packets to the World Front meetings.

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International Campaigns of the World Front

The official newsletter of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, *Frente Mundial*, says that there are national chapters in 42 countries, and informal networks in no less than 13 other countries, including within the Soviet bloc and in Third World Communist states allied with the USSR where political organization can function only with official party approval.

As of September, 1983, the World Front reported that it had formal campaigns in Albania, Angola, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Grenada, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Countries listed as having an existing "solidarity movement with the people of Central America" but which did not have formal members of the World Front were Bulgaria, Egypt, Guyana, Libya, Morocco, New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Yemen and Suriname.⁶⁹

World Front's role in Soviet active measures strategy

The activities of the World Front and its cast of actors fit the description of objectives of all Soviet active measures operations, which are best summed up by Tufts University Professor Richard Shultz and Georgetown University Professor Roy Godson in their book *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*:⁶⁹

- "1. To influence American, European, and world public opinion to believe that U.S. military and political policies are the major cause of international conflict and crisis.
- "2. To demonstrate that the United States is an aggressive, militaristic, and imperialistic power.
- "3. To isolate the United States from its friends and allies (especially those in NATO), and to discredit those states which cooperate with the United States.
- "4. To discredit U.S. and NATO military and intelligence establishments.
- "5. To demonstrate that the policies and objectives of the United States are incompatible with those of the under-developed nations.
- "6. To confuse world public opinion concerning Soviet global ambitions, creating a favorable environment for Soviet

foreign policy."

On the international scale, the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador serves to promote the FMLN worldwide and to discredit El Salvador's fledgling democratic government. More than that, it falsely portrays American policy in the region as a brutal one of propping up corrupt dictators without any regard for human rights. In turn, this discredits U.S. foreign policy in general, at a sensitive time when U.S. nuclear missiles were being placed to counter Soviet missiles already aimed at Western Europe, and currently as the United States is cultivating international support for its Strategic Defense Initiative. Most NATO allies are critical of U.S. policy in El Salvador.

Attention is thus centered on U.S. policy, while Soviet and Cuban subversion there and elsewhere is discounted or unnoticed. Leftist political leaders also point to alleged U.S. transgressions which they use to put Washington on par with Moscow.

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Guerrillas Proposed Raising Money Through Humanitarian Fronts

Even before uniting under the FMLN umbrella, the guerrillas set up humanitarian front organizations through which cash and supplies could be raised from foreign relief organizations. Documents captured from the FMLN and released by the State Department in 1981 reveal a sophisticated and successful plan to raise private funds from the West. Their Soviet-bloc allies, it turned out, gave the guerrillas plenty of military supplies and training, but were cheap when it came to giving them badly-needed dollars. (See footnote 11)

Before beginning this section, it is necessary to point out that the U.S. groups in question, aided by CIA defector Philip Agee, denounced the captured documents as forgeries. However, the State Department has consistently defended their authenticity, and revelations over the past six years confirmed the genuine nature of their contents.

In 1979, the Salvadoran Communist Party set up a front called the Ecumenical Committee of Humanitarian Aid (CEAH), raising over half a million dollars over the following seven months. The documents show that the PCS front received \$170,575 from the World Council of Churches, \$154,254 from the Catholic Relief Service, \$62,230 from Oxfam-America, and \$16,351 from "United Churches." In October, 1980, the month the FMLN was formed, the World Council of Churches approved another \$500,000 grant for CEAH, according to a note signed by Angel V. Peiro, the World Council of Churches' subsecretary for American Aid and Caribbean [Affairs] of the Commission for Inter-Ecclesiastical Aid of the Refugees and World Service.⁷⁰

After the FMLN unified the guerrilla groups, the FPL faction drew up an expanded aid proposal which was considered and approved by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the decision-making body of the FMLN.⁷¹ The proposal sought "to capture the maximum help for humanitarian purposes in benefit of the revolutionary process," and proposed the merger of CEAH and another humanitarian front into a body called the "Salvadoran Ecumenical Committee of Humanitarian Aid," or CESA.

The contents of the document

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The document speaks for itself, implying in the opening paragraph that some of the humanitarian aid would be used for the purchase of weapons: it would be a "single, 'apolitical,' ecclesiastical-humanitarian group that will guarantee the international financial agencies good administration [of funds] for victims of repression and will appear to such agencies to be incapable of using any of the funds to purchase arms."⁷²

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"This group should appear to be directed by persons who are not publicly identified with any revolutionary organization and who inspire confidence among ecclesiastical institutions such as the Archbishopric, Protestant churches, Catholic schools, orders of nuns and priests, etc. This would make it possible for such institutions to participate in the group and make available their many facilities (premises, vehicles, etc.) that might be used in connection with shelters, storehouses, hospitals, etc. ✓

"This group should not only serve the revolutionary process but should be under the control of the DRU.

"The foregoing conditions may be met by creating a structure that is under the control of the DRU subcommittee on obtaining international funds. Control over the humanitarian group will be ensured by the subcommittee's direct contact with those who are in charge of the aid or who occupy key positions in carrying out the group's activities. All these must be militants of revolutionary organizations, but not known as such. In addition, an effort will be made to influence indirectly those who appear, on the surface, to be the highest authorities. This must be done with a good deal of tact so that those less progressive institutions of persons whose participation is desirable because they attract much foreign and domestic aid will not cease to participate."

The document then proposed that CEAH merge with the Salvadoran Ecumenical Council (CES) into CESA, in part because it would resolve conflicts between the two groups and thereby enable more funds to be drawn from abroad. It would be ecumenical in order to attract contributions from the widest number of religious and other organizations. CESA's sole role, the proposal said, would be to raise money for humanitarian purposes; it would issue no denunciations of the Salvadoran government in order to appear non-political and thereby maintain appeal while avoiding negative attention. The political statements, said the document, would come from the Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission (CDHES) and *Socorro Juridico*, the Legal Aid office of the Archdiocese--two groups that would later be revealed as FMLN fronts themselves.⁷³

Care would be taken to mask CESA's true connections. This would be done through using unwitting individuals in various churches by giving them high-level positions which really had little power. Leading CESA's bureaucracy would be an assembly consisting of two representatives of each member organization.

The document explained, "According to the bylaws, the assembly would be the highest authority and would have no organic connection with the DRU. In practice, inasmuch as it is a very large bureaucratic group that meets every three months, its influence would be minimal. It would only provide general guidance. The importance of this assembly, which will be as numerous as possible, is to provide effective cover for the committee that will generate

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confidence, both in El Salvador and abroad, and will make it difficult for the government to prevent the receipt of foreign aid (medicines, food, money, etc.)."

In the results of the CISPES founding conference in Washington, the same concern was expressed. The "work plan" outlined earlier stated that CISPES would "pressure the governments of the U.S. and El Salvador" to "assure the neutrality and protection of humanitarian relief efforts," indicating concern that there would be a crackdown on private groups sending aid destined for the FMLN.

Similarly the CESAHA board of directors, to have ranked below the assembly in the hierarchy, would also consist of well-known, respectable people who had little actual power within the organization. "The board of directors," the proposal said, "will consist of representatives of institutions that are best known abroad and thus make it easier to gain the confidence of funding agencies. . . . These representatives should also be persons who have the trust and respect of the bishops; the bishops will then refrain from interfering in CESAHA policy or, if they should interfere, the representatives would be able to stop the interference without having to break with the bishops." But while the board would have the ability to hold concerned bishops at bay, it would have no real influence within CESAHA. The document continued, "Although the board members will appear to occupy key positions in the bylaws, . . . they will not be the persons who, in practices, wield the real power in CESAHA; they will be very busy persons who can only consider CESAHA matters every couple of weeks. . . . The importance of the board of directors is also to provide cover and decoration for CESAHA, to make it trustworthy and attractive without obstructing its real function."

Politically reliable candidates on the board were important. The designated guerrilla contact in the Archbishopric was Father Octavio Cruz. The proposal said, "We see no need to question this appointment since he sympathizes with the revolutionary organizations without being organized [without being an official member of an organized revolutionary group?], and he would let us act in CESAHA without protesting." In 1987, Father Cruz was identified by former FMLN member Luz Janet Alfaro as a member of the FPL guerrilla faction and as the chief point of contact for the FMLN inside the Archbishopric. Father Cruz, to have been named chairman of CESAHA, would have an important role to play in the FMLN fundraising apparatus.

While San Salvador's Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas was highly critical of the government, he never supported the guerrillas. An additional impediment to his possible interference was to be the inclusion of the Protestant churches. This presence, the document said, "ensures that Monsignor Rivera cannot act fully in CESAHA policy and that the Protestant funding agencies will cooperate more readily."

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Representatives of the Confederation of Religious Orders and the local Catholic schools would also be on the CESA board. The schools, especially the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), were hotbeds of pro-FMLN faculty. The guerrilla proposal noted, "It is important that CESA attract and incorporate this sector of the Catholic Church because it has a great deal of infrastructure and a certain autonomy from the Archbishopric." The director of the Sacred Heart school, whom the guerrillas identified as a supporter, was to become public relations director for the fundraising front, because "she sympathizes with the revolutionary movement without being a member of any organization and she is capable of opposing any effort by the Archbishop to change CESA." It was suggested that she oversee a CESA bulletin to be distributed to "collaborators and solidarity committees. The bulletin will point the increasing and specific needs for greater aid, particularly international aid."

The individual to have actual power within CESA would be the executive secretary, who would also be the only board member to work full-time at the CESA office: "He will be greatly responsible for channeling the aid to the revolutionary process. . . To accomplish this, it will suffice for him to submit exact reports to them on what has been distributed, always stating that it has been distributed to the people, the victims of the repression." (emphasis added) In other words, the executive secretary would prepare false financial reports to deceive the board of directors, while channeling the money to the FMLN. It would be a sensitive position, and "should be held by a tested militant, a member of a revolutionary organization who is in constant contact with the DRU subcommittee for obtaining international funds, and a member of that subcommittee," the document said. "His political militance should not be publicly known."

There would be several committees to oversee certain CESA projects. The leaders of most committees, the proposal went on, either would be "militants" of revolutionary groups, "or at least proven sympathizers" who "will work full time with the CESA. They will directly organize distribution of the aid. Their militance must not be publicly known."

These committees would be centered around health and social welfare, to include a Pharmacy Committee to bring in medicines, a Medical Assistance Committee for building clinics, a First Aid Training Committee, a Stores Committee to gather and distribute clothing and supplies, a Shelters Committee, and an Indemnization Committee apparently supporting family members of the guerrillas. The document was plain about the purpose of these committees:

"The economic aid, clothing, food, medicines, etc., will be channeled through these committees to the combatants. However, we should not ignore persons who seek refuge in the shelters or request aid and who are not members of an organized group since it will be part of our cover to provide such assistance."

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"Funds will be channeled to the revolutionary organizations through contact between the CESAHA committees and the health and social welfare coordinators, in accordance with the rules established by the DRU subcommittee on obtaining funds. Care should be taken that the coordination between the committees and the collaborators does not become publicly known." (emphasis added)

For this operation to succeed over the long term, the document continued, the "internal structure" of the fundraising organization had to function in a disciplined manner and would be completely under the control of the FMLN's DRU governing body. The internal structure was described as follows:

"The subcommittee for the acquisition of international funds shall be composed of the leaders of these subcommittees or teams of the various organizations that make up the DRU.

"Its purpose will be to administer the acquisition and channeling of the funds obtained by the CESAHA so that they will benefit the DRU and the FDR. In a word, it will be responsible for the financing of the revolution." (emphasis added) Over time, the subcommittee members would attempt to win over non-committed members of the powerless board of directors "and incorporate them as soon as possible, until at least a majority of them will be following subcommittee policies."

Actual refugees in need of assistance were to be CESAHA's last priority, according to the planners. The revolutionary units came first, and would have to submit requests to CESAHA for funds. The document warned, "It is very important that the revolutionary organizations endeavor to channel their petitions to the CESAHA only through the coordinating units, because that is the only way in which the distribution of foreign humanitarian assistance can be centralized and carried out in proportion to the organizations' actual needs.

"These coordinating units will also expedite and enhance the effectiveness of CESAHA's service to the revolutionary organizations and will prevent CESAHA from giving preferential assistance to fleeing segments of the population, to the detriment of the fighting segment."

A specific section of the proposal was reserved for dealing with American support groups. As a large resource of money and supplies, solidarity groups in the United States would have to set up specialized fundraising campaigns, along the lines of refugee subsistence, family support, medicine, food, hospitals and support for "exiles." "Collections made abroad in churches and solidarity committees for the purpose of meeting the urgent need [of] humanitarian assistance for the Salvadoran people" were one method of fundraising, the proposal said. "Such collections shall be encouraged by CESAHA by disseminating information about the needs

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and nature of CESA; however, it should be "information that does not compromise too deeply persons who cooperate with CESA, but which is likely to promote international solidarity."

Transfer of cash from the U.S.

Under the subheading "Mechanisms for transferring donations from abroad," the document explained,

"There shall be two dollar checking accounts in the name of CESA in Panama or in Mexico. One of the accounts shall be used to channel cash from the [humanitarian] agencies. The number of the latter account shall not appear in literature distributed during the conduct of the collections. In contrast, the other account number shall be used precisely to channel donations made by people abroad. The account number shall be disseminated widely. Both accounts shall be in the names of renowned persons and institutions who are completely trustworthy to the donors and who guarantee that they will transfer to CESA the cash deposited in the accounts in its entirety. It is recommended that the accounts be in the name of famous bishops or pastors who are committed to serve the people. In short it should be Mendez Arceo in Mexico for the public account."

Sergio Mendez Arceo is the former bishop of Cuernavaca, Mexico and a longtime supporter of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary causes. He is a member of the directorate of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador and is an honorary president of the World Peace Council.⁷⁴ Mendez Arceo was denounced by the leader of the Mexican Catholic Bishops Conference as misrepresenting the position of the church.⁷⁵ As will be outlined, it is through Mendez Arceo that funds raised by CISPES and its affiliates are channeled to the FMLN.

The fundraising proposal explained how the money would be laundered from the accounts to the FMLN: "The manner in which the cash deposited in these two accounts shall be transferred to El Salvador shall be by bank drafts of about ten thousand dollars each made out to members or collaborators of CESA. A different name shall be used each time. These drafts should preferably be hand-carried by trustworthy persons."⁷⁶

This document and the Farid Handal diary created quite a controversy when they were made public in 1981. UPI wrote an article about the documents which appeared in the 26 April 1981 Boston Globe under the headline, "Did aid funds go to Salvador rebels?" The article and the State Department were denounced in several press conferences and public statements by the groups named in the documents, such as Oxfam, the World Council of Churches, Church World Services (an arm of the National Council of Churches) and Catholic Relief Services. It was subsequently reported that

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UPI editor in chief H. L. Stevenson publicly apologized for UPI's not having contacted the groups in question when writing the article.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, UPI did not retract the story.

However, despite the protests of the groups involved, at least three of them, the World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches and Oxfam, were supporting the FMLN politically at the time. To add further doubt to the credibility of claims that the documents were false is the fact that one of the most prolific attackers of the documents was Philip Agee, a former CIA operative who defected and has since dedicated his life to discrediting the U.S. government and destroying American intelligence operations. One of the West's top experts on Soviet active measures, former Czech disinformation chief Ladislav Bittman of Boston University, says that Agee has actively "participated in Soviet disinformation campaigns" against the U.S. intelligence community.⁷⁸ Agee was quoted by the *New York Times* as saying, "I aspire to be a Communist and revolutionary,"⁷⁹ has praised the Soviet KGB,⁸⁰ and publicly acknowledged in his first anti-CIA book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* that he relied on the Communist Party of Cuba for source material.⁸¹

This notwithstanding, subsequent statements over the next few years by Oxfam, CISPES, the U.S. Peace Council and other aid groups have proven beyond reasonable doubt that those documents were genuine. These statements have been used as source material throughout this study and are a matter of public record. While critics of the 1980 Farid Handal document denied any CPUSA involvement in the formation of CISPES, for example, the 1986 U.S. Peace Council biography of CPUSA operative Sandy Pollack confirmed the relationship. CISPES and Oxfam-America promote each other's material and cosponsor the same pro-FMLN and pro-Sandinista demonstrations and political events, bringing into question the veracity of Oxfam's denials.

In October 1981, Oxfam's Central America Task Force chairman Laurence R. Simon angrily challenged an article which mentioned Oxfam's aid to the guerrillas. "Oxfam is not named in any captured document describing guerrilla activity," Simon snapped, and followed up with, "the U.S. State Department is not making that claim. . ."⁸² Perhaps despite Oxfam's official political support for the FMLN, Mr. Simon honestly believed that his group was not financing the guerrillas. This seems reasonable, as the fundraising system designed by the FMLN was elaborately designed to conceal its true function, even from its own board of directors and Archbishop Rivera y Damas. Simon finished, "Our funds in El Salvador are committed and used for the care of persons displaced by the civil war [sic]. The refugee organizations we are funding have the strong and continuing backing of acting Archbishop Rivera y Damas." Simon sent a copy of his letter to Oxfam's attorneys. But the reporter made no retraction, and Oxfam took no legal action.

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One of the reasons given for believing that the document was false was that nobody had ever heard of a group called CESAH. The document, though, was a proposal, and the final result was subject to change. Rev. Paul F. McCleary of the United Methodist Church and an officer of the Church World Service said that in January 1981, CEAH merged with the "much larger official Catholic relief group," CES. This merger was known as ASESAM, through which "nearly all worldwide relief efforts" were being coordinated in early 1981.⁸³

An evangelical group from Texas visited the ASESAM office in late 1981, and reported that it was managed by Fr. Octavio Cruz in the archbishopric.⁸⁴ This evidence shows that the document in question was accurate:

1. CEAH and CES did merge into a new group.
2. The merger took place in January 1981, less than a month after the guerrilla proposal was written.
3. The new group was based in the archbishopric and managed by Father Cruz, who had been designated as such in the guerrilla proposal.

(ASESAM changed its name shortly after. Oxfam reported in its Spring 1983 newsletter that it gave \$50,000 to DIACONIA, which it says was "formerly ASESAM." See section on Oxfam-America.)

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Development of the FMLN's private fundraising system

[Author's note: This chapter is a copy the text of a diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador to the Secretary of State in Washington. The cable number is SS10059, and is dated 18 July 1986. Its title is "Guerrilla Finances--Where Does The Money Come From?" It was originally classified "Confidential," but was declassified by the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. The bureaucratic sections of the cable, including the numbering of each section, have been deleted for ease in reading as a text. The author made the editorial decision to insert certain items for clarity; these additions are plainly marked in brackets. All other information contained herein, including subheadings, is from the original cable].

Since 1980, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has conducted a widespread guerrilla war that has proved costly in human and material terms. The FMLN receives most of its arms through Nicaragua and other Communist bloc countries. However, the bulk of its funds come from donations collected in western democracies as well as funds channeled to it by sympathetic human rights groups, unions, and elements in the Catholic church. The FMLN supplements this income with contributions from the socialist bloc and local Salvadoran collaborators and income obtained from kidnappings and the collection of "war taxes." Western donations have declined in the last two years, while the support of socialist states remains static. To cover the resulting budgetary shortfall, the FMLN has increasingly resorted to banditry, extortion, and kidnapping, the primary funding sources of the 1970s. In the absence of new sources of funding, we may expect these activities to increase substantially in the near future.

Much of the information for this report came from an interview with former FMLN guerrilla leader Miguel Castellanos, who served on the finance committee of the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) in 1978 [a major faction of the FMLN] and defected from the movement in 1985. Additional information was provided from the documents captured in April 1985 with Nidia Diaz, comandante of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRCA)--another of the five organizations making up the FMLN. Salvadorans who were victims of guerrilla extortion also provided firsthand accounts of guerrilla fund-raising efforts. . . .

Guerrilla Finance in the Seventies.

During the seventies, the Salvadoran insurgency was a small urban-based force which relied on terrorizing the political and economic elite for most of its funds. Due to its small size, guerrilla financial

requirements for food, housing, and other recurring costs were

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modest; however, the guerrillas had to purchase their arms on the high-priced world market. The guerrillas acquired most of their funds from kidnappings conducted in San Salvador. This enabled them simultaneously to support themselves and to terrorize the urban rich.

The Transformation to Guerrilla Warfare:
An Expensive Proposition.

Spurred by government and right-wing repressive measures, the FMLN was transformed from a self-sustaining urban force into a large, rural-based guerrilla army. This dramatically altered the nature of their fiscal requirements. From 1980 onward, the guerrillas no longer had to worry about financing the purchase of arms and ammunition. Munitions flowed in quantity from Nicaragua and other Communist bloc countries. The FMLN had only to guarantee the safe passage of the weapons. At the same time, however, guerrilla leaders found themselves confronted with millions of dollars of expenses to provision their rapidly expanding army.

Where does the money go?

The documents captured in April 1985 with PRTC comandante Nidia Diaz included a number of financial documents, among which was an estimated budget for 1984. Projected annual expenditures for 1984 for the PRTC alone were about \$580 thousand. Housing, food, and health-related expenditures accounted for the bulk of the projected outlays. The PRTC also budgeted \$10,200 yearly for trips to obtain external financing, \$15,200 to cover overseas subscriptions to newspapers and magazines, and \$300 for international phone calls. Funds were also required to purchase and fuel vehicles and buy other provisions and supplies.

Support From the East--Let Them Eat Rifles

The guerrilla organizations originally planned to obtain the bulk of their funds from "fraternal" socialist states. To their dismay, although weapons were provided, only Cuba, Libya, and to a lesser extent, Nicaragua were responsive to requests for money. According to Castellanos, Facundo Guardado, a member of the FPL and of the finance committee of the FMLN, visited Libya in 1981. During his visit, Col. Muammar Gaddafi [sic] offered the FMLN \$4 million in direct assistance. By 1984, at least \$2 million had been delivered. East Germany, in contrast, offered only uniforms and medicine to the guerrillas. The Soviet Union ignored all direct requests for help, preferring to channel its assistance through Cuba. The extent of past (and current) Soviet assistance to the FMLN is therefore very difficult to estimate.

Direct Fund-Raising Efforts in the West.

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The Western democracies became the largest source of cash for the guerrilla[s] during the 1980s. The various constituent fronts of the FMLN and its political ally, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) set up "solidarity" organizations in western Europe, the United States, Canada, and other Latin American countries. In churches and town halls, on campuses and street corners, these support groups painted a horrific picture of government oppression and portrayed the FMLN-FDR as a force for positive change. The resulting funds soon became the most important source of income for the FMLN, raising millions of dollars in hard currency. In 1982, for example, the "Arms for El Salvador" campaign in West Germany raised approximately \$2 million for the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL).

From FMLN Records.

The documents captured with Nidia Diaz clearly reflect the dominant role of external funding as a source of guerrilla financing. One of the documents, dated April 10, 1984, provided a complete accounting of PRTC dollar and colon [local Salvadoran currency] accounts in 1983. During 1983, 93 percent of the PRTC's total annual revenues came from direct dollar donations. According to the captured financial records, total dollar receipts came to \$389,954. The PRTC during 1983/84 was the smallest of the guerrilla armies, and probably represented less than 10 percent of the total guerrilla combatants in El Salvador. Assuming other guerrilla organizations received similar levels of direct dollar contributions from western sources relative to the size of their groups, we conservatively estimate that at least \$4 million was donated to the FMLN in 1983.

Development Projects--To Feed Hungry Guerrillas.

In addition to the direct contributions which were openly associated with the leftist cause, the FMLN-FDR set itself up in the economic development business, then proceeded to siphon off the bulk of the project assistance to FMLN combatants. Former FMLN comandante Castellanos has provided a detailed explanation of how these organizations function. In 1981, Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR--one of three parties belonging to the FDR) founded the Social Action Investment Center (CIAS) [Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social]. The CIAS collected donations from humanitarian organizations and the general public specifically to support FMLN projects in El Salvador. The projects were in areas of strong FMLN persistence and directed to their "masas" support base. A typical project involved the purchase of seed and fertilizer for peasant followers of the FPL. According to Castellanos, many of the projects were fictitious, created to impress westerners with the FPL's technical sophistication, compassion, and economic need. Only about 30 percent of these donations actually reached the projects; the FPL used the other 70 percent to maintain its combatants.

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The success of the CIAS-FPL effort encouraged other FMLN groups to tap private development assistance funds to support their war efforts. The proliferation of these groups and the FMLN's greed to mine this rich and easy vein was counterproductive. So little care was taken to maintain the facade of requesting funds for legitimate development projects that, in at least one case, two different guerrilla groups presented virtually identical project proposals to the same international group. The CIAS and the other "development" front groups eventually lost credibility in the West. Donor agencies began to require detailed accounting of the use of their funds, including photographs of the projects and copies of receipts. The ability of the CIAS to collect funds for the FPL diminished in 1984, and it was eventually disbanded.

More From Nidia Diaz.

The Nidia Diaz documents reflect that the PRTC also milked the development projects as a source of finance. The colon account shows receipts of \$21,998.50 from "projects" in 1983, or five percent of total PRTC revenues. The same April 1984 report projects a budget for 1984 and lists as a method to obtain funds "an increase in projects proposed to CIAS, DIACONIA, and other sources." The picture had clearly changed by 1985. In a section entitled "The Humanitarian Source," a document explaining financing sources dated 16 March 1985 and addressed to front commanders cynically states that "in the last few years a good quantity of funds from these agencies has been received by presenting projects that need developing in various zones. . . . It is essential to develop the projects in an effective way since reports have to be furnished in case of a visit from the agencies. Not being able to show proof, we lose credibility and cut ourselves off from the possibility of receiving more resources."

The Church Steps In.

With the discrediting of CIAS and other guerrilla-front development agencies, the Catholic church, through DIACONIA, became a leading management agency for funneling private development donations to qualified projects. According to Castellanos, the church's involvement brought with it much tighter controls over the use of the funds. For example, the church-sponsored projects required the approval of local parish priests. The closer controls effectively stymied widespread guerrilla appropriation of the project funds. Castellanos said there were constant complaints within the FMLN because the church allowed too little for FMLN projects.

[Note: A central organization in El Salvador called DIACONIA collects funds raised through international churches and private groups such as Oxfam. DIACONIA, which has been described as "the central reserve bank of the FMLN," is directed by church activists

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who are members of various FMLN factions and is considered an FMLN front. Not all church groups within DIACONIA are Marxist, but non-Marxists exercise no control over the body. (see chart)

[According to a study of FMLN "human rights" fronts based on evidence provided by former FMLN members Luz Janet Alfaro and Dora Angelica Campos, the DIACONIA leadership is as follows:

"The Lutheran Church, with Reverend Medardo Gomez, who belongs to the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), as one of its representatives; the Emmanuel Baptist Church, with Brother Juan Sanchez, who is a militant in the Resistencia Nacional (RN); the Catholic Church, its representative Father Octavio Cruz, also a militant in the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL); the Episcopal Church with its representative Brito Bertiz, who does not aid any specific organization, but all of them considered 'democratic'; and finally the Federation of Cooperatives called FUNFROCOP, led by Dimas Vanegas, militant of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS)."⁸⁵

[Apparently, most international organizations donating to DIACONIA are either unaware of its FMLN ties or have no objection to such ties. DIACONIA reportedly prepares false invoices to show to officials of foreign donor organizations to justify expenses, and presents supposed recipients of such aid who are, in reality, FMLN members or supporters. It is estimated that only 10 percent of the funds given to DIACONIA are utilized for genuine relief purposes, with the remaining 90 percent going directly to the FMLN-FDR.]⁸⁶

The "Human Rights" Link

As a consequence of the diminution of project funding, the FMLN fronts were forced to create new, more credible fund-raising organizations in the West. Some of these groups--CRIPDES (Christian Committee for the Displaced of El Salvador), CDHES (Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador), COMADRES (Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Disappeared and Assassinated of El Salvador Monsignor Oscar Romero), and CONIP (National Coordinating Conference of the Popular Church) were essentially reconstructed versions of the CIAS--they solicited funds for humanitarian efforts and channeled the funds to FMLN fronts. Some of these groups have recently lost credibility as well--particulaly since the recent defection and public testimony of two of their members in June [1986]--and they will likely be reincarnated under new names, according to Castellanos.

Labor Organizations Channel Funds to [the] Guerrilla[s]

The guerrillas have found that they can obtain a substantial amount of capital from donations from labor unions which they control. Groups like FENASTRAS (National Federation of Workers'

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Unions), FUSS (United Federation of Salvadoran Workers), ASIES (Independent Union Association of El Salvador), ANDES (National Association of Salvadoran Educators--21st of June), and COACES (Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El Salvador) all channel western donations to the FPL. As "representatives" of the Salvadoran working class, these organizations attract sympathy and support from many westerners who would not consciously assist a communist insurgency. Castellanos stated that the wife of French President Francois Mitterrand provided ANDES with \$40,000 in 1984, much of which found its way to the FPL's coffers. Castellanos estimates that the FPL receives about 50 percent of the funds donated by the West to labor groups like ANDES.

Auxiliary Funding Sources.

Assistance from abroad, though substantial, has never provided enough money to fund the guerrilla effort completely. The guerrillas have thus found it necessary to supplement their income with local means of support. Relying on local sources for each month's revenue is not possible, as a memo which accompanied the PRTC's 10 April 1984 financial report noted. Flows may be relatively strong one month, then dry up completely the next. Unlike the external financing and the project financing, which are centrally controlled by each guerrilla organization, auxiliary funding sources are managed independently at the front or sub-front level. Cash is also sent from Nicaragua. In 1985, for instance, a Lada [automobile] from Nicaragua crashed in Honduras. A search of the vehicle revealed secret compartments which contained arms and \$27,400 in cash. Castellanos said this was not destined for the FPL, and he considered it "amateurish."

Collaborators.

The guerrillas prefer, of course, to obtain funds through donations offered by collaborators. This is a painless, easy way to procure money, but it is not lucrative, because FMLN collaborators are few and generally relatively poor. A letter dated March 13, 1984, which was captured with Nidia Diaz discusses recent progress in generating resources: "The ranch will be ready shortly and will be handed over to some collaborators. We have thought about sending Victor to the front. His wife will remain in Santa Tecla and help set up a small business."

Kidnappings.

Another guerrilla fund-raising technique involves kidnapping. The FMLN does not discriminate in the selection of its victims: it kidnaps small cotton farmers in Usulután and big businessmen in San Salvador. A survey of recent incidents shows that ransoms range from as little as \$20 to more than \$50,000, with the bulk in the \$4000 to \$5000 range. By early 1985, the need for money had driven

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the guerrillas to seek to rebuild their capability to conduct large-scale kidnapping activities. The FMLN conducted kidnapping operations in Costa Rica and Honduras; Castellanos attributes the kidnapping of a Japanese businessman in Costa Rica in the early 1980s to the FPL.

Although potentially far more lucrative than contributions from collaborators, this strategy is problematic. It is difficult and expensive to create urban commando units which are capable of carrying out successful kidnappings. The task is all the more difficult now, because the urban infrastructure of the guerrillas is in shambles as a result of the government's thorough investigations of the Inez Duarte kidnapping and the [June 19, 1985] Zona Rosa massacre [of four U.S. Marine Embassy guards, two U.S. businessmen and seven others]. Although in need of additional professionalism, the security forces have improved their anti-terrorist capabilities. The kidnappings of wealthy members of San Salvador's elite would prove both ideologically satisfying and remunerative to the FMLN, but the guerrillas do not now appear to be in the position to carry out many of these operations.

As a result, FMLN groups direct the bulk of their operations against small farmers in rural--and generally impoverished--areas. This places the self-proclaimed "representatives of the people" in the uncomfortable position of victimizer. The victims rarely have anything to do with the government and are often individuals of modest means. Indeed, those kidnapped by one guerrilla front are sometimes sympathizers of another; on more than one occasion, says Castellanos, this type of mistake has strained relations between allied guerrilla bands. This kind of infighting has also been revealed in numerous captured documents.

War Taxes.

"War taxes" provide another means of guerrilla finance. This is the guerrilla term for the banditry and blackmail which they perpetrate. Guerrillas sometimes stop buses and rob or "solicit" money and watches from the indigent, working-class passengers. They also demand extortion payments (often a combination of cash and provisions) from farmers and businessmen who work in areas of guerrilla activity. Because of FMLN weakness in Salvadoran cities, urban dwellers and businesses usually are not subject to war taxes. According to Castellanos, the FMLN leadership does not like to rely on these activities, because they reveal the guerrillas as enemies of the people and make it difficult for the leadership to prevent their groups from deteriorating into bands of common thieves.

Two typical examples of war taxes follow. The manager of a small coffee farm received a form letter in late 1985 from the FMLN informing him that if he wished to harvest his coffee in peace, he had to:

- (A) Comply with the salary schedule endorsed by the FMLN;

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- (B) Pay 10,000 colones in cash (\$2,000);
(C) Deliver 10 pounds of aluminum oxide, 10 pounds of potassium chlorate, 10 meters of slow wick, and 10 flares.

The manager was given 17 days to purchase and deliver the cash and the goods.

Another grower, who received a similar form letter, faced much stiffer demands. This time the guerrilla demanded 250,000 colones (\$50,000), 100 pounds each of aluminum oxide and potassium chlorate, 200 blasting caps, and a rotary multicopier. The coffee grower had only 11 days to respond.

Guerrillas also ask for boots, materials for uniforms, and knapsacks, as well as money.

Nonetheless, as foreign funding sources diminish, some fronts increasingly rely on war taxes. Castellanos says that since 1984 the San Vicente front of the FPL has received much of its funds from war tax collections. Property owners in a village in the western shadow of the San Vicente volcano report that guerrilla harassment over the past year has been at its highest level in years. A middle class resident of the village was kidnaped and ransom notes were distributed not only to his family, but a dozen of the leading villagers as well. (Although many of the villagers did not accede to the extortion demands, the victim eventually was released.) The guerrillas also prevented property owners from harvesting from the higher elevations. Posing as small farmers, they harvested the coffee themselves and sold it to INCAFE [the state-controlled coffee monopoly]. Transportation interruptions and collections of war taxes have greatly increased in frequency in this area.

Current Trends in Guerrilla Finance.

Finances are a grave problem for the FMLN. Castellanos estimates the FPL's monthly non-military expenses in 1985 at 800,000 colones; its monthly income from external donations had dropped from 300-400,000 colones in earlier years to 200,000 in 1985. It had to collect the rest from its union allies and through auxiliary measures. The crux of the shortfall lies in the increasing difficulty of raising funds for the Salvadoran guerrilla movement in the West. Past donors are no longer convinced of the inevitability of the guerrilla victory, and they have turned their attention to newly urgent areas of "struggle" like Chile and South Africa. Barring spectacular FMLN military triumphs or severe political or human rights deterioration in El Salvador, the decline in western contributions to the guerrillas will accelerate.

Unless the guerrillas manage to convince the socialist bloc to increase its financial assistance to their cause, they will find it necessary to deepen their reliance on auxiliary measures. Because

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potential increases in collaborator donations are marginal, the FMLN will have to collect more war taxes and conduct more kidnapping operations, especially of wealthy targets. The financial exigencies of the FMLN guerrilla warfare will subject Salvadorans to heightened levels of extortion, blackmail, and terror.

[End of text. Document concludes with bureaucratic language.]

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CISPES as the nerve center

✓ "In the U.S., 347 'solidarity committees' funnel money to the movement. The guerrillas have even hired a U.S. public relations firm with offices in Manhattan and Washington to plead their case. Whatever their internal divisions and rivalries, the guerrillas have learned very well that the best place to put up a united front is in public."

--Time, 9 April 1984, p. 33.

Given CISPES' role as the central support apparatus for the FMLN, it is logical that it would also be the nerve center of financial support activities for the guerrillas. CISPES was a key factor in the setting up and promotion of four organizations whose specific function is to raise cash and material supplies for the FMLN. The four organizations have innocuous names, and raise funds in a manner that masks their support for the guerrillas. The Council for Inter-American Security filed complaints with the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Postal Service showing that the fundraising techniques of at least two of the groups through direct-mail are misleading, and urged those government entities to take action.

The four groups in question are New El Salvador Today (NEST), which raises money under the pretense of fostering economic and agricultural development in El Salvador; Medical Aid for El Salvador (MAES), whose direct-mail packages solicit funds for war victims; the Salvador Medical Relief Fund (SMRF), which says it supplies and trains rural community health workers; and the Salvadoran Humanitarian Aid, Research and Education Foundation (SHARE), which is said to benefit Salvadoran refugees living in Central America.

In a way, their statements of purpose are true, in that some of their funds are used for development and relief. However, they are also misleading, as their fundraising literature does not say explicitly that their projects are conducted inside zones controlled by FMLN paramilitary forces or that funds raised are channeled to the guerrillas. By contrast, private groups which support the contras in Nicaragua specifically tell their donors that money is to be used for aid to the fighters and their families.

In a brochure called "Humanitarian Aid Drive for the People of El Salvador," CISPES explained its version of human suffering in El Salvador and solicited donations for NEST, MAES and SMRF. A 1986 CISPES brochure titled "Raise Your Voice for Peace in El Salvador" made an identical pitch.

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Other CISPES activities to raise cash for the FMLN was a fundraising drive "to benefit childcare centers for Salvadoran children." The money was sent directly to the Women's Association of El Salvador (Asociacion de Mujeres del Salvador, AMES), a political front for the FMLN.⁸⁷

A September, 1981 letter to activists from the CISPES national office announced the Emergency Aid to El Salvador campaign which set a goal of \$250,000 to be raised. The CISPES national office collected all the funds and in CISPES organizer Lisa Tarver's words, "The money will then be channeled through SHARE, which will have tax-exempt status that we will be able to utilize." Tarver continued, "SHARE sends all financial contributions for the refugees to Archbishop Sergio Mendez Arceo in Cuernavaca, Mexico, from where they are distributed to refugee camps throughout Central America."⁸⁸ As noted earlier, the FMLN designated the Mexican former clergyman to serve as its repository for humanitarian aid raised by groups in the United States.

Fundraising projects sponsored directly by CISPES are varied: San Francisco CISPES, for example, sponsored an effort to raise \$15,000 "for a school and an agricultural project in El Salvador." The local chapter maintains a continued flow of donations through a pledge system.⁸⁹ Another CISPES chapter sponsored a 12 kilometer walkathon "to raise material aid for El Salvador."⁹⁰ In Washington, D.C., local CISPES activists held a series of functions to raise \$17,000 over a six-month period to build a "shoe factory" in the FMLN-held town of Tequeque in Chalatenango province.⁹¹ D.C.CISPES documents showed that the goals of that project were to "develop new values" among the Tequeque residents through "collective work," and to provide food to the "popular army"--the CISPES euphemism for the FMLN. (Although Tequeque's population was only 600 at the time, CISPES wanted its residents to produce 6,000 pair of shoes per year. It is doubtful that the shoes were to have been made for trade outside the area, as CISPES noted that the dirt roads in and out of Tequeque were "barely passable.")

With the separate humanitarian fundraising operations functioning as successfully as they did, CISPES concentrated its efforts on propaganda and political action aimed at changing the votes in Congress. However, as noted in the aforementioned diplomatic cable from San Salvador, the FMLN was in desperate need of cash by mid-1986. CISPES abruptly canceled its years-long "Stop the Bombing" campaign that June and re-directed its activities toward fundraising. In the July-August 1986 issue of the CISPES newsletter Alert!, activists were told that the "Stop the Bombing" tactic was over and that the national office had begun training activists to raise a quick quarter of a million dollars. The entire article is reprinted here from the cable to demonstrate CISPES' fundraising vocabulary and how the funds are raised on a local level:

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"CISPES has closed its campaign to stop the bombing, and has now begun a new cycle of material aid fundraising as part of our campaign to promote peace with justice in El Salvador.

"The culminating event of "Stop the Bombing" took place on June 20 in Washington, DC--a dinner to benefit CISPES' Healing the Wounds of War medical campaign in which CISPES pledged to raise \$130,000 for medical aid for El Salvador and Salvadoran medical relief fund. The dinner itself raised over \$1500, and featured as speakers Gus Newport, the mayor of Berkeley, Ca., and Violetta Delgado, a Salvadoran physician.

"CISPES kicked off its new cycle of material aid fundraising with a material aid training in Washington, DC, July 9-13. The national coordinators conference in May set the ambitious goal of \$250,000 to be raised by December, and called for this training to help us meet the challenge. The NCC [national coordinators conference] designated the money to fund projects for New El Salvador Today (NEST), Medical Aid for El Salvador and Salvadoran Medical Relief Fund. [The latter is headed by Dr. Charles Clements.]

"14 people attended the material aid training, representing 10 committees in the New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Northwest regions. Ken Jacobs, formerly of NEST in Berkeley, led the training as the new national office material aid coordinator. He considers the most important contribution of the training to be the trainees' increased understanding of just how critical material aid work is in the solidarity movement. The training also increased participants' understanding of how to carry out material aid work, particularly how to integrate it with the rest of the program. The participants learned in skills workshops how to do outreach, bring new people into committees, and increase their visibility within the community through medical aid work.

"One of the primary objectives of the training was to show the participants that they could raise a lot more material aid than they thought they could--and the inspiration proved immediate. A goal of \$1500 had been set for the hands-on phone-banking and streetwork, and the trainees surpassed it by raising \$2250.

"Trainers included staff from NEST, the CISPES national office, and CISPES regional offices. Diane Greene from NEST told the trainees that those who raise material aid for El Salvador should feel personally responsible for the thousands of lives that are saved through Material Aid.

"Beth Westgarde of San Francisco CISPES gave a workshop on producing dance-a-thons. Beth has worked for two years on Give Peace a Dance (GPAD), a 12-hour dance marathon which after three years has become a Bay Area tradition, and an astonishingly successful fundraiser. 3500 dancers participated in GPAD '85, sponsored by San Francisco and Oakland/Berkeley CISPES and the San Francisco Freeze. The event grossed an incredible \$110,000,

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netting over \$70,000, and Oakland/Berkeley CISPES earmarked half of their share for their Medical Aid for El Salvador project. (For more information call San Francisco or Oakland/Berkeley CISPES at (415) 861-0425 or (415) 644-3636.)

"The participants agreed that one of the greatest strengths of the training was its success in bringing together people from different sized communities and different geographic areas to share experiences and work together. The trainees are now energized to take on the \$250,000 goal; most importantly, they're ready to take the training back to their committees and to other committees in their area, and pass on the information and the inspiration they received."⁹²

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MEDICAL AID FOR EL SALVADOR

Tapping the generosity of the more fortunate Americans, Canadians and West Europeans, the FMLN received the organizational assistance from friends in those democracies to set up its fundraising front organizations at the same time it phased out its traditional methods of fundraising, such as kidnapping and extortion. In the U.S., three particular fronts were set up for three different "humanitarian" projects: Medical aid, development and literacy, and aid to refugees still living in Central America.

Medical Aid for El Salvador (MAES) was founded in Los Angeles in February, 1982.* One of its founders, Bill Zimmerman, was a veteran at arranging such deceitful fundraising campaigns; during the Vietnam War, Zimmerman led a Vietcong fundraising project innocuously called Medical Aid for Indochina.⁹³ "Medical Aid for El Salvador," Zimmerman announced, "has two purposes. One is to deliver medical assistance for the alleviation of the suffering in El Salvador; and two, to protest the involvement of our government in that struggle, because that involvement is creating more victims in need of medical care." To kick off MAES, the group presented a \$25,000 check to a Salvadoran doctor based in Mexico.⁹⁴

Reminiscent of the Vietcong support campaigns, MAES organizers recruited a host of actors to lend itself instant recognition. Ed Asner, Howard Hesseman, and Lee Grant were at the Washington press conference for its initial unveiling. Asner described how he got involved months earlier after being approached on the El Salvador issue by a politically active nun. Initially, Asner had little success in getting other Hollywood celebrities involved. "Then a guy named Bill Zimmerman approached me. He had done a phenomenal job on medical aid to Indochina, and he told me he was doing the same for El Salvador, and would I be one of the titular heads for the committee? I thought about it and thought about it and finally said okay. And he knew how to do it."⁹⁵

Asner said that Zimmerman then wrote up a fundraising letter "which I signed after a few changes, and he got it out. Everything was cool, everything was fine. There were some internal conflicts between the Salvadoran groups, which were finally ironed out, and I was able to work easily and gracefully with the [Archbishop] Romero [Relief Fund] people and the Zimmerman group. . . . The letter provided money."

Meanwhile, Asner read up to become an instant authority on El Salvador, relying on everything from the major media to [Marxist] publications like The Nation. The nun who had initially recruited Asner passed him literature from the pro-Castro North American

*A month later, in March 1982, Zimmerman was in Mexico City as the founding president of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador.

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Congress on Latin America (NACLA). "I'm not an expert on El Salvador," Asner said, "but I'm a citizen who can read."⁹⁶

Actors Martin Sheen and Mike Farrell joined Asner in signing direct-mail fundraising letters for MAES calling for help for El Salvador's impoverished and suffering people, but conveniently failing to mention anything about the FMLN. Because of this misleading fundraising campaign, the Council for Inter-American Security filed a complaint with the Internal Revenue Service that MAES, a designated charity, is raising money under false pretenses.⁹⁷

Asner is more open with the leftist press than with his prospective donors. In an interview with the CISPES newsletter in March 1982, Asner stated, "if we Americans want to deliver medical assistance to the people of El Salvador, frankly we must do it through the rebel forces. They are now the most effective institution in El Salvador committed to health delivery."⁹⁸ CISPES itself said that the role of MAES is "to raise money nationwide to fund efforts by the FMLN-FDR to provide basic medical services to the people of El Salvador."⁹⁹ (emphasis added) MAES national coordinator Christina Courtwright defends the FMLN's record. In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, she said, "The rebels were bringing health care as part of their attempt to liberate the country, while the military and the death squads have been waging a campaign against doctors."¹⁰⁰ She admitted that MAES "sympathizes with the insurgents."

How funds are raised for the FMLN

Medical Aid for El Salvador conducts many of its fundraising campaigns with CISPES at a grass-roots level, through door-to-door canvassing (activists for Ralph Nader's PIRGs have taught MAES how to canvass), benefit dances and dinners, bake sales, auctions, film festivals, walk-a-thons and even church collections, as well as more sophisticated direct-mail.¹⁰¹ The pitch made is generally a broad appeal for aid to the suffering war victims in El Salvador. Unless done at an openly pro-FMLN event such as a CISPES rally or demonstration, the fundraising appeals generally avoid references to the FMLN entirely, but usually stress the need to cut off U.S. aid to El Salvador.

In a March 1984 direct-mail letter signed by Martin Sheen, MAES said that it had already raised nearly \$450,000; nowhere in the letter is the FMLN mentioned. An Asner letter similarly

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⁹⁶Christina Courtwright is the wife of Dave Courtwright, executive director of SANE. Once confined to anti-nuclear issues, SANE has expanded its activities to "anti-intervention" work. Dave Courtwright explained his reasons for doing so in a special column he wrote for the April 23, 1987 issue of the CPUSA newspaper *People's Daily World*.

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sidetracks the FMLN issue: "When you contribute to Medical Aid for El Salvador, you are sending a message of hope to the people there, as you are sending a message to President Reagan that you believe the road to peace is humanitarian aid, not military aid." The donors are misled into thinking that their contributions are intended solely for civilians.

CISPES and the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador also raised money for the MAES project. The CISPES newsletter said that October 1982 saw the "first wave of international protest coordinated by the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. . . . Several of these actions raised funds which were channeled through Medical Aid for El Salvador to the people's clinics in El Salvador administered by the FMLN."¹⁰² In 1983, CISPES set up its own "People-to-People" aid program, whose "two main goals" were pathetically described by CISPES newsletter editor Bob Ostertag as "to raise money for the FMLN's popular clinics and to educate people in this country about the new El Salvador being patiently and lovingly constructed in the zones of popular control."¹⁰³

Once the funds are raised, they are deposited in the MAES account in Los Angeles, where they are "sent to an FMLN-FDR approved team of physicians in Mexico, who buy medical supplies to be taken clandestinely into FMLN-controlled areas of El Salvador," according to the Marxist Guardian.¹⁰⁴ At times, MAES money is channeled through contacts in Costa Rica.¹⁰⁵ By April, 1987, MAES said that it had raised nearly \$1 million in cash and delivered \$1.13 million in supplies.¹⁰⁶ MAES raised \$273,000 in supplies for victims of the terrible October, 1986 earthquake which leveled part of San Salvador, but judging by MAES' record, there is little doubt that the disaster was used as a fundraising opportunity for the guerrillas.

In December, 1986, Medical Aid for El Salvador reported sending \$631,000 worth of supplies to El Salvador in cooperation with Oxfam America, the Archbishop Romero Relief Fund (which was involved in setting up MAES), and Chevron Corporation, making MAES' total claimed deliveries to Salvadoran recipients \$2.09 million.¹⁰⁷

MAES set up a network inside El Salvador which is overseen by the National Students Association of El Salvador (AGEUS), identified as a front for the FMLN; and the Salvador Committee of Health Professionals (COPROSAL).¹⁰⁸ (see glossary) These two organizations are said to administer MAES projects inside FMLN-dominated areas of El Salvador, however, there is evidence that the projects never existed, and that the money "disappeared." Seventy percent of the funds raised are diverted for military purposes, according to former FMLN bookkeeper Miguel Castellanos. MAES funds are often sent either through Sergio Mendez Arceo in Mexico, or directly to Rev. Octavio Cruz, a radical priest working in the Archbishop's office in San Salvador who is a [member of the FMLN and a] point of contact between the guerrillas and the

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church.¹⁰⁹ Cruz is a leading member of the San Salvador-based FMLN fundraising front DIACONIA, a coalition of church groups which serves as a repository for funds from international humanitarian organizations which are diverted to the FMLN.¹¹⁰ (see section on SHARE)

Direct aid to terrorist commander

According to a MAES flyer describing its history, it won a "landmark victory" in August, 1985, when it "pressured the Salvadoran government into permitting an urgently-needed operation on La Palma Peace Talks participant Nidia Diaz," who had been shot by the army.¹¹¹ Again, the group is misleading prospective supporters. Diaz was not a simple peace talks participant brutalized by the army, but is one of the FMLN's top commanders as a leader of the Trotskyist Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) faction.¹¹² She was shot and captured in combat in April, 1985.

In danger of losing the use of her trigger finger (her right hand had been injured in battle), Diaz requested an operation. Medical Aid for El Salvador rushed to her aid. In the U.S., MAES and CISPES leaders organized a telegram-sending campaign to President Duarte and the Salvadoran Defense Minister, and a phone-in campaign to the Salvadoran Embassy in Washington. The government relented and allowed the MAES doctors inside the prison to operate. T.V. actor Mike Farrell, who played a doctor on MASH went along to heighten the drama.¹¹³

Medical Airlift to El Salvador, December 1986

A combination aid shipment/media event took place in late November and December 1986, when the "Medical Airlift to El Salvador" was launched from Los Angeles. Designed for its "high visibility and dramatic stance," the airlift was meant to "refocus the American public's attention on the problems of El Salvador and stimulate future support for humanitarian aid." The aid MAES referred to is private assistance through the pro-FMLN network, as MAES consistently opposes U.S. government aid of any kind, including humanitarian, to El Salvador.

MAES said that two chartered DC-6 planes and a 727 were to fly more than 50,000 pounds (\$1 million) of medical supplies to El Salvador for displaced people inside El Salvador, civilian amputees and "combatants from both sides," and sick and wounded children.¹¹⁴ The aid was indeed delivered, but through FMLN operative Octavio Cruz at the Archbishopric. It was reported that Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, who had publicly endorsed the MAES campaign, expressed frustration that the church had little say in determining where or how this aid was distributed.¹¹⁵ The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, which met with members of the 32-person MAES delegation,

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said that the group defended their program to aid terrorist commander Nidia Diaz, but would not comment on her faction's June 19, 1985 murder of the four U.S. Marine Embassy guards and the other people. Nor would they comment on the FMLN's kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter, who was released in exchange for Diaz and more than 100 other FMLN guerrillas and terrorists who subsequently flew to Cuba. The MAES delegates also refused to talk about Diaz's broadcasts over Radio Havana, which were occurring at the time of the visit.¹¹⁶

The Medical Airlift was organized by MAES executive director Sand Brim and staff, as well as Jon Floyd, a former decorated Marine captain who served bravely in Vietnam but subsequently joined the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW); David Evans, a Marine who enlisted in 1969, lost both legs in Vietnam, and later joined the VVAW and is now a leader of the left-of-center Vietnam Veterans of America; and Mario Velasquez, a Yale graduate and pro-FMLN activist who is said to be the son of a former high-ranking Salvadoran military official and now lives in "exile" in the U.S. To his credit, Evans visited maimed Salvadoran army soldiers and, according to MAES, delivered prosthetics devices to some of the amputees. It was not reliably recorded, however, the effect the visit had on the soldiers' morale.¹¹⁷

In the United States, the airlift was made for the media. The projected itinerary went as follows: the group was to leave Los Angeles on November 30 after a press conference and a second press photo session with the aircraft and supplies. On December 1, Evans was scheduled "to deliver and fit ten artificial limbs to selected Salvadoran amputees." Between December 2 and 4, the delegation was scheduled to deliver supplies in various camps in El Salvador, meeting with government officials on the fifth. They were then scheduled to go to Mexico City to meet with foreign ministers of the Contadora group and leaders of the FMLN-FDR, where they would publicly denounce American foreign policy.¹¹⁸

The event was conducted in cooperation with Oxfam, and was underwritten by the Chevron Corporation.¹¹⁹

MAES Sponsors and Endorsers

Members of Congress:

Rep. George E. Brown (D-CA)
Rep. John Conyers (D-MI)
Rep. George Crockett (D-MI)
Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA)
Rep. Julian Dixon (D-CA)
Rep. Mervyn Dymally (D-CA)
Rep. Walter Fauntroy (D-DC)
Rep. Thomas Foglietta (D-PA)

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Rep. Robert Garcia (D-NY)
 Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA)
 Rep. Mickey Leland (D-TX)
 Rep. Parren Mitchell (Retired D-MD)
 Rep. Richard Ottinger (Retired D-NY)
 Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark (D-CA)
 Rep. Bruce F. Vento (D-MN)

Other national sponsors

Hal Ashby
 Larry Birns, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
 Ruben Blades
 Peter Bonerz
 Noam Chomsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 David Clennon
 Rev. John Collins, Clergy and Laity Concerned
 Barry Commoner, Citizen's Party
 Harvey Cox, Harvard Divinity School
 Colleen Drewhurst, actress
 E. L. Doctorow, novelist
 Michael Douglas, actor
 Maxwell Gail, actor
 Jack Gilford
 William Goodfellow, Center for International Policy
 Lee Grant, producer, actress
 Robert Guillaume, actor
 Gregory Hines, actor
 Barry Hirsh
 Deborah Jackson, National Conference of Black Lawyers
 Paul Jarrico
 Frances Moore Lappe, founder, Institute for Food and
 Development Policy
 Rev. James Lawson, Southern Christian Leadership Conference
 Dr. Salvador Luria, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Alan Myerson
 Edward Olmos, actor
 Grace Paley, poet
 Michael Phillips
 Tony Randall, actor
 Michael Ratner, former president, National Lawyers Guild
 Carl Reiner, actor
 Rev. Mark Ridley-Thomas, Southern Christian Leadership
 Conference
 Ramona Ripston, Executive Director, Southern California ACLU
 Mark Rosenberg
 Helen Safa, professor, University of Florida-Gainesville
 Waldo Salt
 Dr. John Sassin
 Dr. Richard Saxon, Physicians for Social Responsibility
 Roy Scheider, actor

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Martin Sheen, actor
 David Soul, actor
 Dr. Benjamin Spock
 Dr. Jerome Tobis
 Jon Voight, actor
 Ralph Waite, actor
 Dr. George Wald, Harvard University
 Rev. George Webber, President, New York Theological Seminary
 Dr. Michael Weissberg, University of Colorado
 Rev. Phil Wheaton, EPICA
 Sol Yurick, actor

RDV. DELLUMS
 SENATOR, CALIFORNIA
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 2120 PAVILION DRIVE
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 (202) 224-2001
 BAPTIST LEE
 SENATOR, CALIFORNIA
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Congress of the United States
 House of Representatives

ANY MAIL TO THIS OFFICE
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 201 100 STREET, SUITE 100
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 207 100 STREET, SUITE 100
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 (415) 764-1200
 RONALD V. DELLUMS
 SENATOR, CALIFORNIA

June 17, 1982

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing this letter to express my full support of the fundraising efforts of Medical Aid for El Salvador, which is providing medical supplies and health care to the victims of the civil war in El Salvador.

The efforts of this group have already saved the lives of hundreds of innocent women, men, and children by providing such essential items as antibiotics, anesthetics, and health care manuals to those attempting to respond to the brutal violence in El Salvador. The government of El Salvador is unable or unwilling to provide medical care to all but the very few who support its policies and practices in a war against its own people.

The people of El Salvador are in urgent need of help. In the face of such incredible human need the Reagan Administration is spending hundreds of millions of dollars for more military aid to El Salvador. This money is directly supporting a military that former U.S. Ambassador Robert White has called "one of the most out-of-control, violent, bloodthirsty group of men in the world."

I urge you to support Medical Aid for El Salvador in their requests for financial contributions. In doing this, you will be contributing to the improvement of the human condition of our world.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
 Member of Congress

RVD/rch

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Since mid-1982, SHARE has published a regular newsletter called "El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis." Its bias is obvious: While giving great attention to victims of the Salvadoran army, it never pays attention to victims of the FMLN. In one issue, the newsletter tells about a Salvadoran doctor named Leonardo Gonzalez, who "was forced to take his practice underground after other doctors were persecuted and often killed for treating peasants in poor communities." It turns out that Dr. Gonzalez is a representative of COPROSAL, a pro-FMLN group in New York that supports the FMLN.¹²³

A doctor whom SHARE frequently quotes is Charles Clements, an American Vietnam veteran who was stripped of his rank for refusing to follow orders (he is a Quaker) and later spent a year in El Salvador as a medic for the FMLN. Clements, who wrote a book about his El Salvador experience titled *Witness to War*, has spent the past few years speaking out on behalf of the FMLN to civic and university groups, journalists, and on television and radio shows.¹²⁴

Other pro-guerrilla material SHARE recycles is from the Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission (CDHES), a widely-quoted organization which has been revealed to be a propaganda front of the FMLN.¹²⁵ This is SHARE's analysis of the situation in El Salvador:

"The growing awareness of the poor and their call for change was threatening to the wealthy and to the government, however, and lead [sic] to the formation of death squads that tortured and murdered members of the base communities and burned their houses and crops. Those who remained fled for their lives.

"The refugees who arrived in the camps after 1981 (the year the war started) [SHARE is wrong; it began in earnest when the FMLN was formed the previous year, but terrorist attacks had been occurring through the 1970s] were peasants from conflictive areas whose very presence drew suspicion from the military that they sympathized with the opposition.

"Refugees in the camps described the invasions and indiscriminate bombings of their villages that most often claimed those least able to run or take cover quickly--small children and the elderly:

"We found ourselves without a home, nothing. They burn our clothes, our homes and all our farm animals. If someone is Christian, they kill him. So we fled, we ran without knowing what direction to run in, with fear because if it isn't a truck, it's airplanes that burn us,

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or rockets that swirl, or explosions that go 'BOOM, BOOM, BOOM.' The smoke leaves you sick, the bombs kill the elderly and they destroy everything. . . . The situation of the women is a tragedy, they were cut in half. The armed forces killed them. We want the bombing to stop, we want to stop suffering." (Emphasis in original)¹²⁶

Shades of Vietnam. This passage from a SHARE promotional brochure is telling:

"To be a Salvadoran refugee is to have daily viewed slaughter so pervasive that almost every Salvadoran family has a member tortured, raped or murdered by government forces. There is no time for grief, no time for childhood, only the immediacy of survival. Among the peasant population, many of the men and single women have been assassinated [?] or left to join the opposition. . . For mothers, children and the elderly it is a daily struggle to escape, to stay alive, to avoid starvation."¹²⁷


The theme is the same as that of CISPES and the FMLN itself. Only the Salvadoran government is guilty of atrocities, and these atrocities are so systematic and widespread, SHARE says, that "almost every Salvadoran family" has been a victim. There is no mention of the FMLN guerrillas by name; they are referred to vaguely as "the opposition." The same brochure accused the government of systematically torturing and gunning down 600 people: "Women were tortured before being killed; babies were tossed in the air for target practice."¹²⁸

SHARE also aims its propaganda at children, in one case telling horror stories to children from the Sidwell Friends School in Washington, D.C. SHARE editor Mark Bradley told the children about an experience he said he had at a refugee camp in Honduras. The children wrote an article about what Bradley had told them, which was printed in the SHARE newsletter.

This is what they recounted: The first night Bradley was at the camp, he saw soldiers shooting inside the camp. Alarmed, he said he tried to persuade them not to shoot for fear of endangering some of the refugee children. He said that "an angry sergeant" responded, "If any of those refugees shines a flashlight on me again, I will shoot. I don't care if it hits a child." Bradley also told the schoolchildren that an old man was beaten up by soldiers when he had to go to the bathroom.¹²⁹

SHARE also has spoken out about the plight of Guatemalan refugees and illegal aliens posing as refugees. It has shown no interest in the plight of refugees from Nicaragua.

Politicians, celebrities endorse SHARE



Former vice presidential candidate and George McGovern running mate Sargent Shriver and his wife Eunice Kennedy hosted a fundraising dinner for SHARE at their Washington, D.C. home. The November 16, 1982 event featured such luminaries as Carl Bernstein, Bianca Jagger (a Nicaraguan who has been identified as an agent of the Sandinista government), and Institute for Policy Studies figure and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Marc Schneider, who was master of ceremonies. A benefit film showing on December 3 was sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, who was unable to attend but wrote a "dear friends" letter asking for cash donations to SHARE.¹³⁰

Some of SHARE's sponsors include:

Chauncey Alexander, Executive Director, National Association of Social Workers
 Sergio Mendez Arceo, former bishop of Cuernavaca, Mexico, honorary president of the World Peace Council, and manager of FMLN funds raised in Mexico and the United States
 Julian Bond, former Georgia state senator
 Ramsey Clark, former U.S. attorney general
 Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA)
 Congressman Robert Garcia (D-NY)
 Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, a Vietcong sympathizer during the Vietnam war and currently fundraiser for the pro-Sandinista "popular church" in Nicaragua
 James R. Herman, President, International Longshoreman Workers Union
 Fr. Alan McCly, President, Conf. of Major Superiors of Men
 Fr. Cuchulain Moriatry, Chairman, Committee on Social Justice, Archdiocese of San Francisco
 Paul O'Dwyer, Esq.
 Charles A. Perlik, Jr., President, The Newspaper Guild
 I.F. Stone, journalist
 Dr. George Wald, Nobel laureate
 Cora Weiss, Director, Riverside Church Disarmament Program

The original board of directors of the SHARE foundation was:

Larry Birns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
 Jorge Lara-Braud, Director, Council on Theology and Culture, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.
 Isabel Letelier, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and widow of Orlando Letelier, a former high-ranking confidant of the late Marxist Chilean president Salvador Allende, and a reputed Cuban agent of influence
 Vicente Navarro, Professor, Johns Hopkins University
 Simon E. Smith, Director, Jesuit Missions Inc.
 Heidi Tarver, National Coordinator, CISPES

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Where the money goes

Most of the money is raised through community action programs which take advantage of people's charity without telling them that SHARE supports the FMLN. Methods of fundraising include door-to-door neighborhood campaigns; tables at shopping centers, churches, community centers, union meetings, flea markets, and clinics; events like walk-a-thons, benefit concerts and parties; displays at shopping centers and universities, and direct solicitation of individuals and humanitarian and religious organizations. Priests at Georgetown University in Washington who returned from El Salvador impressed with SHARE's model projects also made fundraising pitches during Mass.

Money raised in the United States by SHARE is sent to the same controversial former clergyman in Mexico who handles other private funds raised for "humanitarian" purposes. In SHARE's own words, "SHARE sends financial contributions for refugee assistance directly to Bishop Sergio Mendez Arceo in Cuernavaca, Mexico, who then distributes it to refugee centers in Central America."¹³¹

From Mexico, SHARE funds are sent to the Archdiocese of San Salvador, which runs several of the camps for displaced people. However, the individual within the Archdiocese who actually handles these programs is Father Octavio Cruz, [a member of the FMLN] who serves as the guerrillas' liaison inside the church and is a leader of DIACONIA, the FMLN financial front in San Salvador.

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NEW EL SALVADOR TODAY (NEST)

The division of labor between the humanitarian fundraising groups is distinct. MAES is designed for medical aid. SHARE is for refugees and displaced persons living in Central America. A third group is for developmental projects, a CISPES spinoff called New El Salvador Today (NEST), which set up operations in October, 1983 as a tax-exempt charity. Its national office in Berkeley, California, is shared with that of the local CISPES headquarters.

So as to understand NEST a bit more clearly, it is necessary to take a look at the first of its four directors, former Berkeley mayor Gus Newport. He can hardly be called a humanitarian. Newport is co-chairman of the United States Peace Council, and is a vice president of the World Peace Council.¹³² At a WPC conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, Newport expressed support for the Palestine Liberation Organization and other terrorist organizations, and defended the Soviet invasion and military occupation of Afghanistan, physically grappling with a man who was passing out leaflets denouncing the Kremlin's atrocities in Afghanistan. Newport refuses to condemn the African National Congress (ANC) for its practice of burning alive moderate blacks by binding their arms and legs or hacking off their limbs, then placing a gasoline-soaked tire around their shoulders and lighting it. After a heated debate about Communist influence within the WPC conference, Newport blurted, "As a black American, I got no problem with the Communists. It's the Democrats and the Republicans who I got a problem with."¹³³

Radio Havana reported in December 1986 that Newport was prominent at an anti-American demonstration in the Cuban capital, alongside Fidel Castro and FMLN commander Nidia Diaz.

Yet he puts on a great act for reporters. After returning from a trip with the FMLN in March, 1985, Newport burst into tears during a press conference, weeping that the "policy of the Duarte government is to totally wipe out the civilian population in areas under popular control."¹³⁴

NEST sent \$80,000 worth of aid to its destination in the first year. In its first annual report, NEST executive director Tracey Schear said that the aid went to "local community governments" in "areas of popular control," again the euphemisms which give no indication to unsuspecting donors that these are actually areas under Communist control. Elsewhere in NEST's literature, readers are told that the aid goes to the "Poderes Populares Locales," or PPLs, another euphemism for the local FMLN administrations which is not explained in the literature.

In early 1984, NEST set up a "National Community-to-Community Program," a sister cities concept which linked American towns with "liberated" villages in El Salvador. The pilot project was

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initiated by the Berkeley, California city council, which declared the FMLN-dominated village of San Antonio Los Ranchos as its sister city. Berkeley residents reportedly raised \$17,000 for the village.¹³⁵ Evidently, the flow of money from NEST to sites in El Salvador does not flow through the regular FMLN conduit in Mexico.

A peculiar fundraising project was organized for 1985 called "National Work-a-Day for El Salvador." This effort entailed getting people to donate a day's pay for NEST, a concept used elsewhere to raise funds in a hurry.¹³⁶

In response to the Salvadoran army's successful counter-insurgency campaign, NEST organized an "Emergency Fund" for Chalatenango, the northern province which has been a guerrilla stronghold. In two weeks, NEST raised \$26,000, which it sent to Chalatenango with a delegation consisting of Carlottia Scott, administrative assistant to Congressman Ronald Dellums; Fr. Eugene Boyle, of San Jose, California; Mary Kay Baum, of the Madison, Wisconsin school board; and Margarita Studemeister of the Center for Central American Studies, a NEST board member. NEST personnel included Tracey Schear and Lisa Robinson. The delivery was made on 28 April 1986.¹³⁷ By July, 1986, NEST claimed to have sent "over \$268,000 in humanitarian assistance to El Salvador."¹³⁸

As with Medical Aid for El Salvador and SHARE, NEST coordinates its fundraising activities with CISPES. In the September, 1984 issue of *El Salvador Alert*, for example, CISPES notified its activists, "In upcoming months, many CISPES chapters will be focusing their material aid campaigns on New El Salvador Today. . . . This fall dozens of organizations, including over 20 CISPES chapters, plan to raise over \$200,000 by January. Chapters have pledged amounts ranging from \$1000 to \$50,000." The money, readers were told, was to be spent on agricultural cooperatives and chicken ranches and fisheries. Other NEST projects include funding literacy campaigns for the peasants; however, these campaigns are more ideological indoctrination campaigns than they are educational. (see section on literacy campaign)

The CISPES newsletter explained what some chapters would be doing: "The fundraising schemes hint at the breadth of CISPES membership. Washington, D.C., which is funding a shoe workshop, will host a Fiesta de Zapateas, with a prize for the person wearing the most outrageous shoes. Santa Rosa will hold a paddle tennis tournament, while Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco and Portland are organizing Work-a-Days where workers donate one day's salary to the zones. Several cities are considering 24-hour dance-a-thons." The New York CISPES printed greeting cards, while the Olympia, Washington chapter published "a bilingual coloring book on the zones."¹³⁹

While NEST's literature aimed at donors hides the relationship between the local governments it funds and the FMLN, its spokesman have publicly acknowledged the relationship elsewhere. In the 10

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October 1984 issue of the Guardian, for example, NEST is described as "a material aid project benefiting the local governments in El Salvador's rebel-held zones of control." NEST coordinator Tracey Schear is quoted by the Guardian as acknowledging that her group's efforts aid the FMLN militarily:

"Within the past two years, there have been significant advances in the zones. First, the FMLN has been able to expand and consolidate those areas. Second, there's been the development of popular power. When I was in Chalatenango, 90% of the province was under popular control.

"The ability of the FMLN to develop and advance as a regular army has everything to do with these emerging civilian structures. For example, I was told that a year ago the FMLN might recoup food for the civilian population. Now, the popular power is developing agricultural production not only for the civilian population and the guerrillas, but also for reserves for people fleeing government attacks." (emphasis added)

Schear continued, "there is essentially a transformation of an entire society in which the political, economic and military institutions of the old Salvadoran regime are being replaced by the structures of popular power, the mass organizations and the FMLN." NEST is helping with that transformation.¹⁴⁰

So is a particular United States Congressman. Representative John Conyers (D-MI) signed a direct-mail fundraising letter for NEST in 1986, which contained such gross inaccuracies and untruths that U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador was prompted to respond with a long letter of clarification. Both are reprinted in Appendix 8. Like the rest of NEST's fundraising literature, Conyers' letter fails to tell the donors that the campaign has anything to do with the guerrillas.

The Council for Inter-American Security filed a complaint to the Internal Revenue Service that NEST is raising money under false pretenses to supply a foreign paramilitary organization with money and materiel.

NEST board of directors

Eugene 'Gus' Newport
Barbara Christian, Ph.D.
Margarita Studemeister
Tracey Schear

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National office staff

Tracey Schear, Executive Director
Lisa Robinson, Associate Director
Ann Baumberger, Office Administrator
Steve Gibson, Financial Administrator
Lisa Lloyd, Grassroots Fundraiser
Jennifer Manriquez, Resource and Media Director

East Coast office staff


Diane Greene, Associate Director
Mary Price, Development Director
Geoff Thale, Grassroots Fundraiser

National office: PO Box 4762, Berkeley, CA 94704.
415-549-2114

East Coast office: PO Box 53196, Washington, DC 20009.
202-775-1760

Board of endorsers

Susan Anspach
Edward Asner
Prof. John Coatsworth
Harvey Cox, *Harvard Divinity School*
Dave Cortwright, *executive director, SANE*
Rusty Davenport, *Oxfam America*
Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA)
Congressman Mervyn Dymally (D-CA)
Barbara Ehrenreich
Robert Foxworth
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Tom Lupher, *ILWU Local 10*
Marie C. Mailliett, *CWA Local 9410*
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Ruth Messinger, *New York City Council*
Rev. Paul Moore, Jr., *Bishop of New York*
Francis Moore Lappe
Rev. John Moyer, *North Carolina Ecumenical Council*
Mario Obledo
Stanley Sheinbaum
Dr. Benjamin Spock
Sr. Marjorie Tuite, *Women's Coalition to Stop Intervention in Cent. America*
Marc Van Der Hout, *President, National Lawyers Guild*
George Wald
Bill Zimmerman



OXFAM-America

Oxfam-America was founded in 1970 as an autonomous sister of the original Oxfam which was founded in Oxford, England in 1942. A highly reputable refugee relief and development organization, Oxfam-America raises money for humanitarian causes in under-developed countries. However, an ongoing study by the Council for Inter-American Security shows a pattern indicating Oxfam-America's distinct political support for pro-Soviet Marxist regimes and revolutionary movements. This trend shows that in countries with a ruling Marxist party, Oxfam-America usually works through the party structure, while in pro-western countries under attack by a Marxist insurgency, the organization tends to work outside the government with groups allied with the paramilitary movement.

Oxfam-America's programs in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Kampuchea, Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua were and/or are run through or with the ruling Marxist party apparatus. Its literature praises these governments as "models" of economic development. Oxfam-America closed down its operations in Grenada after the U.S. removed the Communist government in 1983, despite that Caribbean country's dire need of continued development support.¹⁴¹ By contrast, Oxfam's programs in South Africa, Guatemala and El Salvador are conducted outside government channels, and, respectively, in conjunction with the Soviet-backed and Communist-controlled ANC, URNG and FMLN paramilitary organizations.¹⁴²

Oxfam's \$15 million annual budget comes from foundation grants, direct-mail campaigns, and grass-roots activities. The latter category includes an annual "Fast for a World Harvest" where high school and college students are encouraged to forego a lunch on their meal plan, the cash value of which is donated by the food service to Oxfam. Up to \$10,000 is raised from a single school in a day using this method. These fasts are popular and are widely accepted by high school and college officials who see nothing political in this ostensibly humanitarian campaign. However, Oxfam's newsletter and other publications are quite political.

In El Salvador, Oxfam-America's literature has been supportive of the FMLN-FDR and hostile to the Salvadoran government. FDR leaders Guillermo Ungo and Jose Penate were hosted at an Oxfam-America luncheon. Contrary to its stated support for democracy and consistent with the guerrillas' policy, Oxfam has not encouraged the FMLN-FDR to participate in El Salvador's electoral process. Like the guerrillas, Oxfam-America calls for "talks leading to a political solution," or power-sharing with the elected government without having to go through an election. An Oxfam "Central America Advocacy Statement" also called upon the U.S. Congress "to end bilateral military and economic assistance to El Salvador." (Emphasis added) For an organization interested in development, Oxfam's opposition to economic aid to El Salvador is

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strange, as it has criticized the U.S. government harshly for cutting aid to the Sandinista government in nearby Nicaragua.¹⁴³

While the FMLN guerrillas destroy El Salvador's economic infrastructure through attacks on farms, roads, and energy facilities, CISPES and related groups lobby in the U.S. against economic aid to El Salvador. Here, Oxfam took an identical position.

Captured FMLN documents show that in the first six months of 1980, Oxfam sent the dollar equivalent of 62,230 Salvadoran colones to CEAH, the Ecumenical Committee of Humanitarian Aid, which has been identified as a front for the Communist Party of El Salvador.¹⁴⁴ While Oxfam leaders denounced the documents in question as containing falsehoods, the organization itself had said months earlier, in its August 1980 newsletter, "Oxfam America recently approved a grant of \$50,000 for emergency aid to refugees in El Salvador," and that the funds would be distributed through CEAH.

In 1983, Oxfam-America donated \$50,000 to the FMLN front DIACONIA. In its Spring '83 newsletter, Oxfam-America said that DIACONIA was formerly known as ASESAN, which has been shown to have been the result of a planned guerrilla merger between the CES and the CEAH. Any claims of ignorance by Oxfam as to DIACONIA's relationship with the FMLN is suspect due to Oxfam's open support for the guerrillas at the time.¹⁴⁵

Oxfam-America's attitude toward refugees cannot be more graphically illustrated than those unfortunate people living in Honduras. The relief group publicized the fate of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras and sent aid to them in 1983. Former FMLN commander Alejandro Montenegro told the author that the FMLN routinely crossed into Honduras to use the refugee camps as sanctuaries and to be with their families who resided in those camps.¹⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Oxfam has all but ignored the plight of the tens of thousands of Nicaraguan refugees also living in Honduras. When asked why this was so, an Oxfam-America spokesman gave this weak excuse: "We have never worked with those [Nicaraguan refugee] camps; the Catholic Relief Service is involved with them."¹⁴⁷

Politically, Oxfam-America has been very active. In November 1984, for example, Oxfam co-sponsored the pro-FMLN "March on Washington" demonstration in conjunction with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), the Communist Workers Party, the reputed CPUSA front National Lawyers Guild, and CISPES. In fact, Oxfam-America recommends CISPES material as part of its recommended literature on El Salvador.¹⁴⁸

Oxfam-America officials deny that the organization supports the FMLN, and maintain that if it ever supported the guerrillas, it was several years ago under a different administration. However, as recently as April 1987, Oxfam-America cosponsored political

events in support of the Sandinistas and the FMLN. Oxfam was an official endorser of the massive April 25 mobilization on Washington, which was denounced by Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO, Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington Post, and others as a demonstration supportive of communism in Central America.¹⁴⁹ Leading the rally were such figures as Jesse Jackson, Ed Asner, and representatives of the Sandinista government and the FMLN. Oxfam-America officially marched with them, carrying a banner down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.¹⁵⁰

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How a ten-dollar contribution reaches the FMLN

To illustrate how a ten-dollar contribution from an American donor travels from his or her pocket to the FMLN, we give the following hypothetical example:

Mary Smith receives a letter in the mail from actor Martin Sheen, asking her to donate to Medical Aid for El Salvador (MAES) to help relieve the misery of victims of the war in that country. She is told nothing about that organization's support for the FMLN. In fact, the FMLN is not mentioned at all in the letter. Heartened by the emotional appeal, she writes a check for ten dollars and sends it to MAES.

Once it reaches the MAES office, about half of it goes to pay for overhead and legitimate fundraising expenses such as list rentals, printing and postage, leaving five dollars for the people of El Salvador. That five dollars is sent to one of the bank accounts managed by Sergio Mendez Arceo in Mexico City. In Mexico, it is decided to which organization the money will be sent. These particular five dollars will go to DIACONIA.

The money is transferred to the DIACONIA office in San Salvador, where it is to be distributed to "the people." Thirty percent, or \$1.50, is spent on legitimate humanitarian aid projects which politically benefit the providers--the FMLN. The other seventy percent of Mary Smith's net contribution, or \$3.50, goes directly to FMLN military operations.

Months later, she receives another letter from Medical Aid for El Salvador, showing pictures of how peasant families have been benefiting from contributions like hers. These pictures are real; these programs do exist, but the nature of the programs is unknown to the donors. Mary Smith gives a second contribution. She cannot afford much, so she writes Medical Aid for El Salvador to ask what else she can do to help. In a few weeks, she receives a package of brochures, articles, and a MAES annual report showing how the money is supposedly spent. Incensed, confused and concerned, she writes a letter to her congressman, asking him to stop U.S. military aid to El Salvador. She approaches the pastor of her church, and urges him to hold a special collection for the suffering Salvadoran people. It seems like a worthy cause. On Sunday, the collection basket is passed and the money is sent to MAES. This time, there are no fundraising expenses, so a greater percentage of this contribution reaches its final destination.

On the facing page is a flow chart demonstrating how one's humanitarian contribution is diverted to the FMLN guerrillas.

CISPES ACTIONS ELICIT RESPONSE IN CONGRESS

Many of CISPES' activities have produced responses by Members of Congress. Representative Mervyn Dymally (D-CA), a member of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, documented some of CISPES' successes in a fundraising letter he signed for the group in early 1986. In the letter, he repeated CISPES' own themes. The congressman said,

"... CISPES has... already shown results in Congress:

"47 Members of Congress have co-sponsored a resolution by Rep. John Conyers condemning the continuing human rights violations in El Salvador and calling for a halt to the indiscriminate air and ground attacks on civilians.

"At CISPES' urging, House Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski wrote letters to our colleagues, David Obey, Chair of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, and Michael Barnes of the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He voiced opposition to the Administration's supplemental request of \$54 million in Central American police training funds.

"The police training measure failed--thanks in part to the opposition of Rep. Rostenkowski and other members of Congress contacted by CISPES.

"Following Rep. Rostenkowski's letter and thousands of letters from CISPES members, Rep. Barnes held Subcommittee hearings on the human rights situation in El Salvador.

"Rep. Frank Annunzio, a former supporter of military aid to El Salvador, credits CISPES members in his district with changing his point of view about the effects of that aid in El Salvador."

In an accompanying letter, CISPES national coordinator Angela Sanbrano said, "we're putting pressure where it's needed most. In 50 key Congressional districts, CISPES is helping tip the balance on critical legislation." (emphasis in original)

Congressman Dymally then appealed for donations so that CISPES could continue its operations, especially its efforts to get Congress to stop the Salvadoran army's successful aerial counterinsurgency operations. Dymally continued, "Sign the 'Urgent Reply Memorandum' I am enclosing and return it along with your contribution. We need to obtain thousands of signatures as part of CISPES' effort to deliver these pledges by the truckload to Members of Congress. Your representatives must recognize that you want them to act to stop the bombings." Congressman Dymally added as a

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postscript that contributions of \$100 or more could be itemized as a tax-deduction if made out to the Institute for Effective Action, which would "fund CISPES' ongoing educational work."

Barnes holds hearings in response to CISPES campaign

Congressman Dymally helped CISPES launch its national petition campaign to get the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs to hold hearings on the "air war." Subcommittee chairman Michael Barnes (D-MD) agreed, and held a special hearing on 14 May 1986, called "The Air War and Political Developments in El Salvador." This hearing institutionalized the term "air war" as coined by the FMLN and CISPES into accepted congressional vernacular.

The development of this hearing is a textbook example of how a Communist front, its tax-exempt spinoff, and a friendly congressman work together to influence policy on Capitol Hill. It also shows the incestuous relationship between CISPES and its "humanitarian" spinoffs, and how the two work together to change public opinion and policy.

It began when Berkely, California mayor Gus Newport, leader of New El Salvador Today (NEST), returned from eight days with the FMLN in Chalatenango province in March, 1985. He returned to California denouncing the "air war," and, with Congressman Dellums, began a campaign to lobby for congressional hearings on the subject.¹⁵¹ As the "air war" campaign developed, Congressman Dymally sent out the CISPES letters to generate petitions to Congress demanding the hearing. Evidently, CISPES supporters responded overwhelmingly. During the hearing, Congressman Barnes remarked, "we probably have had more requests for this hearing than any hearing we have ever held."¹⁵² In an exchange with Barnes, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams called the hearing "the product of a kind of drive to besmirch and muddy the reputation of El Salvador, a drive to claim human rights abuses that do not exist."¹⁵³ Barnes protested this observation, and Congressman Dymally complained, "I frankly resent the aspersions that the committee chairman is being used and the committee is being used by people for disinformation."

"This meeting," Dymally continued indignantly, "is a result of petitions from all over the country. In fact, I brought several thousand petitions to you, Mr. Chairman. So did the gentleman from New York [Congressman Ted Weiss] and many other members." Dymally mentioned nothing of his involvement in generating the petitions. He was upset: "To suggest that this committee is being used by the guerrillas or the Communists distresses me a great deal. I want to express my strong resentment over those statements issued by the members of this committee."¹⁵⁴

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Yet the critics, including Secretary Abrams, Congressmen Dan Burton (R-IN) and John McCain (R-AZ) were correct. The guerrillas and the Communists were indeed using the hearing. Dymally was distressed because he had been caught.

To be fair, Secretary Abrams and former Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States Ernesto Rivas-Gallont were allowed to state their case, as was Democrat William C. Doherty of the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).

Congressman Conyers was the first witness to testify. (He was not a member of the subcommittee). His testimony was the exact political line taken by the FMLN and CISPES. He made six policy recommendations: 1) For the denial of all U.S. aid to the Salvadoran police, 2) an overall cut in U.S. aid to El Salvador for FY 1987, 3) that all aid be conditional on certification of the Salvadoran government's conduct against the FMLN, 4) withholding delivery of six training helicopters "until there are several dozen prosecutions" for human rights abuses, 5) making future aid contingent on negotiations with the Communists, and 7) investigating the Reagan Administration's "misrepresentation of fact as it applies to human rights in El Salvador."¹⁵⁵

This is very similar to what CISPES wanted, which is not surprising; Conyers is one of the most radical members of Congress who has taken such extreme stands as supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization and abstaining from condemning the Soviets for their shooting down of 269 people aboard Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September, 1983. Conyers is from a radical background. A native of Detroit, he is known as a Red diaper baby. His father, John Conyers, Sr., was a local Communist Party official and close friend of a leading Detroit Communist Party collaborator, George Crockett.¹⁵⁶

(Congressman Barnes lost his seat in 1986. George Crockett, who was elected to Congress in 1980, succeeded Barnes as chairman of the subcommittee. For more information on Crockett, see the Council for Inter-American Security's package, *The Crockett File*.)

Conyers brought in as a witness a fellow radical, NEST leader Gus Newport, who visited the FMLN in Chalatenango in March, 1985, accompanied by Diane Greene of NEST and Mary Ann Buckley of CISPES.¹⁵⁷

Needless to say, this was not made clear in the hearing. Newport was vague about exactly who hosted him in El Salvador, and would not come out and say that he was with the FMLN. However, his evasiveness was noted by Congressman Burton, who was in the same areas of El Salvador as was Newport, but saw nothing like what the Berkely mayor described.

Yet another witness was Eileen Purcell, representing San Francisco Archbishop John R. Quinn. Ms. Purcell is executive

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director of SHARE. In October, 1986, Purcell went to El Salvador as part of a Medical Aid for El Salvador advance team to prepare for the November airlift.¹⁵⁸

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Appendix 1

Statements by CISPES and the FMLN

"The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) seeks to educate and mobilize public opinion against U.S. intervention in El Salvador and Central America and in solidarity with the FMLN-FDR, the legitimate representative of the Salvadoran people."

--CISPES newsletter "Alert!" April 1985.

"Our organization is a working class party. Our ideology is Marxism-Leninism."

--FMLN document AA.

"The FMLN-FDR advocates political pluralism, a mixed economy and a foreign policy of non-alignment."

--CISPES membership packet, 1/85.

"The World Socialist Camp is the vanguard of the World Revolution and constitutes our friend and fundamental ally."

--FMLN document AA.

"The El Salvadoran revolution has no alternative to armed struggle. The communists are convinced that the revolution will triumph despite all obstacles. Our revolution rests on the strength, will, and heroism of the people, and its vanguard consists of left forces that are united and have extensive experience of struggle."

--Shafik Handal, General Secretary, Communist Party of El Salvador,

and leader of FMLN General Command, in *World Marxist Review* (Prague), October 1980.

CISPES Goals for 1984:

"1. Impede the escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America by (a) making the political costs of a full-scale, direct intervention too high; (b) obstructing the step-by-step escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America.

"2. Provide political and material support to the FMLN-FDR of El Salvador; and

"3. Defend the Sandinista revolution.

"Our defense of the Sandinista revolution will directly contribute to the Nicaraguan people's efforts to consolidate their revolution. It will also undermine Reagan's attempts to build a 'strategic consensus' in the U.S. for intervention in all of Central America."

--"1984 CISPES National Administrative Strategy Proposal."

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". . . there are survivals of sectarianism. . . . But this is now of minor importance and cannot inhibit the successful development of the unitary process, whose purpose is to create a united Marxist-Leninist party, although nobody can say exactly when this will happen."

--Shafik Handal, World Marxist Review, September 1980.

"The United Revolutionary Leadership is highly appreciative of the international solidarity fettering the aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism. In this connection the main task of the day is to expose the U.S. policy of genocide relative to the peoples of El Salvador and Guatemala, whose thousands upon thousands of families have lost relatives and homes or found themselves in the bloodstained hands of butchers directed by U.S. military advisers."

--Shafik Handal, World Marxist Review, September 1980.

"We have organized a large solidarity apparatus that encompasses the whole planet, even in the United States, where one of the most active centers of solidarity exists."

--FMLN Radio Venceremos, March 13, 1983.

"Monday morning the offices of Congressman Dellums were turned into our offices. Everything was done there."

--CISPES organizer and communist agent Farid Handal, in diary of trip to U.S. to organize CISPES, March 1980.

"The heroic people and government of Viet Nam have set an example for the oppressed people of the world by their courageous struggle and defeat of U.S. imperialism on April 30th, 1975. That victory inspired national liberation struggles around the world, many already victorious. . . . We also support the heroic people of El Salvador, led by the Democratic Revolutionary Front [FDR], for their courageous struggle for self-determination."

--Undated flyer co-sponsored by CISPES and the Committee in Solidarity with Viet Nam, Kampuchea and Laos, for 9 May 1981 rally at Washington Square Methodist Church, New York City.

"The job of such a movement is to challenge U.S. policy; to disrupt the war effort, to polarize opinion, to inspire people to refuse to cooperate, to create divisions within Congress and every other institution from the AFL-CIO to the campuses, etc. Each escalation of the war must bring a response more costly than the one before, precisely the Vietnam war phenomenon the administration is trying to avoid. As the FMLN wears down each incremental phase of intervention, such a movement can make it impossible for the U.S. government to escalate to new levels at the rate it needs in order to win."

--CISPES "Alert!" editor Bob Ostertag and others, in "The Strategic Task of Our Movement," document submitted at CISPES 1985 convention, May 10, 1985.



On killing U.S. Army Sergeant Gregory Fronius:

"We think it is about time for the House or Senate to realize that Ronald Reagan is entangled in the region, that his policy is an attack not only on the interests of the people of the region and on the just cause of our people but also on U.S. interests. The current revolutionary campaign has revived the El Salvador debate in the United States."

--FMLN Commander Valentin Martinez, Radio Havana, April 4, 1987. Monitored in the Latin America Daily Report, FBIS, April 7, 1987.

"The war is against the United States right now."

"The bodies of more American people will be coming here."

"It is very logical they are going to be attacked. This is just the beginning."

--FMLN representative Ernesto Godoy, Associated Press, 6 April 1987:

"It was in LSM [the Liberation Student Movement] that I met my husband Carroll Ishee. In 1980, we moved to New Orleans as students with the intention of eventually travelling to Angola as brigadistas. The war in El Salvador changed that plan.

"After a difficult and painful winter of decision-making, we left school. In 1981 Carrol [sic] went to El Salvador as a militant and I became increasingly active in CISPES. In August 1983 Carroll was killed by U.S. helicopter fire as a member of the FMLN."

--LaVaun Ishee, CISPES Southeast Regional Coordinator, in biography at CISPES 1985 National Convention.

"In Nicaragua in 1980 if you asked anyone what you could do to help, you were invariably told to go home and work for El Salvador where death squad terror was at a peak and the newly-formed FMLN was preparing for the General Offensive. When I returned I immediately began working with Salvadoran refugees. . . when I returned CISPES had been formed. I jumped into the NYC chapter and became the first Mid-Atlantic Regional Coordinator. In this position, I travelled extensively doing the initial work of setting up the region, and participated in all the early CISPES political struggles."

--Bob Ostertag, editor of CISPES newsletter "Alert!," Biography at CISPES 1985 Convention.

"FMLN/FDR--The People United Will Win."

--CISPES flyer promoting National Week of Solidarity and Action with El Salvador, January 18-22, 1982.

"The FMLN/FDR together constitute the largest political movement in the history of El Salvador."

--Ibid.

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"The FMLN and FDR are working to bring to power a Democratic Revolutionary Government."

"Not a single human rights institution has condemned the FMLN as terrorist or as systematically violating human rights."

--CISPES flyer, "El Salvador's Freedom Fighters--What They Stand For." Undated.

"Our slogan is, 'Make every road a river of enemy blood, every stone a mine, and every helicopter a coffin.' We will make it a reality."

--FMLN Commander Joaquin Villalobos, Radio Venceremos Systems,
El Salvador Information Center, PO Box 421965, San Francisco CA 94142.

". . . the Salvadoran opposition, united in the FMLN-FDR (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Democratic Revolutionary Front), has gained the political and military initiative. They have established 'zones of control' throughout the country, clearly demonstrating that they have the support of the people."

--CISPES flyer promoting November 12, 1983 March on Washington.

"We must seriously address the question of the right of the Salvadorans to self-determination, and of the FMLN/FDR as the legitimate representative of the Salvadoran people. As more and more leaders of the FMLN are captured/arrested, as more and more organized sectors are repressed because of the alleged FMLN affiliations, we must underline their right to organize freely and struggle to replace the repressive U.S.-backed regime in El Salvador."

--CISPES national office, in letter to activists, August 27, 1982.

". . . we are also committed to support the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan revolutionary struggles, through our own work and regular participation in support of the work of the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People (NNSNP [or Nicaragua Network]) and the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA)."

--CISPES Membership Packet, January 1985.

"Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras will have their hour of liberation and . . . the Sandinista revolution was the first flame in that process."

--Oscar Gonzalez, FMLN representative at conference in Cuba. Quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, Advanced International Studies Institute and University of Miami, 15 March 1982.

"The goals of CISPES are two-fold: to educate and mobilize the public against U.S. intervention; and, to build popular support for the FMLN-FDR, the broad popular movement for social justice in El Salvador. We also support the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the revolutionary movement in Guatemala."

--Chicago CISPES flyer, "Peace & Justice in Central America,"
undated.

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"This is not just a Salvadoran revolution. We have to help all of the oppressed and exploited people of Latin America. After we triumph here we will go to Guatemala and offer our proletarian brothers the benefit of our experience. . . . Eventually we will fight in Mexico."

--FMLN Comandante Neto, San Diego Union, 1 March 1981, p. 1.

"CISPES has supported the struggle of the Salvadoran people and the FMLN-FDR since our founding in October of 1980. The FMLN-FDR have legitimately earned recognition as the leaders of that struggle. This position, not only against U.S. intervention, but in support of the Salvadoran people, is the basis for our existence as a solidarity organization."

--CISPES Membership Packet, January 1985, in section titled "Why CISPES Supports the FMLN-FDR."

"During the hearing, [Congressman] Sensenbrenner and minority counsel Alan Slobodin closely questioned Michael Lent of CISPES, seeking to link his group to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and its political arm, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN/FDR)."

"Lent. . . denied any link to the Salvadoran rebel-political-military coalition. . . ."

--Washington Post, February 20, 1987, p. A26.

"We had hoped that our support for and contact with the FMLN-FDR would build an organization with a sophisticated understanding of the ups and downs of a revolutionary struggle and a long-term perspective."

--Bob Ostertag, "A History of CISPES," October 1983 Alert!.

"The groundwork has been laid for a larger and stronger movement that can contribute to the defeat of the U.S. and the victory of the FMLN. Now we must build that movement."

--Ibid.

"On Wednesday, 19 June, six U.S. advisers [sic] were justly punished. They were annihilated at a restaurant in the San Benito neighborhood by FMLN guerrilla commandos. . . . The FMLN's actions against the Yankee invaders will be expanded, both in number and nature. . . . The execution of these military men is an act of revolutionary justice."

--Radio Venceremos, 21 June 1985, reported in 24 June FBIS.

CISPES response to FMLN's killing of four U.S. Marines and two U.S. businessmen, 19 July 1985:

"Should it surprise us that the Salvadoran guerrillas view U.S. military personnel as enemies? The U.S. military arrives in Third World countries like El Salvador with very sophisticated, modern weapons. The guerrillas have no infrared sights, no helicopters or planes with which to counterattack, or even

anti-aircraft weaponry for simple self defense. When they hit back, they strike at a target within their means, in this case Marines at a sidewalk cafe. A 'terrorist' attack? Compared to what?"

--CISPES editorial, July-August 1985 Alert!, p. 2.

"We are not tied to terrorists." --CISPES spokesman Beth Perry.

--Miami Herald, October 25, 1984, p. 16A.

"Yankee aggressor, your tomb will be El Salvador!"

--FMLN General Command, Radio Venceremos, 25 June 1985, reported in 25 June FBIS Latin America Report.

"Our struggle in the diplomatic and political field already has a regional context, and if the imperialists insist on their policy of aggression, the open regionalization of the war will become a necessity and we will participate in it. It is in this context that the forces that form the FMLN will maintain and strengthen relations with all the forces and governments interested in the peace of Central and Latin America. That is why we reply to imperialism: We are and will continue to be friends of the peoples and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua and we are not ashamed of this. On the contrary, we are proud to maintain relations with those peoples, who are bastions of the anti-imperialist struggle."

--FMLN Radio Venceremos, 13 March 1983. Monitored in FBIS Latin America Report, 15 March, 1983.

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Appendix 3

The FMLN literacy campaign

Charitable groups which have been either created or co-opted by FMLN support organizations have heralded the guerrillas' literacy campaign for the illiterate peasants in rural El Salvador. The FMLN's literacy program serves a threefold purpose: To demonstrate to El Salvador's poor that it can offer the people something which the government cannot, in this case education; and to project the image in the western democracies that the FMLN has a humanitarian agenda in addition to its political/military one.

Third, the image of a functioning FMLN literacy program enables FMLN supporters to raise money in the West to sustain that program. Most humanitarian funds raised for the FMLN are skimmed off and diverted for military purposes. According to Miguel Castellanos, former finance director for the FPL faction of the FMLN, seventy percent of such humanitarian aid is channeled to the actual combatants.

Ideological indoctrination

Like the highly-publicized political indoctrination that forms the core of the literacy program sponsored by the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the FMLN's literacy campaign serves to indoctrinate as it educates.

A hand-written FMLN literacy book captured from the unit with Commander Nidia Diaz in April 1985 shows how the paramilitary organization indoctrinates its supporters in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The following letters, words, sounds, phrases, sentences and illustrations are taken from the literacy book and serve as examples:

- C. *Centro America*. (Central America). Map of Central America, with El Salvador marked with an explosion, and Nicaragua marked "libre."
- CH. *Ernesto Che Guevara*. Sketch of Che Guevara. Phrase: "*La lucha de Chile*." (The struggle of Chile). For a literacy campaign, there is little concern with sentence structure.
- D. *Dialogo*. (Dialogue). Picture of two men seated at table; one man is bearded and wears a cap, resembling Fidel Castro.
- F. *Farabundo*. Picture of Salvadoran Communist Party founder and Comintern agent Farabundo Marti, for whom the FMLN is named.
- G. *Burguesia*. (Bourgeoisie). Picture of well-dressed fat man with bag of money.
- K. "*Emboscamos en el Kilometro 51*." ("We will ambush at Kilometer 51.")
- L. *Liberacion*. (Liberation). Picture of map of El Salvador with FMLN flag flying over it.

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- M. *Milicias Populares*. (Popular Militias). Picture of peasant with sickle and gun.
- P. *Poder Popular*. (People's Power). Accompanied with a picture of a group of people with an FMLN flag. *Pepe*. Picture of a man ("Pepe") holding a gun.
- RR. *Barricada*. Barricade. Picture of barricade in the streets.
- T. *Titere*. (Puppet). Picture of President Duarte as marionette, with puppeteer labeled "Reagan."
- Z. *Zapadores*. (those who dig trenches, lay mines, etc). Picture of *zapador* with gun and shovel near electric power pylon, a common target of FMLN bombings. Sentence: "*Zenobio va a la zona liberada*." (Zenobio goes to the liberated zone). "Zenobio" is not a Spanish name, but it appears to be a reference to Grigory Zinoviev, the Comintern leader who oversaw the international Communist movement at the time of Farabundo Marti in the 1920s and '30s.
- "AR" sound. *Partido*. (Political party). Sentence: "*La Alfabetizacion. . . Otra arma en la revolucion*." ("Literacy. . . Other arm of the revolution.") Picture of hammer and sickle.
- "AM" sound. "*Campesino. El campesino se organiza. Combatimos al imperialismo*." ("Peasant. The peasant organizes. We combat imperialism.")
- "CL" sound. "*Lucha de clases*." "*La lucha de clases es el motor de la historia*." ("Class struggle." "Class struggle is the engine of history.") Accompanying the example is a picture of soldier and a well-dressed fat man with a bag of money, faced by an angry crowd with a gun and sickle.
- "BR" sound. "*Hombre nuevo*." "*Obreros y campesinos al poder*." ("New man." "Workers and peasants to power.")
- "DR" sound. "*La DRU*." "*Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada*." ("The DRU." "Unified Revolutionary Directorate.") These vocabulary words refer to the first coalition of Salvadoran guerrilla groups in 1980 that evolved into the coordinating body of the FMLN. Illustrating these examples is a cloud bearing the initials of the five political factions of the FMLN, which were also members of the DRU: FPL (Popular Liberation Forces), PCS (Communist Party of El Salvador), PRTC (Central American Revolutionary Workers Party), PRS (Salvadoran Revolutionary Party), and RN (National Resistance).
- "FR" sound. "*Frentes de liberacion*." "*Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional. Los revolucionarios no tenemos fronteras*." ("Liberation fronts." "Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The revolutionaries have no borders.") The accompanying picture is of the FMLN banner.

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Appendix 4

1980 CISPES Founding Conference Work Plan

WORK PLAN FOR THE SALVADOREAN SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT
as recommended by
the East Coast Conference in Solidarity with the Salvadorean People
Washington, D.C., October 11-12, 1980

OPPOSE ALL FORMS OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR

- **Pressure Congress to halt all U.S. military aid to El Salvador
- **Pressure the Administration to halt all U.S. military aid shipments, military cash sales, and military education and training of Salvadorean forces
- Initiate letter-writing campaigns to Congress and the Secretary of State
- Confront Congresspersons in their local districts through visits, attending forums where they will be speaking, etc.
- Promote the approval of resolutions or statements by city, county, or state governments and major political figures
- Use full-page ads in local newspapers with signatures showing broad opposition
- Organize fact-finding delegations to El Salvador which can return and generate publicity and support

BREAK THE MEDIA BLACKOUT AND INFORMATION DISTORTION

- **Pressure the traditional media to include more and better coverage of El Salvador
- **Pressure journalists' associations, newspaper guilds, etc., to denounce the repression of journalists and media workers in El Salvador
- **Develop alternative channels of communication and information sharing
- Bombard editors with letters, arrange for visits or influential local delegations
- Prepare Op-Ed pieces, suggest possible radio/TV interviews with local angle
- Develop a network of people who will respond immediately to articles or coverage as it does appear
- Raise money to help distribute the bulletin or the FOR
- Develop an El Salvador news and information center here in the U.S.
- Distribute news updates on a regular basis to the solidarity network
- Provide information on a systematic basis to labor, minority, and community presses

EXPOSE THE REPRESSIVE NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

- **Raise public awareness of the program, linking it to the "land-to-the-tiller" pacification program used in Vietnam
- **Denounce the role of AIFLD, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, in planning and implementing the reform
- **Make contact with farm groups, food and farm workers, and others with a special interest in agrarian or hunger problems
- **Pressure Congress to halt use of military aid, as well as World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank funds, for the agrarian reform

SUPPORT THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE IN THEIR LIBERATION STRUGGLE

- **Denounce the genocidal repression and the critical situation of refugees and displaced persons
- **Pressure the governments of the U.S. and El Salvador to assure the neutrality and protection of humanitarian relief efforts, including in particular refugee centers and medical and relief personnel
- **Work to secure refugee, or in the U.S. "extended voluntary departure", status for those Salvadoreans who have been forced to flee their country
- **Encourage greater support for humanitarian assistance efforts already underway
- **Establish a nationally coordinated fund-raising campaign to support the people of El Salvador, including sale of "Free El Salvador" certificates

RELIGIOUS SECTOR

General Considerations

Outreach within the religious community should seek, among other things, to highlight the witness of the Church and Christians in El Salvador today, including their support of the popular organizations. It should also seek to help North American Christians understand the theological basis for the Church's action in El Salvador, and the persecution it is subjected to as a consequence. Care needs to be taken, however, not to present the Church in isolation from the people of the community as a whole. In the same manner, solidarity efforts within the religious community here should strive to maintain close cooperation with secular groups in the broader Salvadorean solidarity movement.

Specific recommendations:

1. Organize delegations of church people to visit the religious editor of local newspapers; coordinate with a broader-based letter-writing campaign to focus on media blackout, distortion
2. Insure regular distribution of news updates, analysis to religious press
3. Prepare Op-Ed pieces for submission by local church officials
4. Encourage local groups to plan commemorations of the anniversary of Archbishop Romero's assassination
5. Form a coordinating group for religious people within the broader El Salvador solidarity movement, with the specific task of helping develop and coordinate the following:
 - Preparation of informational materials, liturgical aids, suggestions for prayer vigils, speakers, etc. for use by local churches
 - Facilitation of church-to-church dialogue, arranging for visit of U.S. church delegations to El Salvador and visits of Salvadorean church people here
 - Participation of religious groups in the National Week of Solidarity, suggested to be held January 18-25 so as to include commemoration of the peasant massacre in 1932 and the march of 200,000 in 1980 (both Jan. 22) and the week of Prayer for Christian Unity
 - Preparation of a resource list for distribution to local churches, parishes: include "theological" resources, slides, music, speakers, forums, liturgies, etc.
 - Translation and distribution of news from Socorro Jurídico, Orientación
 - Approval by major church bodies of statements or resolutions denouncing U.S. aid to the junta, its genocidal policies, persecution of the Church, and offering support for the popular organizations
 - Preparation of an ecumenical letter, signed by top religious officials, to the President, State Department, Congress, perhaps to be delivered by a top-level delegation

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Appendix 5

Copy of Congressman Dellums' CISPES Fundraiser

Congressman Ronald V. Dellums

Washington, D. C.
Friday morning

Dear Fellow Citizen,

A growing militarism infects our nation, threatens our planet, and poisons the hopes of our children.

Will you help me convince my colleagues in Congress to stop building a perpetual war machine and start rebuilding America?

Ronald Reagan now gives the Pentagon half of every dollar you and I pay in federal income taxes. If yours is a typical American household, you will have poured more than \$20,000.00 down this defense drain before Reagan's second term is over.

Don't think it will end there. Reagan proposes a 12% increase in military spending for this year, coupled with massive cutbacks in nearly every non-military program. This arms build-up is wreaking incredible long-term damage to our economy and seriously weakening our social fabric. Education, health care, jobs -- all suffer the ill effects resulting from the misplaced priorities of this new militarism.

I plan to submit an Alternative Defense Budget to the 100th Congress when it convenes -- just as I have done in every session since 1982. It is a budget for defense -- not for playing strategic "chicken" with the Soviet Union or for war-games -- and war -- in the Third World. Instead, it will allow us to return to the vital task of building a just, compassionate America and a peaceful world.

Since I suspect you already share my concern over America's ominous, wasteful, military build-up, I invite you to join me now in support of the Alternative Defense Budget. Let us establish together the framework for a new era of safety, security, and realism about America's global role.

Together we can keep alive national debate at the highest levels of government, and make significant progress toward a sane defense policy.

In this debate, we must very clearly understand what we are willing to pay for, and why.

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I believe that until we re-order our defense policies, military spending will continue to ravage American society and drain both our personal and national resources

Military spending is the issue upon which the fate of our whole society now hinges. Its urgency does not allow you and me to sit around waiting for a changing of the guard. We must start now to bring the country back to reality.

Because many of my Congressional colleagues are now searching for the right road -- and open to alternatives -- it is particularly urgent that we fully debate the Alternative Defense Budget in the next session of Congress.

Even my arch-conservative colleague Newt Gingrich conceded during the historic House debate on an earlier version of the Alternative Defense Budget: "I think your cry from the heart is fundamentally right."

And despite intimidation by the Pentagon brass and the arms manufacturers, we keep on winning important victories.

I have fought continuously against the MX missile. In 1977, I could muster only 11 votes to kill all funding for this dangerous, useless weapon. But in 1985, the tide had turned. Congress approved only a fraction of the requested funding. And we have succeeded in publicly exposing the fraudulent shift in strategy that would base the MX in hardened missile silos as a first-strike weapon.

My opposition to the B-1 bomber also dates back to the day it was proposed. As special Congressional advisor to President Carter, I was able to halt the development of the B-1 for several years. Under Ronald Reagan, it has unfortunately been revived at an estimated \$398 million per plane.

I helped engineer the successful freeze on military spending in the 99th Congress.

And I am continuing the fight against Reagan's destabilizing "Star Wars" program after helping to cut more than \$1 billion from his original request for research and development.

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The humane, realistic assumptions about America's real national security needs and our proper role in world affairs are what makes the Alternative Defense Budget so different from the Reagan Administration's budget. Here is our agenda:

- ** We must reverse the nuclear arms race.
- ** We must end American interventionism in Central America and throughout the world.
- ** We must curtail the plans for Star Wars.
- ** We must initiate effective arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
- ** We must stop acting as the world's biggest arms merchant.
- ** We must reform the Pentagon's procurement methods.
- ** We must begin the conversion to a productive peacetime economy.

But as long as national priorities are defined by the Pentagon and not by the people, the debate will continue. And we will have to defer even longer our vision of full employment, true security, justice and equality.

I will not deceive you by suggesting that we can make our views about the madness of current military policies prevail overnight.

But I will not allow us to delay even a moment in carrying on the work that we must do for ourselves, our children, and our children's children.

Let me tell you exactly what I plan to do.

I will present the Alternative Defense Budget to the 100th Congress. I will make certain its assumptions and implications are explored by the full House of Representatives in debate on the Floor.

I will work to explain the Alternative Defense Budget to the national news media, to specialized journals, and to the American people directly. The counsels of peace will be given their chance to prevail.

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And I will keep on confronting the military establishment until it accepts the inevitable: The United States must build a just, compassionate society at home while working unceasingly for world peace.

Let us start right now to work together toward this goal.

Please respond quickly to this letter. Your personal support is a vital tool in building a Congressional coalition in favor of the Alternative Defense Budget.

The Republican National Committee and wealthy Right-wingers in California are all as eager as ever to unseat me in the coming elections. Your contribution to my re-election campaign for \$25, \$35, \$50, \$100 or more -- especially at this crucial early date -- will help ensure that my campaign committee has adequate resources to defend me from the Right-wing attack we can expect.

With your gift of \$250 or more, you will become a member of the Dellums Leadership Circle, a select group of far-sighted Americans committed to a sound, progressive vision of our future.

By helping me, you will be making sure that the concerns of all progressive Americans, wherever they live and work, are voiced both in crucial Committee meetings and on the House Floor.

I will keep you fully informed of my progress. And I pledge to make your support for sane defense policies more widely known in Congress and throughout Washington. The fight for a rational alternative to military madness remains my unrelenting priority.

Sincerely,


Ronald V. Dellums

Appendix 6

Copy of Congressman Dymally's CISPES Fundraiser

Congressman ~~Al~~ Al Dymally**RELEASED**El Salvador: Human Rights Washington, D. C.
Special Project (1993) Wednesday afternoon

Dear Fellow American Citizen,

The United States is deeply involved in a civil war in El Salvador -- a war which has cost over a billion taxpayer dollars, killed 50,000 Salvadorans, and driven over one and a half million more from their homes.

U.S. arms provide firepower in the Salvadoran civil war. U.S. advisors provide training and oversight, and U.S. pilots use infra-red equipment to identify targets.

The war will not stop without your help.

There are three things you can do to help stop the bombing in El Salvador and end U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. But before telling you what they are, I must make clear how seriously I view this situation.

During my six years on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I have listened to witnesses chronicle our deepening military involvement in Central America. In my Los Angeles County home district, Salvadoran refugees have told me about the high human toll of the war.

Sporadic news reporting fails to convey a full picture of the intensity of the fighting or of its impact:

- o Our tax dollars fund an escalating air war which features daily bombings of civilian areas. U.S.-trained pilots fly AC-47 gunships which can put a bullet in every square foot of an area the size of a football field -- within three seconds.
- o Since January, the Salvadoran military has been conducting "Operation Phoenix" -- a massive drive to depopulate Guazapa Province, a few miles north of El Salvador's capital city.
- o Once, 50,000 people -- mainly farmers -- lived in the area around the Guazapa Volcano. Now, less than 1,500 civilians are estimated to be left. The army has methodically killed livestock, burned fields and fruit trees, and destroyed food stocks -- all violations of the Geneva Accords.
- o According to an April 18th report from the Christian Committee for the Displaced of El Salvador, Operation Phoenix has produced 245 civilians murdered, including 5 pregnant women; 1,345 civilians captured; and 13 villages totally destroyed.

On January 13, 1986 the Washington Post (p. A21) reported, "El Salvador's Roman Catholic Archbishop [Arturo Rivera y Damas] said he witnessed a government aerial bombardment of a populated

area during his pastoral visit to guerilla-controlled areas this week ... he witnessed the bombing last Monday as residents of the embattled northern Chalatenango Province were singing songs of welcome to him.... Defense officials denied that there was any bombing in the area where Rivera y Damas visited."

The American people and their representatives in Congress must not allow our government to support the bombing of civilians. That is why the U.S. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) is organizing a National Emergency Campaign to Stop the Bombing. I ask you to support the campaign.

Members of CISPES are working in local communities across the country, informing their neighbors about the threat of full-scale war in Central America -- and asking them to also take action.

With 450 committees in towns and cities in all 50 states, and close working relationships with many other organizations, CISPES is ideally suited to inspire public opposition to the widening U.S. role in Central America. Through films, slide-shows, and public discussions in churches, community centers, and homes, CISPES' volunteer members are showing Americans what is really happening in Central America.

In its 5-1/2 years of existence, CISPES has helped hundreds of thousands of Americans take action for peace -- many for the first time.

** CISPES efforts have motivated thousands to call Members of Congress and to write letters voicing opposition to the U.S. war in Central America.

** CISPES volunteers are breaking through the news media blackout on El Salvador. Op-ed articles, letters to the editor, and newspaper ads are telling the facts. "Stop the Bombing" bus and subway placards are up in urban transit systems across the country.

** CISPES has sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to help meet the basic human needs of those in El Salvador suffering from war. In 1985 alone, CISPES grassroots committees sent over \$180,000 in humanitarian aid.

My House and Senate colleagues have access to the same information as do I. "War stories" will not change their votes -- unless they also know that a consensus in opposition to the war is building among their own constituents.

Through organization, that consensus can be built. That is why CISPES is embarking on a two-year educational campaign in 50 key Congressional districts. With trained full-time organizers,

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CISPES will reach the unconvinced, recruit volunteers and build effective opposition to the bombing.

With generous initial contributions, CISPES has begun the effort -- and already shown results in Congress:

- * 47 Members of Congress have co-sponsored a resolution by Rep. John Conyers condemning the continuing human rights violations in El Salvador and calling for a halt to the indiscriminate air and ground attacks on civilians.
- * At CISPES' urging, House Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski wrote letters to our colleagues, David Obey, Chair of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, and Michael Barnes, Chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He voiced opposition to the Administration's supplemental request of \$54 million in Central American police training funds.

The police training measure failed -- thanks in part to the opposition of Rep. Rostenkowski and other members of Congress contacted by CISPES.

- * Following Rep. Rostenkowski's letter and thousands of letters from CISPES members, Rep. Barnes held Subcommittee hearings on the human rights situation in El Salvador.
- * Rep. Frank Annunzio, a former supporter of military aid to El Salvador, credits CISPES members in his district with changing his point of view about the effects of that aid in El Salvador.

But now our government is escalating the U.S. military role in Central America in ways reminiscent of the expansion of the war in Vietnam -- and we must all redouble our efforts to respond.

Here are the three things YOU can do RIGHT NOW to help STOP THE BOMBING:

- 1) Write a check to CISPES today for \$35 -- or for \$25, \$50 or \$100 -- and send it to us in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.

The day-to day work of CISPES is carried out by volunteers, and the CISPES staff are paid subsistence wages. But other expenses are unavoidably high. To finance its National Emergency Campaign to Stop the Bombing, CISPES must raise over \$45,000 in the next two weeks -- and most of it must come from individuals like yourself.

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- 2) Sign the "Urgent Reply Memorandum" I am enclosing and return it along with your contribution. We need to obtain thousands of signatures as part of CISPES' effort to deliver these pledges by the truckload to Members of Congress. Your representatives must recognize that you want them to act to stop the bombings.
- 3) If you wish to participate actively in your local community as well, write down your phone number on the enclosed reply memorandum. CISPES staff or other volunteers in your area will contact you with details about grassroots activities in which you may take part.


The Reagan Administration and the Congress are at a crossroads. You can help point out the right path.

One path leads to peace and economic justice. It is the route to the recognition of human rights and the sanctity of human life.

The other path -- the way of death squads and massive bombardment -- leads to large-scale death and destruction. We took that path in Southeast Asia.

Let us not allow our government to lead us down that path again.

Sincerely,



MERVYN M. DYMALLY
Member of Congress
Committee on Foreign Affairs

P.S. Your check for \$100 or more will be tax-deductible if made payable to the "Institute for Effective Action". Contributions will fund CISPES' ongoing educational work.

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Appendix 7

Copy of Congressman Conyers' NEST Fundraiser

Congressman John Conyers, Jr.

FIRST DISTRICT MICHIGAN
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Dear Friend,

I know you share with me a commitment to peace in Central America, and that's why I'm writing you now.

For the twenty-one years I've served as a U.S. Congressman, I've been proud of the desire of most Americans to protect human rights and their willingness to help those less fortunate when help is necessary.

Today our help is desperately needed in El Salvador.

You are no doubt aware of the shocking facts about the human toll of El Salvador's war -- 50,000 persons killed largely by the military and right-wing death squads over the past five years; 500,000 refugees struggling for survival within El Salvador alone.

Now in the Salvadoran countryside, human suffering has taken on a new face -- a face molded, in large part, by the more than \$1.7 billion in U.S. aid to El Salvador during the Reagan administration.

And the chief victims are El Salvador's civilians.

Determined to destroy any base for the opposition movement, the Duarte government and the Salvadoran military forces are attacking their own people with unrestrained savagery.

Every day planes bought with U.S. tax dollars fly over countryside considered "enemy territory," machine-gunning, firing mortars and dropping anti-personnel bombs on whatever moves below. Ground forces ruthlessly carry out "search and destroy" missions -- standard procedures ordered by their U.S. advisors.

And every day, caught up in a war not of their making, hundreds of children, women and men are forced to flee their homes in terror of the military's raids or aerial attacks.

A handful of U.S. observers have taken the perilous journey into these war zones. They have brought back bloodchilling testimonies of military massacres.

- o Old women unable to run -- mowed down with machine guns.
- o Children stabbed, shot and mutilated.
- o Babies crying in pain from white phosphorus burns.

When the Salvadoran army mounts a drive through a village, the people flee to avoid the wrath of the military. These marches -- called quindas (pronounced "GEEN-duz") -- sometimes last for weeks.

The quindas take a shocking toll on children and the elderly. Often safe drinking water and food are simply unavailable. Without adequate shelter, without medicine, without rest, often the very youngest and the very oldest simply die. As one eyewitness said:

"Sometimes we have suffered for eight days or ten days without water during the different times when we had to be fleeing. I have two children who died and, really, I blame that on the [military] because they didn't have to die...."

"A lot of times when we had to leave, I might be right in the middle of making tortillas or whatever and there was no choice, you just had to leave everything. There have been so many massacres that when you have to leave, you just leave...."

And when the survivors return, bravely determined to rebuild some semblance of a normal life, this is what they find: the military has burned down their houses, killed their chickens and pigs, even razed their newly planted crops. Deprived of their only sources of livelihood and nourishment, they are desperately hungry.

You might well ask: how can this be?

While a wealthy minority controls the bulk of the country's resources, the majority of Salvadorans are trapped in poverty and landlessness. Peaceful attempts at land reform or other democratic change that might ease this chronic impoverishment have been ruthlessly thwarted by the Salvadoran military.

It is not difficult to comprehend why some who oppose the Salvadoran government's war on its own people have fought back in desperation.

But it is difficult to comprehend why the Salvadoran military, in seeking to stop this opposition, is attacking the unarmed population with such ferocious brutality.

In destroying the rural economy and deliberately targeting civilians, Napoleon Duarte's "democratic" government hopes to undercut support for its opposition. But the true sufferers are the innocent.

"Every time when soldiers have come here they have either burnt the fields or trampled down the new plants, so you

never know. These are things they are doing against the civilian population because we are not [guerrillas] here...."

We can no longer avoid addressing what is being done in our name in El Salvador.

On the floor of Congress, I have adamantly opposed military aid to the Salvadoran government. And, though Congress ended up approving additional U.S. military assistance to El Salvador, I believe the American public stands with me in opposing this tragic use of our tax dollars.

I hope that someday our government will correct itself, just as it finally extricated itself from the Vietnam War. But until that happens, we cannot help but shoulder part of the responsibility for our country's role in heightening the conflict in El Salvador -- and for the human suffering this conflict is causing.

I know that you share my concern for the civilian victims of El Salvador. So I am eager to tell you about a way in which we can help, not hurt, the people of El Salvador.

A small and resourceful organization called New El Salvador Today (N.E.S.T.) is working to provide emergency help for the children, women and men living in economic desperation because of El Salvador's war.

N.E.S.T. is a non-profit tax-exempt foundation which is sending humanitarian aid to those whose lives are most affected by the violence of the U.S.-supported war. Already N.E.S.T. has succeeded in channeling over \$225,000 to the civilian populations in El Salvador's war zones.

The situation these thousands of families face is truly a life-or-death emergency.

They lack even the most basic requirements for life:

- o Because their crops have been destroyed, they need food.
- o Because they had to flee for their lives, leaving everything behind, they need clothing.
- o Because they have walked for weeks on end, wearing out what footwear they had before, they need shoes.

And, most of all, despite their incredible resilience and determination, they need our immediate help.

To respond to this urgent need, N.E.S.T. is mounting an Emergency Relief Campaign to raise \$100,000 for desperately needed food and everyday necessities.

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Because the situation is so critical, N.E.S.T. is appealing to individual Americans like you who care enough to support this Emergency Relief Campaign right now.

I am asking you to give whatever you can -- \$25, \$35, \$50 or more. Your contribution will be used immediately to support N.E.S.T.'s efforts to provide clothing and food for the civilian populations impoverished by this violent civil conflict. These supplies will then be transported at great risk -- often on people's backs -- into El Salvador's war zones.


Our government sends billions of dollars to El Salvador that destroy lives. Here is a chance to send something to save human lives.

And it takes so little to help! Simply fill out the enclosed reply form and return it with your tax-deductible contribution -- whatever you can afford to give.

As a supporter of N.E.S.T.'s Emergency Relief Campaign, you will have the satisfaction of knowing that you are helping to redress the destruction being done by the U.S. military aid sent to El Salvador.


On behalf of N.E.S.T. and the people of El Salvador, I thank you.

Sincerely,


Congressman John Conyers, Jr.
1st District, Michigan

P.S. Every day is critical now for the people of war-torn El Salvador. So, please, don't put this letter aside. I urge you to take a moment to send in your contribution to N.E.S.T.'s Emergency Relief Campaign today.

JC/rmk



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Appendix 8

CISPES and the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy

The Coalition for a New Foreign Policy is a lobbying organization made up of various church, "peace" and activist groups with a liberal to leftist outlook. It serves as a coordinating body for grassroots activists to lobby their elected officials, monitoring legislation, publicizing the bills before Congress, and mobilizing its constituent groups. There is some question as to whether the Coalition and/or its members may be violating IRS tax codes which forbid religious, charitable and educational organizations from devoting more than a small portion of their budgets and programs to lobbying.

CISPES is a member of the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy. In a March 1987 letter sent to "Dear Friends Concerned About El Salvador," the Coalition urged local activists to participate in a "Campaign of Inquiry designed to educate Congress on El Salvador," and "to prod congresspeople to learn more about the reality of El Salvador today and thus lay the foundation for specific legislation for a more positive U.S. policy."

This "positive" work is done in tandem with CISPES' own campaign to influence legislation which would help undermine the government of President Duarte in El Salvador, and brings into question whether the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy is simply a mainstream liberal organization that is being used by CISPES, or is a more radical group with a hidden agenda that is concealing its true intentions from its members and from Congress.

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Appendix 9

Overt FMLN bank account numbers,
addresses, and related operativesFMLN Accounts in Mexico City

Bank: BANAMEX
Account number: 516-612221-1
Name: Esteban Ramirez.

Bank: BANCA SERFIN, S.A. (Sucursal Perisur)
Account number: 66-327-5227
Name: Andres Fabregas or Gilberto Lopez y Rivas.

World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
(Frente Mundial de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Salvadoreno)
Hacienda de Colorme 51
Col. Floresta-Coyoacan
C.P. 14310
Mexico, D.F.
Tel: 905-684-6005

or

Cuauhtemoc 799
Despacho 7
Col. Navarte
C.P. 03020
Mexico, D.F.
Tel: 905-687-5659
Telex: FRENTE MUNDIAL, No. 0761155 NASRME

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NOTES

¹"Structure of the Salvadoran Left," chart, The Washington Post, 9 July 1983, p. A13; Guy Gugliotta, "Leftist List: Little New, Lots That's Old," The Miami Herald, 14 March 1982, p. 10A. Also see, El Salvador Revista Internacional, No. 4, 1981, published in Mexico by the FMLN.

²Ibid.

See new study published

³R. Bruce McColm. El Salvador: Peaceful Revolution or Armed Struggle? (New York: Freedom House, 1982), p. 24. Also, Roger Reed, El Salvador and the Crisis in Central America (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1984), p. 13.

*Anderson book
for historical*

⁴See footnote 1.

⁵The founding and operation of the FSLN solidarity apparatus is documented by L. Francis Bouchey, ed., The Real Secret War: Sandinista Political Warfare and its Effects on Congress (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1987), Part II.

⁶This is described by New York Times journalist Bernard Diederich in his book, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981).

⁷The Handal diary was released by the U.S. Department of State in February 1981. A published translation appears in Uri Ra'anani, et. al., Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 350-358.

⁸Edward O'Malley, Assistant Director of Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Soviet Active Measures. Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 and 14 July 1982, pp. 203-206, 218.

⁹Farid Handal identified Garcia Almeida by name. The Cuban is identified as an intelligence operative by John Barron in KGB Today--The Hidden Hand, (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1983), p. 244.

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¹⁶Anthony Lewis, "Another Noble Cause," The New York Times, 1 December 1980.

¹⁷O'Malley, hearings, p. 230.

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¹⁸Bittman, pp. 91-95.

¹⁹The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) is a product of the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, Cuba. NACLA is described as an offshoot of the radical Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). "NACLA specializes in the preparation of reports on Latin American affairs from a decidedly Marxist perspective," and its material "finds its way into the hands of journalists and government policy formulators," according to a study on terrorism and terrorist support operations by Stefan Possony and L. Francis Bouchey. NACLA, the study said, "has come to be known as the 'intelligence-gathering arm of the movement,' a movement dominated by groups and organizations of Marxist-Leninist persuasion who are part of the Tricontinental revolutionary support apparatus." Stefan Possony and L. Francis Bouchey, *International Terrorism: The Communist Connection*. (Washington: American Council for World Freedom, 1978), pp. 104-105.

²⁰John Rees, Information Digest, 28 January 1983.

²¹CISPES flyer for Salvadoran "refugees," originally cited in "CISPES: A Terrorist Propaganda Network" (Washington: CIS, 1984).

²²The Institute for Policy Studies report is described by Allan C. Brownfeld and J. Michael Waller in *The Revolution Lobby* (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1985), pp. 23-27.

²³"Metodo Revolucionario," historical analysis of revolution by Manuel Hernandez. Captured from Nidia Diaz archive, April 1985. (Document AQ)

²⁴Dan Williams. "Salvadoran Rebel Documents, Defector Describe. . ." Los Angeles Times, 25 May 1985, p. 20. Also see "Revolution Beyond Our Borders': Sandinista Intervention in Central America," U.S. Department of State Special Report No. 132, September 1985, p. 12.

The evidence that the Sandinista government directly provides the FMLN with weapons and supplies is incontrovertible. The following documents issued by the U.S. Department of State provide information from both public and intelligence sources: "Communist Interference in El Salvador," Special Report No. 80, 23 February 1981; "Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Buildup and Support for Central American Subversion," 18 July 1984; "News Briefing on Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador," 8 August 1984; "The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, March 1985; "The Sandinista Military Buildup," 1985; and "The Challenge to Democracy in Central America," June 1986. Selected press reports include, "Pilot Confirms Arms Shipments to El Salvador," by the Spanish AFP news agency, 21 July 1982; "Young Defector Confirms Sandinistas Crossing to Enter El Salvador," Washington Times, 27 August 1984; "Apoyo de Sandinistas a Terroristas Salvadorenos," UPI Spanish language dispatch, 13 February 1985; "Salvadoran Rebel Leader Cites Cuban, Managuan Aid," Washington Times and wire services, 30 April 1985; "Presenta EEUU Pruebas Sobre Envio de Armas de Nicaragua a El Salvador," UPI dispatch appearing in Diario Las Americas, 21 December 1985. Perhaps the best single article is James LeMoyne's "The Guerrilla Network," which appeared in the 6 April 1986 New York Times Magazine. University of Virginia Professor John Norton Moore's book, The Secret War in Central America (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987) is the best single non-government source on the subject.

²⁵Section 1 of memorandum from FMLN General Command to National Directorate of Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) dated 24 November 1983, on how to isolate President Reagan internationally. Signed by Shafik Handal, Joaquin Villalobos, Roberto Roca and Leonel Gonzales. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document Q)

²⁶Section 4 of FMLN memorandum about a "very important meeting with DRI," the International Relations Department of the FSLN, dated 22 November. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document AP-2)

²⁷"Directives for the Political Struggle of the FMLN in This New Phase of the War Process." 26-page memorandum and eight-page annex, dated

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November 1983. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document S)

²⁸"Resolutions: C.P. of the C.C. [Central Committee] of the PRTC [Central American Revolutionary Workers Party], 3rd Day of Sessions, April 1984," pp. 3-4, 5-6, 9. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document C)

²⁹Ibid., pp. 18-19.

³⁰Shirley Christian. "Salvador Rebels Say They Killed 13." New York Times, 22 June 1985, p. 3. The FMLN General Command issued a communique on 25 June 1985 praising the attack and announcing that it had been done under the auspices of the entire FMLN. Rural FMLN guerrilla forces also targeted bases where U.S. military training personnel were present. A large FMLN force attacked an army garrison at La Union in June 1986, inflicting heavy casualties on the army, but failing to realize its objective of killing American military personnel there. In March 1987, the FMLN assaulted the El Paraiso garrison in Chalatenango, killing U.S. Army Sergeant Gregory Fronius. The FMLN's apparent intent in conducting these attacks was to give opponents of President Reagan's policy in the United States another excuse to demand a pullout of the small U.S. contingent in El Salvador.

³¹Memorandum from the General Command of FMLN to "Exterior Commission" of FMLN (in Managua), 5 June 1984, in regard to offering a temporary ceasefire for propaganda purposes prior to Democrat Party convention in San Francisco. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document A-3)

³²"Analysis of the New Salvadoran Government and of its International Context." 22-page memorandum of FMLN-FDR Politico-Diplomatic Commission, 1 June 1984. From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document W)

³³Points of "Jaime," "Maria," and "Bernardo" conversation with Dick McCall, Advisor to Senator Paul Tsongas, 22 June 1984. Signed by "Logan." From Nidia Diaz archive. (Document M)

³⁴"CISPES 1984 Administrative Strategy Proposal," referred to earlier in text.

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³⁵"Interagency Intelligence Study: Soviet Active Measures." Exhibit I, Soviet Active Measures. Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 13-14 July 1982, p. 45.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Nicarauac. (Managua: Sandinista Ministry of Culture), January-March 1981.

³⁸Max Singer is quoted by Michael A. Ledeen in "Central America: The Future of the Democratic Revolution." (Washington: Gulf and Caribbean Foundation, 1984), p. 24.

³⁹Frente Mundial. Official newsletter of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. (Mexico City) September 1983, p. 9.

⁴⁰Vanguardia. (Saltillo, Coahuila, Mexico), 15 March 1985, p. 1.

⁴¹The author was present and took notes when Chandra made this statement at the World Peace Congress in Copenhagen, Denmark, 15 October 1986.

⁴²For more information on the World Peace Council, see Herbert Romerstein, "The World Peace Council and Soviet 'Active Measures,'" (Washington: The Hale Foundation, 1982); John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1983); "World Peace Council: Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Note (Washington: U.S. Department of State, April 1982); Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), pp. 114-132; and Richard H. Shultz, "Recent Regional Patterns" in Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism, Op. cit., esp. pp. 114-117.

⁴³The author was a member of the United States delegation to this conference, and witnessed the proceedings. See his article based on his experience, "Soviet World Peace Council Targets South Africa," Human Events, 8 November 1986, p. 1.

⁴⁴Barron, p. 263.

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⁴⁵See "CIA Study: Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda." Report submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, in Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive) hearings, p. 79.

⁴⁶O'Malley, hearings, pp. 203, 204, 211, 218. Also see U.S. Peace Council Founding Agenda, reprinted in The Real Secret War, Op. Cit., pp. 179-182.

⁴⁷New Perspectives, Journal of the World Peace Council (East Berlin) January, 1987, p. 2.

⁴⁸Soviet Active Measures Against the United States. (Alexandria, VA: Western Goals, 1984), p. 47. Also see Barron, p. 271.

⁴⁹The hearings are titled "Soviet Active Measures." A copy of the original, unaltered 48-page World Peace Council brochure is in the author's collection.

⁵⁰Barron, pp. 291-293.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 282.

⁵²Soviet Active Measures Against the United States, p. 47.

⁵³Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast (Washington: Regnery Gateway), Summer 1986, and Winter 1987, p. 5.

⁵⁴The author saw the Kennedy and Dellums letters of greeting publicly displayed at the WPC World Peace Congress in Copenhagen, October 1986. Kennedy wrote, "We admire your commitment to the cause of peace, and we look forward to learning the results of your meetings. In the words of the old civil rights anthem, 'Deep in our hearts, we do believe that we shall overcome some day.'"

⁵⁵Scott was witnessed at the conference. Her name appears on the official roster of delegates, which identified her as a representative of Congressman Ronald Dellums.

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⁵⁶"Interagency Intelligence Study: Soviet Active Measures," Op. Cit., p. 52.

⁵⁷"Salvadoran Rebels Assault Electoral Office," UPI article, Washington Post, 26 March 1982, p. A26; Christopher Dickey, "Turnout Heavy in El Salvador, Thousands Vote Despite Rebel Threats," Washington Post, 29 March 1982, p. 1.

⁵⁸Caryle Murphy. "12 Will Fast Here for Salvador Peace." Washington Post, 29 March 1982, p. A13. Harkin was quoted as wanting to tell President Reagan, "No, no more guns to El Salvador."

⁵⁹CISPES brochure titled "March 27: At the Crossroads," page 2.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3. On the cover of the brochure is a photograph of demonstrators carrying a banner which reads, "F.D.R. is the Only Representative of the Salvadoran [People]."

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Membership form for the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, Hacienda de Corfome 51, Col. Floresta-Cocoacan, C.P. 14310, Mexico DF., Tel: 905-684-6005. The list of the board of directors and permanent bureau appears on the left of that page.

⁶³"Reestructurado el Buro," Frente Mundial. Newsletter of the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (Mexico City), August 1983. The article announced the reorganization of the Front's governing body, and the resignation of Zimmerman as president. The article ended, "To comrade Bill Zimmerman and to the other comrades who remain on the Permanent Bureau, we give you thanks and satisfaction for having shared with you during the first year of the FMSPS [World Front] the tasks of coordination of international solidarity: For the new members, a salute of welcome and an invitation that, with all your help, imagination and creative forces we will coordinate and build the World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador into a dissuasive force against the intervention of the United States in Central America." (The July 1983 issue of Frente Mundial described the planning of the upcoming 12 November demonstrations in Washington.)

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⁶⁴Pete Hamill. "What Does Lou Grant Know About El Salvador?" New York magazine, 15 March 1982. An undated Medical Aid for Indochina (MAI) brochure from 1973 said that since 1971, MAI raised over \$1 million, which was sent to the "Red Cross Section" of North Vietnam (DRVN) and the Vietcong (PRG). The project was to "repair the damage inflicted by the U.S. government."

⁶⁵This information is contained in the masthead of the World Front's newsletter Frente Mundial.

⁶⁶"CIA Study: Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures." Published in the "Soviet Active Measures" hearings before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 13 and 14 July 1982, p. 52.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸"Voces de Cuscatlan." Newsletter describing itself as the official voice of the Salvadoran community in the United States. (Mexico) October 1983. Translation appears in Ra'anani, Uri, et. al., Hydra of Carnage, Op. Cit., pp. 347-349.

⁶⁹Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. Dezinformatsia: Active Measures In Soviet Strategy. (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), p. 40.

⁷⁰"Humanitarian Aid' Sent to Salvadoran Guerrillas," West Watch (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security), May 1981, p. 9.

⁷¹"Propuesta para Captar al Maximo de Ayuda con Fines Humanitarios en Beneficio del Proceso Revolucionario." Captured document from FPL faction of FMLN. Released by the U.S. Department of State as Annex I of a series of captured guerrilla documents, April 1981.

⁷²Ibid. This was the opening paragraph of the 11-page document.

⁷³For further information and documentation, see Brownfeld and Waller, The Revolution Lobby, Op. Cit., pp. 49-51. Documentation of the CDHES serving as a front for the FMLN is contained in a letter from U.S. Ambassador to San Salvador Edwin G. Corr to Congresswoman Barbara Boxer (D-CA), in diplomatic cable SS 08117, June 1986. Former

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CDHES director Luz Janet Alfaro, a member of the RN faction of the FMLN, described in a televised news conference in San Salvador on 30 May 1986 how the FMLN controlled the CDHES and CO-MADRES, the "Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Disappeared and Assassinated." More information on other FMLN fronts in El Salvador which are used to deceive international observers is contained in U.S. Embassy San Salvador cable 07425 titled "Phantom Critics from the Legal Left: FMLN Front Organizations and their Paid Announcements," May 1986.

⁷⁴World Front in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador membership form, undated. Sergio Mendez Arceo's name appears on the form as a member of the World Front's governing body. It also appears on the masthead of the World Front's monthly newsletter, Frente Mundial. Mendez Arceo is identified as an honorary president of the World Peace Council on page 2 of the January 1987 issue of the WPC's official magazine New Perspectives, published in East Berlin.

⁷⁵Michael Tangeman, "4 Bishops Back Sandinistas, Mexican Prelates Deviate from Majority on State-Church Rift," San Diego Union, 2 November 1986, p. 26.

⁷⁶"Propuesta Para Captar El Maximo De Ayuda" document, Section 5.1, p. 8. Original citation in note 79.

⁷⁷Ecumenical Press Service, 23 October 1981; United Methodist Newscope, 4 December 1981; United Methodist Reporter, 8 May 1981; Columbia Review of Journalism, September/October 1981. For added insight into the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches and their longtime support for left-wing and Communist causes, see C. Gregg Singer, The Unholy Alliance. (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975); and Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, The Coercive Utopians: Social Deception by America's Power Players. (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983); and James L. Tyson, Prophets or Useful Idiots? Church Organizations Attacking U.S. Central American Policy. (Washington: Council for the Defense of Freedom, 1986). CBS "60 Minutes" exposed the National Council of Churches on 23 January 1983, in a segment titled "The Gospel According to Whom?" A four-

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page description of the program is contained in the February-B 1983 issue of AIM Report from Accuracy in Media.

Add: A TIME FOR CANDOR.

⁷⁸Bittman, Op. Cit., p. 189.

⁷⁹Ibid. See the New York Times, 17 May 1978, p. A23.

⁸⁰Philip Agee, interview with Peter Studer. "Philip Agee--Turncoat CIA Agent." Tages-Anzeiger (Zurich), March 1975. Cited in Broken Seals, (Alexandria, VA: Western Goals, 1980), p. 46.

⁸¹Philip Agee. Inside the Company: CIA Diary. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1975), pp. 639-640.

⁸²Technically, Simon could be correct about the State Department's claim. The State Department released the FMLN document containing Oxfam's name and contribution, but did not make the accusation itself. The point is moot, however, because Oxfam's August 1980 newsletter said that it gave money to the same group mentioned in the FMLN document. A recently declassified cable from Secretary of State Alexander Haig to the US Embassy in San Salvador showed official U.S. concern with possible funding of the FMLN by Oxfam. However, a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Powell Moore to Senator Jeremiah Denton dated 11 March 1982 said that "An extensive search of our files has produced no record of [Oxfam's] involvement [with the FMLN]." Moore was mistaken, because it was the State Department itself which released the captured guerrilla documents a year earlier. Additionally, former Sandinista intelligence officer Miguel Bolanos revealed that Oxfam was running financial support operations for the Sandinistas through Mexico.

⁸³Roy Howard Beck. "Aid Allegation Discounted." United Methodist Reporter. 8 May 1981.

⁸⁴Information provided by the Institute on Religion and Democracy in the form of a personal letter dated 18 December 1981 from the religious worker who visited the ASESAN office at the San Salvador archbishopric.

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⁸⁵"Injerencia del FDR/FMLN en los Organismos Humanitarios de El Salvador." (FMLN-FDR Infiltration of Humanitarian Organizations in El Salvador). Unpublished report by former FMLN members Luz Janet Alfaro and Dora Angelica Campos, August 1986.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Asociacion de Mujeres del Salvador (AMES) has no public office in El Salvador. It has offices in Nicaragua (Apartado 1009, Telcor Central, Managua); Costa Rica (Apartado 7522, San Jose); Mexico City (Apartado 20-134, Mexico 20, D.F.); and three in the United States: P.O. Box 40331, San Francisco, CA 94140; PO Box 41146, Chicago, IL 60641; and PO Box 1308, Brooklyn, NY 11234. It lists no office in El Salvador, but according to its literature, AMES conducts projects in FMLN-held areas. Also see, Marilyn Thomson. Women of El Salvador: The Price of Freedom. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986).

⁸⁸Letter to local activists from CISPES national office signed by Lisa Tarver, dated 11 September 1981. She wrote, "if an individual or organization wants to receive the tax deduction or feels uneasy about giving money to CISPES, they can make the checks payable directly to SHARE."

⁸⁹Undated letter from San Francisco CISPES coordinator Mike Zielinski to "Friends of Proposition N," with monthly pledge card soliciting monthly donations to CISPES. From 1984.

⁹⁰Westside (California) CISPES promotional flyer for 29 June 1985 walkathon "to raise material aid for El Salvador."

⁹¹Michael Boos of Young Americas Foundation attended a 9 June 1984 public meeting of the District of Columbia CISPES, and reported this in a memorandum about the fundraising effort.

⁹²This section is copied from U.S. Embassy San Salvador diplomatic cable 15295 from December 1986, titled "Background on FMLN-FDR U.S. Support Campaign."

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⁹³Pete Hamill. "What Does Lou Grant Know About El Salvador?" New York Magazine, 15 March 1982. Also see note 64.

⁹⁴"The History of Medical Aid for El Salvador." Two-page document from Medical Aid for El Salvador, 6930 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 200, Los Angeles, CA 90036/(213) 937-3596.

⁹⁵Hamill, Op. Cit.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷See "CIS Charges Two El Salvador Charitable Groups with Fraud," Council for Inter-American Security news release, 12 January 1987. A copy of the four-page CIS letter to the IRS was attached.

⁹⁸"Medical Aid for El Salvador." Alert! Newsletter of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, March 1982.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Jonathan Tasini. "The Challenge of Medical Help for El Salvador." Los Angeles Times, "View" section, page 4.

¹⁰¹Deborah Mutnik. "The Human Face of U.S. Aid to Central America." Alert!. CISPES newsletter, undated article, p. 6.

¹⁰²Bob Ostertag, et. al. "A History of CISPES." Alert!, CISPES newsletter, October 1983, p. 6.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰⁴"CISPES aids clinics in rebel-held areas." Guardian. 9 March 1983.

¹⁰⁵Tasini, Op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰⁶Medical Aid for El Salvador direct-mail fundraising package signed by actor Mike Farrell. The exact figures given by MAES are \$955,931 in funds, and \$1,130,000 worth of supplies, totaling \$2,094,931 delivered to its recipients in El Salvador. The figures appear on a map enclosed with the Farrell letter.

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¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Tasini, Op. Cit., pp. 1 and 4. Also, Deborah Mutnik, op. cit. AGEUS was identified as a front for the FMLN in U.S. Embassy San Salvador cable 14790, November 1986, paragraph 7. CISPES asks that U.S. teacher groups donate funds to AGEUS, the cable said.

¹⁰⁹The "point of contact" for MAES at the archbishopric is Rev. Octavio Cruz, according to U.S. diplomatic cable from San Salvador number 15218, December 1986, titled "Third/Fourth U.S.-Based FMLN-FDR Support Activities Underway," paragraph 2. The cable used the term a second time to refer to Cruz as "a point of contact of the FMLN in the Archbishopric." The source of this information, the cable said, were defectors from the CDHES, but the Embassy said that it could not confirm this independently.

¹¹⁰See note 85.

¹¹¹"The History of Medical Aid for El Salvador," MAES document cited in note 102. MAES was more forthright in another flyer, titled "Salvadoran Government Blocks Critical Surgery for Nidia Diaz," identifying Diaz as an "FMLN commander and delegate to the La Palma peace talks" of October 1984.

¹¹²FMLN-FDR communique of 21 April 1985, and Salvadoran Armed Forces Committee (Coprefa) bulletin of 22 April 1985, texts appearing in the 23 April 1985 issue of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Daily Report, pp. P6-7. Also see texts of two Radio Venceremos clandestine broadcasts of 21 June 1985, appearing in the 21 June 1985 FBIS Latin America Daily Report, pp. P5-6; clandestine Radio Venceremos broadcast of 22 June 1985, which was the text of the PRTC's Mardoqueo Cruz Urban Guerrilla Command which conducted the attack and Radio Farabundo Marti broadcasts of 21 and 22 June, appearing in the 24 June 1985 FBIS Latin America Daily Report, pp. P9-11; and a communique from the FMLN General Command issued on Radio Venceremos on 25 June.

Diaz was planning to travel to Vietnam that year for additional guerrilla training (LA Times, 25 May 1985). Two months after her

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capture, fellow PRTC members launched the terrorist attack against the American Marines and businessmen at the Zona Rosa in San Salvador. CISPES defended the action in a page 2 editorial in its July-August 1985 newsletter. MAES issued no public comment, and lobbied on Diaz's behalf for the August operation.

¹¹³Marjorie Miller. "TV Doctor from 'MASH' Scrubs Up for Salvador Surgery. Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1985.

¹¹⁴"Medical Airlift to El Salvador," issued by Medical Aid for El Salvador, advance document, 5 September 1986.

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¹¹⁶U.S. Embassy San Salvador diplomatic cable number 15218, December 1986, titled "Third/Fourth U.S.-Based FMLN-FDR Support Activities Underway," paragraph 2.

¹¹⁷"Medical Airlift to El Salvador" document, Op. Cit.

¹¹⁸"Projected itinerary," Ibid.

¹¹⁹Medical Aid for El Salvador promotional map with supposed breakdown of funds and supplies delivered. Part of direct-mail fundraising campaign that went out in early 1987 over signature of Mike Farrell.

¹²⁰Lisa Tarver letter to activists from CISPES national office, 1 October 1981; and Bob Ostertag, et. al., "A History of CISPES." Op. Cit., p. 7.

¹²¹"UN Said to Harbor Leftist Guerrillas." Associated Press dispatch, 9 September 1985. The article is the result of an interview with a deserter from the ERP faction of the FMLN, who reported that the FMLN routinely uses refugee camps in Honduras administered by the United Nations. The former guerrilla also said that UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) personnel unwittingly help the FMLN by giving the guerrillas refugee documents, and permission to rest at the camps. Medicine and cloth donated by international relief agencies for the refugees are taken from the UN camps into the combat areas for use of the FMLN combatants.

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Documents captured from Commander Nidia Diaz in April 1985 show that the FMLN uses Honduras as "refuge." A particular FMLN memorandum discusses the "Eastern Front" and refers to "continue directing the work in the interior from the refuge located in Honduras." (Diaz document No. 4)

¹²²"Salvadorean [sic] Refugees in Honduras--A Fact Sheet." Undated document issued by SHARE.

¹²³"A Doctor's Lonely Journey." El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis (SHARE newsletter), June/July 1983, p. 2.

¹²⁴"White Phosphorus, Napalm Cited in El Salvador." Ibid. Also see Charles Clements, M.D. Witness to War. (New York: Bantam, 1984). In this book, Clements describes his year with the FMLN at Guazapa.

¹²⁵At a San Salvador news conference on 30 May 1986, former CDHES public relations director Luz Janet Alfaro, a member of the RN faction of the FMLN, stated that the CDHES was a front under the control of the guerrillas. On 4 June 1986, Alfaro appeared with Salvadoran Foreign Minister Rodolfo Castillo Claramount before the press and the diplomatic corps with former CO-MADRES director Dora Angelica Campos.

¹²⁶"Refugees Recall Poverty, Persecution." El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis, August/September 1983, p. 4.

¹²⁷"Who Are the Salvadorean [sic] Refugees?." SHARE promotional brochure, undated. Address: SHARE, PO Box 53372, Washington DC 20009.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹"El Salvadoreans [sic] in Trouble." El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis, June/July 1983, p. 4.

¹³⁰"Shriver Dinner Benefits Refugees." El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis, January/February 1983, p. 2.

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¹³¹"Who Are the Salvadorean [sic] Refugees?" SHARE promotional brochure, undated. Also, "Walk for Salvador." Daily World. Official newspaper of the Communist Party USA. 4 December 1981.

¹³²New Perspectives. Journal of the World Peace Council. (East Berlin) January 1987, p. 2.

¹³³Additional details of this event are provided by this author in the 8 November 1986 Human Events.

¹³⁴Jack Viets. "Tears for the Salvadorans." San Francisco Chronicle, 21 February 1985.

¹³⁵NEST 1984 Annual Report, p. 2.

¹³⁶Bob Ostertag. "The Human Face of U.S. Aid." CISPES Alert!, undated, p. 6.

¹³⁷See prepared statement of Carlottia Scott, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Dellums, regarding her trip to El Salvador as a member of a NEST delegation, in "The Air War and Political Developments in El Salvador," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 May 1986, p. 210.

¹³⁸NEST Foundation Progress Report Number One, January 1987, p. 2.

¹³⁹This literature is in the collection of the author.

¹⁴⁰Deborah Mutnik. "Inside the Incubator of a New Society." Interview with NEST coordinator Tracey Schear. Guardian, 10 October 1984, p. 15.

¹⁴¹Oxfam issued the following statement: "With the invasion of over 8000 foreign troops, Grenada's experiment with political independence and self-reliant development has apparently been halted." Steve Baldwin, "Humanitarian Aid, But Mostly for the Left." Human Events, 9 November 1985, p. 11.

¹⁴²Ibid. Also see Daniel Seligman, "Oxfamism." Fortune, 12 December 1983, p. 45.

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Juan Walte. "Did Aid Funds Go To Salvador Rebels?" UPI dispatch, appearing in the Boston Globe, 26 April 1981. The original document naming Oxfam is titled, "Informe Sobre Donaciones y su Utilizacion Comprendidos entre Diciembre '79 y Julio '80." Released by the U.S. Department of State after being captured from the FMLN.

¹⁴⁵"Health, Education for Salvadorans Fleing Civil War." Oxfam America News, Spring 1983, p. 2. Also, "El Salvador: Surviving Now and In Future." Oxfam America Special Report, "Central America in Crisis," Fall 1983, p. 3

¹⁴⁶Also see, "UN Said to Harbor Leftist Guerrillas," Associated Press dispatch, 10 September 1985., and Baldwin, Op. cit.

¹⁴⁷This was told to Baldwin and published in his above article.

¹⁴⁸Oxfam Facts for Action newsletter.

¹⁴⁹The April 25 demonstration was held simultaneously in Washington and San Francisco. John Trinkl reported in the 6 May 1987 Guardian that the Communist Party USA, Socialist Workers Party and Revolutionary Communist Party participated. Also see, Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "A Mobilization Against Democracy," Washington Post, 24 April 1987; George Archibald, "Sandinistas, Qaddafi Fund U.S. Protest," Washington Times, 24 April 1987; Rita McWilliams, "Kirkland Cautions Unions About Pro-Sandinista Rally," Washington Times, 21 April 1987. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-RI) was spotted marching at the Washington rally.

¹⁵⁰CIS staffers were at the rally and photographed the Oxfam delegation carrying the banner alongside a group from the Workers World Party, a Trotskyist organization.

¹⁵¹Rebecca Salner. "Mayor Reports on El Salvador; Berkeley's Newport Assails U.S. Policy." San Jose Mercury News, 21 March 1985.

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**Servicio Cultural e Informativo de
los Estados Unidos
de América**

Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América
Reforma 305
C.P. 06500 México, D.F.

SECRET

November 10, 1987

RELEASED IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Roger R. Gamble
THRU: PAO - Ms. Sally Grooms
FROM: DPAO - Robert R. Conner
SUBJECT: IF YOU ARE KNOWN BY THE COMPANY YOU KEEP!!

Two sources (separately) with a record of reliability have told the USIS DPAO that Carlos Salinas' de Gortari's campaign security team is headed by big-name drug traffickers Miguel Aldana (cousin of reputed drug trafficker and alleged partner in exchange houses of the Mexican AG Sergio Garcia Ramirez) and Armando Pavon Reyes (implicated in the escape of Rafael Caro Quintero in the aftermath of the Camarena killing in 1985).

Another source with close links to the PRI speculates that Aldana might be slated for a job at the undersecretary level in Gobernacion and that Camacho Solis might end up as Secretary of Gobernacion instead of the Vera Cruz Governor Fernando Gutierrez Barrios since Aldana is not on good terms with Gutierrez Barrios. "He belongs to another Mafia clan," said the source.

COMMENT: It's possible yet highly improbable that Salinas is not aware of the background of these men. Whatever the reason, these appointments do not augur well for us or for Mexico.

cc: AMB/O: AChacon
DEA: EHeath
NAU: RGoldberg
POL: AThoms
State ARA: JSt. Johns ✓
USIA AR: DHamill
RAS: MPalmer/ASepia-Bosch

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Donna M. DiPaolo, Senior Reviewer

SECRET

13-100

1 Q AND DID HE EXPRESS THAT ANGER TO YOU IN SOME FASHION?

2 A HE DID, UNTIL HE CHECKED THE TWO SYSTEMS AND FOUND OUT THAT
3 THAT WASN'T TRUE.

4 Q NOW, DURING THE PERIOD THAT YOU WERE LIVING IN THIS
5 RESIDENCE, WAS ERNESTO FONSECA ALSO LIVING THERE?

6 A YES, HE WAS.

7 Q DID HE MAINTAIN AN OFFICE THERE, AS WELL?

8 A YES. HE HAD AN OFFICE IN HIS HOUSE.

9 Q AND DID YOU PERFORM ANY NON-ELECTRONICS TYPE WORK FOR HIM
10 DURING THE PERIOD THAT YOU WERE LIVING AT HIS HOUSE?

11 A AS I CONSIDERED HIM TO BE A SUPERIOR OFFICER, I DID
12 ANYTHING THAT I WAS ORDERED BY HIM TO DO; BY HIM OR ANY OF THE
13 OTHER GOBERNACION --

14 THE COURT: YOU'VE ANSWERED THE QUESTION.

15 THE WITNESS: YES. THE ANSWER IS YES.

16 BY MR. [REDACTED]

17 Q WHY DID YOU CONSIDER HIM TO BE A SUPERIOR OFFICER? WHAT DO
18 YOU MEAN BY THAT?

19 A BECAUSE HE HAD A VALID I.P.S. INVESTIGATOR'S CREDENTIAL
20 FROM MEXICO CITY.

21 Q DID YOU SEE THAT?

22 A YES, I DID.

23 Q WHEN DID YOU SEE IT?

24 A I SAW IT IN THE FIRST -- LAST PART OF 1983.

25 Q WHAT WAS THE OCCASION?

13-20

1 Q. CAN I DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THAT AREA. WERE YOU ABLE
2 TO CONDUCT ANY TYPE OF AUTOPSY OR EXAMINATION AS TO POSSIBLE
3 HEAD INJURIES?

4 A. YES. THERE WERE CLEARLY OBVIOUS HEAD INJURIES IN THE FACE
5 REGION AND FRONT PART AND SIDES AND ON THE TOP OF THE HEAD.

6 I'LL BEGIN WITH THE FACE REGION. ON BOTH SIDES OF
7 THE FACE IN THE JAW REGION, ON THE RIGHT SIDE, THERE WERE TWO
8 FRACTURES THAT EXTENDED THROUGH THE BONE OF THE UPPER JAW.

9 THAT BONE IS CALLED THE MAXILLA, AND THERE WERE TWO
10 FRACTURE LINES THAT EXTENDED ALL THE WAY THROUGH THE JAW BONE,
11 UPPER JAW, THROUGH INTO WHERE THE TEETH ARE.

12 AND THESE TWO FRACTURE LINES ON THE RIGHT CONNECTED
13 WITH ADDITIONAL FRACTURE LINES IN THE ORBITAL BONES. NOW,
14 BEHIND THE EYES WE HAVE THIN BONES CALLED ORBITAL BONES, AND
15 THEY ALSO HAD MULTIPLE FRACTURES.

16 AND ADDITIONAL FRACTURE LINES EXTENDED UP THE RIGHT
17 FRONT PART OF THE HEAD ON BACK -- THE BONE IN FRONT IS CALLED
18 THE FRONTAL BONE, AND ON BACK TO THE SIDE, THE BONE CALLED THE
19 PARIETAL BONE.

20 LIKEWISE, ON THE LEFT SIDE THERE WAS A FRACTURE
21 THROUGH THE JAW, UPPER JAW AGAIN, THE LEFT MAXILLA. ONE
22 FRACTURE THIS TIME, NOT TWO. AND THAT, AGAIN, EXTENDED ALL THE
23 WAY THROUGH THAT BONE, THROUGH THE ORBITAL BONES BEHIND THE
24 EYE, AGAIN UP THROUGH THE LEFT FOREHEAD AND ON BACK TO THE
25 SIDE, THE LEFT SIDE OF THE HEAD.

13-21

1 THERE WAS A LARGE FRAGMENT OF THE SKULL MISSING SO
2 THERE WERE MULTIPLE FRACTURES ON THE TOP OF THE HEAD, IN
3 ADDITION. PLUS, THERE WAS AN OVAL DEFECT THAT RESEMBLED --
4 INITIALLY I THOUGHT IT WAS A GUNSHOT WOUND.

5 Q. DR. SPENCER, IN ESSENCE, MULTIPLE FRACTURES TO THE SKULL
6 AREA?

7 A. YES.

8 Q. NOW, THE FRACTURES -- WELL, THE UPPER CHEEK AGAIN IS
9 CALLED THE MAXILLA?

10 A. YES, IT IS. THE UPPER JAW IS CALLED MAXILLA,
11 M A X I L L A.

12 Q. NOW, THE FRACTURE THAT COMMENCED THERE, ARE YOU SAYING
13 EXTENDED BACK BEHIND THE EYES IN THE ORBITAL AREA?

14 A. YES.

15 Q. UP TOWARD THE TOP OF THE SKULL?

16 A. YES. THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO BLOWS THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED
17 THE FRACTURE TO THE RIGHT SIDE. OTHER THAN THAT, I DON'T KNOW
18 HOW MANY MORE WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE REMAINING FRACTURES.

19 Q. SO YOU'RE SAYING FRACTURES STARTING IN THE UPPER JAW OR
20 CHEEK, EXTENDING TO THE TOP OF THE HEAD?

21 A. YES.

22 ██████████: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. ASKED AND
23 ANSWERED.

24 THE COURT: OVERRULED.

25 ██████████: I DIDN'T HEAR YOUR ANSWER, SIR.

1 THE COURT: HE SAID "YES".

2 [REDACTED]: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

3 BY [REDACTED]:

4 Q. DR. SPENCER, REGARDING THESE FRACTURES TO THE CHEEK OR
5 MAXILLA BONE, DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA, SIR, OR ARE YOU ABLE TO
6 ASCERTAIN WHAT DEGREE OF FORCE IS NECESSARY TO INFLICT THAT
7 TYPE OF BREAK OR FRACTURE?

8 A. THE BONES OF THE MAXILLA OR UPPER JAW, AND THE BONES OF
9 THE FRONT PART OF THE HEAD AND TOP PART OF THE HEAD ARE QUITE
10 THICK, AND THEY WOULD REQUIRE SEVERE FORCE IN ORDER TO CAUSE
11 THOSE FRACTURES.

12 Q. ANY THOUGHTS OR OPINION AS TO WHAT TYPE OF FORCE OR WHAT
13 TYPE OF INSTRUMENT?

14 A. WELL, THE TYPE OF INSTRUMENT THAT WOULD USUALLY CAUSE THIS
15 TYPE OF INJURY WOULD BE A HEAVY -- RELATIVELY HEAVY, BLUNT
16 OBJECT THAT WOULD USUALLY BE SWUNG THROUGH AN ARC.

17 THAT IS, SOMEONE HOLDING THE OBJECT AND SWINGING IT
18 THROUGH AN ARC TO CAUSE THESE PARTICULAR INJURIES.

19 Q. TYPICALLY, SIR, ON THE BASIS OF YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH THESE
20 TYPES OF EXAMINATIONS, WOULD A BLOW TO THAT CHEEK WITH AS
21 CLOSED FIST BE SUFFICIENT FORCE?

22 A. THE FIST USUALLY WOULD NOT CAUSE THAT PARTICULAR INJURY TO
23 THE MAXILLA. IT MIGHT UP A LITTLE HIGHER WHERE THIS BONE GOES
24 ACROSS, BUT NOT FRACTURE ENTIRELY THROUGH THE MAXILLA ALL THE
25 WAY THROUGH INTO THE TEETH. A FIST WOULD USUALLY NOT DO THAT.

13-23

1 Q. IF NOT A FIST, HOW ABOUT THE USE OF A FOOT? A KICK?

2 A. A KICK POSSIBLY COULD CAUSE A FRACTURE. IT WOULD NOT
3 CAUSE THE FRACTURES OF THE FRONT PART OF THE HEAD OR THE TOP OF
4 THE HEAD, WHICH IS VERY THICK.

5 A KICK MAY CAUSE, FOR EXAMPLE, A FRACTURE TO THE SIDE
6 OF THE HEAD IN THE TEMPLE AREA, CLOSE TO THE EAR WHERE THE BONE
7 IS THINNER, BUT NOT ON TOP OF THE HEAD.

8 Q. AGAIN, ON THE BASIS OF YOUR EXPERIENCE, DR. SPENCER, DO
9 YOU HAVE ANY VIEWS OR OPINION AS TO WHAT TYPE OF BLUNT
10 INSTRUMENT MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TYPE OF BLUNT FORCE?

11 A. YES. IN MY EXPERIENCE, IT HAS BEEN A HEAVY, BLUNT OBJECT.
12 THINGS THAT COME TO MIND ARE AN IRON PIPE, A TIRE IRON,
13 SOMETHING THAT IS HEAVY AND FAIRLY HEAVY THAT CAN BE SWUNG
14 EASILY THROUGH AN ARC.

15 A. NOW, IF I COULD TAKE YOU TO THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE
16 SKULL OTHER THAN THE CHEEKS OR MAXILLA. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE
17 TYPE OF FRACTURE, IF ANY, THAT CHARACTERIZED THE REMAINING PART
18 OF THE SKULL?

19 A. WELL, THERE WERE EXTENSIVE FRACTURES, AGAIN AND BOTH
20 SIDES, EXTENDING AGAIN FROM THE FRONT PART ON BACK ACROSS THE
21 SIDE OF THE UPPER PART OF THE SKULL, CALLED THE PARIETAL BONE
22 ON BOTH SIDES.

23 AND THEY WERE FAIRLY LONG. I CAN'T REMEMBER EXACTLY
24 HOW LONG, BUT VERY EXTENSIVE, PLUS A SEGMENT OF THE SKULL WAS
25 MISSING.

13-24

1 Q. NOW, I BELIEVE YOU'VE INDICATED EARLIER THAT THERE WAS
2 ANOTHER TYPE OF DEFECT THAT YOU INITIALLY THOUGHT WAS A GUNSHOT
3 WOUND. COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT, PLEASE?

4 A. YES. WHEN I STARTED MY EXAMINATION AND LOOKED AT THE HEAD
5 INJURIES BEFORE GOING ON TO THE REST OF THE BODY, THERE WAS A
6 DEFECT IN THE TOP LEFT PART OF THE HEAD, JUST TO THE LEFT OF
7 THE MIDPORTION OF THE HEAD, LOCATED IN WHAT IS CALLED THE LEFT
8 PARIETAL BONE.

9 IT WAS AN OVAL TO ROUND DEFECT THAT LOOKED JUST LIKE
10 A GUNSHOT WOUND LOOKS LIKE. AND THAT WAS MY INITIAL
11 IMPRESSION, AND THEN WHEN I CAME BACK, I PAID A LOT OF
12 ATTENTION TO THAT WHEN I CAME BACK TO THE HEAD INJURIES.

13 Q. NOW, THIS IS A MISSING PIECE OF BONE?

14 A. NO, IT WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT. THE MISSING PART OF BONE WAS
15 ON THE RIGHT SIDE, AS I RECALL. THIS WAS ON THE LEFT SIDE. IT
16 WAS JUST TO THE LEFT OF THE MIDLINE, AN OVAL DEFECT THAT LOOKED
17 VERY SIMILAR TO A GUNSHOT WOUND.

18 I THINK THAT CAN BE BEST CHARACTERIZED IN THINKING OF
19 A PANE OF GLASS. YOU HAVE AN OUTSIDE AND AN INSIDE; JUST LIKE
20 ON THE SKULL THERE IS AN OUTSIDE AND INSIDE. AND YOU MAY HAVE
21 SEEN WHERE A BULLET OR SOME OBJECT HAS GONE THROUGH A
22 WINDSHIELD OF A CAR AND YOU HAVE A CIRCULAR DEFECT, AND LITTLE
23 PIECES OF GLASS HAVE CHIPPED OFF SO IT IS A LARGER DEFECT FROM
24 THE INSIDE.

25 AND YOU SEE THE SAME THING IN A SKULL WHEN THE BULLET

13-25

1 GOES THROUGH THE SKULL. THERE IS A DEFECT, CIRCULAR DEFECT,
2 USUALLY ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE SKULL, AND THEN A LARGER
3 CRATER-LIKE DEFECT ON THE INSIDE.

4 Q. LET ME STOP YOU THERE. THIS INJURY OR WOUND, IS THERE A
5 SPECIFIC TERM OR DESCRIPTION USED TO IDENTIFY THAT TYPE OF
6 PHENOMENON OR MANIFESTATION?

7 A. I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND.

8 Q. LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH A TERM
9 THAT IS CALLED BEVELING?

10 A. OH, YES. BEVELING IS ANOTHER TERM WE USE TO DESCRIBE THE
11 FACT THAT THERE IS A LARGER AREA INSIDE, WHERE A BULLET HAS
12 GONE THROUGH; THAT IS, A LARGER AREA ON THE INSIDE, THE
13 CRATER-LIKE DEFECT ON THE INSIDE AS OPPOSED TO THE OUTSIDE.

14 THIS PARTICULAR DEFECT HAD INTERNAL BEVELING, IT ALSO
15 HAD A SMALL AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL BEVELING; THAT IS, AREAS ON THE
16 OUTSIDE OF THE SKULL WHERE PIECES OF BONE WERE CHIPPED OFF.

17 [REDACTED]: MAY I HAVE JUST ONE MOMENT, YOUR HONOR.

18 (BRIEF PAUSE.)

19 BY MR. [REDACTED]

20 Q. IS IT A FAIR STATEMENT, DR. SPENCER, THAT OVERALL, TO
21 CHARACTERIZE THE SKULL, IT CONSISTED OF MULTIPLE FRACTURES?

22 A. YES.

23 Q. NOW, IN ADDITION TO THE -- STRIKE THAT.

24 YOU USED YOUR ANALOGY OF A WINDSHIELD AND A BULLET
25 GOING THROUGH IT.

1 A. YES.

2 Q. NOW, IF COULD YOU VISUALIZE THAT, AND IF THAT BULLET GOES
3 THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD, IS THE GLASS THAT STILL REMAINS ON THE
4 INSIDE THE INTERNAL BEVELING THAT YOU ARE DESCRIBING FOR US?

5 A. YES, IT IS.

6 Q. IN ADDITION TO THE INTERNAL BEVELING, THERE WAS THE
7 EXTERNAL BEVELING, AS WELL?

8 A. YES. THERE WAS A CRATER ON THE INSIDE. THE INTERNAL
9 BEVELING WAS, AS I RECALL, ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS BY THREE-FOURTHS
10 OF AN INCH.

11 AND THERE WERE ALSO CHIPS OF BONE MISSING FROM THE
12 OUTSIDE SURFACE OF THE SKULL, WHICH IS A LITTLE UNUSUAL FOR A
13 BULLET WOUND AND REALLY STARTED ME THINKING MAYBE THIS IS NOT
14 AN INJURY CAUSED BY A BULLET.

15 Q. BECAUSE OF THE EXTERNAL BEVELING?

16 A. YES. I'VE SEEN THAT A COUPLE OF TIMES, THAT IS, BOTH
17 INTERNAL BEVELING AND LITTLE PIECES OF BONE CHIPPED OFF WITH A
18 A CONTACT GUNSHOT WOUND, BUT IT IS UNUSUAL.

19 AND BECAUSE IT WAS UNUSUAL, I DID SOME FURTHER
20 STUDIES TO MAKE SURE THAT IT WAS NOT A GUNSHOT WOUND.

21 Q. WHY DON'T YOU ELABORATE ON THAT NOW. WHAT ELSE DID YOU DO
22 TO SATISFY YOURSELF?

23 A. THE FIRST THING I WANTED TO DO, WHENEVER THERE IS A
24 POSSIBILITY OF A GUNSHOT WOUND, YOU WANT TO RECOVER THE BULLET.

25 AND THE LOCATION OF THE DEFECT WAS SUCH THAT IF IT

13-27

1 WAS A BULLET THAT CAUSED THE DEFECT, IT COULD HAVE GONE RIGHT
2 STRAIGHT DOWN THE SPINAL CANAL WHETHER THE SPINAL CORD IS
3 LOCATED. AND I REALLY NEEDED AN X-RAY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR
4 NOT THERE WAS A BULLET IN THE BODY.

5 AND I ASKED IF I COULD GET AN X-RAY WHILE I WAS AT
6 THE CITY HOSPITAL IN GUADALAJARA.

7 Q. WAS ONE AVAILABLE FOR YOU THERE?

8 A. NO. THEY TOLD ME THERE WAS NO X-RAY MACHINES AVAILABLE,
9 SO I THEN RECOMMENDED THAT WHEN THE BODY WAS TRANSPORTED BACK
10 TO -- OR TRANSPORTED TO SAN DIEGO, THAT I BE ALLOWED TO
11 TRANSPORT THE BODY TO THE NAVAL HOSPITAL AT SAN DIEGO, WHERE I
12 TRAINED, TO GET X-RAYS AND MAKE SURE THERE WAS NO BULLET THERE,
13 AND THAT RECOMMENDATION WAS ACCEPTED.

14 Q. DID YOU, IN FACT, LATER X-RAY THESE REMAINS IN A HOSPITAL
15 IN SAN DIEGO?

16 A. YES. THE BODY WAS TRANSPORTED FROM GUADALAJARA TO SAN
17 DIEGO IS THE NEXT DAY, AND AFTER A MEMORIAL SERVICE AT NORTH
18 ISLAND NAVAL AIR STATION, WE IMMEDIATELY TRANSPORTED THE BODY
19 TO THE NAVAL HOSPITAL AT SAN DIEGO.

20 I HAD MADE PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS. TOTAL BODY X-RAYS
21 WERE TAKEN AT THAT TIME. NO BULLET WAS FOUND, NO ADDITIONAL
22 FRACTURES OTHER THAN THE FRACTURES OF THE SKULL, MAXILLA, AND
23 THE RIB FRACTURES I ALREADY MENTIONED WERE IDENTIFIED ALSO.

24 OTHER STUDIES I DID WAS THERE WAS SOME SCALP TISSUE
25 THAT HAD NO POWDER RESIDUE. I TOOK SECTIONS OF THAT AND LOOKED

13-28

1 AT THE SCALP TISSUE UNDER A MICROSCOPE AND FOUND NO SCALP
2 TISSUE.

3 PLUS, I ALSO USED A SOPHISTICATED DEVICE CALLED
4 SCANNING ELECTRON MICROSCOPY TO LOOK FOR METAL FRAGMENTS, AND
5 ALSO THERE WAS NO METAL PRESENT. SO I CONCLUDED AFTER THOSE
6 ADDITIONAL STUDIES THAT IT WAS NOT A GUNSHOT WOUND.

7 IN FACT, THE INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY A RELATIVELY
8 NARROW OBJECT BEING FORCED THROUGH THE SKULL INTO THE HEAD, NOT
9 A BULLET.

10 Q. AND THEN WITHDRAWN?

11 A. AND THEN WITHDRAWN. THAT WOULD FIT BECAUSE THE OBJECT
12 WOULD CAUSE THE INTERNAL LEVELING AS IT WENT IN, CHIPPING
13 LITTLE PIECES OF THE BONE OFF, AND THEN AS ITS WITHDRAWN, WOULD
14 DRAG OUT PIECES OF BONE ON THE OUTSIDE OFF. SO SOME OBJECT WAS
15 DRIVEN INTO THE HEAD AND THEN WITHDRAWN.

16 Q. THAT WOULD EXPLAIN BOTH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BEVELING
17 TO THAT INJURY?

18 A. YES, THAT WOULD BE THE EXPLANATION.

19 Q. GIVE US AGAIN THE SIZE OR DIMENSIONS OF THIS TYPE OF
20 INJURY THAT YOU WERE OBSERVING?

21 A. THE INJURY, AS I RECALL, WAS ABOUT THREE-EIGHTHS INCH BY
22 THREE-EIGHTHS INCH OR .375 BY .375 INCHES. IT IS ABOUT THE
23 SAME SIZE OF A .38 CALIBER BULLET. THAT'S WHY I WAS
24 PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT <AB> A GUNSHOT WOUND.

25 Q. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR EXPERIENCE, SIR, DO YOU HAVE ANY VIEW

13-29

1 OR OPINION OF WHAT TYPE OF OBJECT COULD CREATE THAT TYPE OF
2 THREE-EIGHTHS-BY-THREE-EIGHTHS INCH HOLE?

3 A. AGAIN, IT WOULD BE A FAIRLY NARROW CIRCULAR TO OVAL
4 OBJECT. I'VE SEEN THAT TYPE OF INJURY WHERE SOMEONE HAS BEEN
5 STABBED WITH A PHILLIPS SCREWDRIVER.

6 I HAVE SEEN SOMETHING SIMILAR WHERE ONE WAS STABBED
7 WITH A STILETTO KNIFE, BUT NOT QUITE THAT CIRCULAR. I HAVE
8 SEEN IT WITH A PHILLIPS SCREWDRIVER.

9 Q. I BELIEVE YOU MIGHT HAVE ANSWERED THIS, DR. SPENCER, BUT
10 DID YOU OR DID YOU NOT CHECK FOR ANY GUN POWDER RESIDUE IN THAT
11 HOLE AREA?

12 A. YES. I DIDN'T SEE ANY VISUALLY, BUT I TOOK SOME TISSUE
13 WITH ME BACK TO WASHINGTON AND SUBMITTED THAT TO MICROSCOPIC
14 EXAMINATION, AND THERE WAS NO GUN POWDER RESIDUE.

15 AND ALSO I DID WHAT I REFERRED TO THE SCANNING
16 ELECTRON MICROSCOPY, AND NO POWDER RESIDUE WAS IDENTIFIED.

17 Q. DR. SPENCER, IN YOUR OPINION WHAT WAS THE CAUSE OF DEATH
18 THEN OF THE REMAINS OF THE BODY THAT YOU EXAMINED?

19 A. THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS MULTIPLE BLUNT FORCE INJURIES IN
20 THE FORM OF FRACTURES OF THE SKULL, PLUS A PENETRATING INJURY
21 OF THE SKULL.

22 Q. IS THAT PENETRATING INJURY EVER ALSO REFERRED TO AS A
23 PERFORATED INJURY?

24 A. PENETRATING IS MORE ACCURATE.

25 PENETRATING SIMPLY MEANS IT WENT IN, AND THAT IS LIKE -- A

ACTION WHA-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CA-00 CG-00 CIAE-00
COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00 DEAE-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00
DS-00 EB-00 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 JUSE-00 L-00 CAC-00 VCE-00 AC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OCS-00 OIC-00 OMB-00 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 DOHS-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-00 SVC-00 TRSE-00 T-00 ASDS-00 IIP-00 PMB-00
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DHS AND DOJ PLEASE PASS RELEVANT OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE ON THE
BORDER

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS HCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2015

TAGS: ASEC, CASC, EAIR, KCRM, MOPS, MX, PBTS, PGOV, SNAR

SUBJECT: MEXICO - VIOLENCE CONTINUES

REF: A. MEXICO 3774

B. MEXICO 3734

C. NUEVO LAREDO 250

D. NUEVO LAREDO 251

E. MONTERREY 625

Classified By: Acting DCM James T. Heg; Reason 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph
thirteen.

Summary (U)

2. (C) Gunmen shot and killed a Mexico City Airport
security official June 16. We expect he will not be the last
police official killed here this year. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Fox Administration has

B1

Mexican officials resent U.S. statements lamenting corruption in Mexican law enforcement agencies, but the Presidency is setting a moderate and cooperative tone. Mexican officials want increased U.S. efforts to help them interdict weapons illegally imported into Mexico from the United States. We ask U.S. officials participating in the June 21-22 North American Aviation Trilateral to query Mexico's Director General of Civil Aviation about recent developments at the airport. Early next week we will present proposals for next steps in our effort to help the Fox administration address this wave of violence. We think we can identify concrete, bounded, and fiscally responsible proposals for cooperation that can help Mexico, and promote U.S. interests here. End summary.

Airport Official Murdered (U)

3. (U) Gunmen shot Pedro Madrigal Trejo, head of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) security unit at Mexico City airport, outside his Mexico City home on June 16. He died later the same day. He was the sixty-second Mexican Federal law enforcement official murdered in 2005. Madrigal, 39, had come to Mexico City from Tijuana last November and was in charge of the PFP's airport unit when it seized 289 kilograms of cocaine June 1, far and away Mexico's largest airport seizure this year. So far, Mexican law enforcement officials tell us they have no leads, although President Vicente Fox's spokesman, Ruben Aguilar, told the Mexican press June 17, "The investigation has revealed a relationship between the ... extreme effectiveness of this official against organized crime and his killing." Madrigal's position at the airport made him a contact of Mission officials and the Transportation Security Administration. He was the second airport official killed in the last nine months. The airport's Deputy Customs Administrator, Jose Noe Garduno Fernandez, was kidnapped and killed on September 2, 2004. Police arrested the three kidnappers and killers in that case, but the investigation petered out with no significant leads regarding the people who ordered Garduno's killing. The Mission's Immigration and Customs Enforcement office

B1

A Wave of Police Killings (U)

5. (U) Madrigal's murder is only one in a wave of recent police killings. We have reported previously on the June 8 murder of Nuevo Laredo Public Safety Director Alejandro Dominguez Coello (REFs A - D). Here are a few others. On June 13, shooters killed the "Special Groups" coordinator of the Ciudad Juarez municipal police and severely injured the head of the city's preventive police unit. Two Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) agents died in a Mexico City gunfight June 11. A group of seven heavily-armed men attacked the City of Chihuahua Central Clinic June 8, murdering AFI Officer Victor Hugo Estrada Gutierrez in his hospital bed and two former Chihuahua State police officers in the room with Estrada at the time of the attack. Estrada was hospitalized June 5 after a previous attack on his life.

Where Operation Secure Mexico Will Go Next (U)

6. (SBU) Dominguez Coello's murder prompted Mexican federal authorities to roll out Operation Secure Mexico, an attempt to use Mexican Federal resources to bring order to a number of increasingly lawless cities, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border (REF A). Madrigal's murder increases pressure to extend the operation to Mexico City. So far, perhaps in a sign of the effort's inevitable politicization, the Fox administration's public position has been that Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador would have to ask the Federal authorities to intervene. Notwithstanding such posturing, we understand that the federal authorities plan to extend their activities to Veracruz and some of the more violent parts of Mexico City, probably to include the District of Iztapalapa.

Developments in Nuevo Laredo and Elsewhere (U)

7. (U) As we have previously reported, less than a hour after a group of AFI agents arrived in Nuevo Laredo June 11 to take up their new Operation Secure Mexico duties, they found

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themselves in a standoff with Municipal police in which the locals shot and severely wounded one AFI officer, Feliciano Campos Sanchez. So far, Mexican authorities have effectively removed the Nuevo Laredo police force from the city's streets, federalizing local law enforcement with a promise to vet every member of the local force and clean out the corruption and the rot. The Office of the Mexican Prosecutor General (PGR) took all 41 Municipal officers involved into custody, flew them to Mexico City, and have already determined that 13 of the 41 had prior criminal records. Federal authorities have since made it clear that they are in Nuevo Laredo indefinitely, with no announced date for their departure.

8. (U) While the Federal authorities have taken effective control of Nuevo Laredo; in other areas they are supporting and sometimes supplanting local and state authorities, setting up roadblocks on major highways and on the Mexican approaches to ports of entry such as Otay Mesa, California. Drug arrests are up, as are arrests of alien smugglers and detentions of foreigners on customs and immigration violations.

A Positive: Arresting Chapo's Brother (U)

9. (U) On June 15, the Secretariat of National Defense announced the arrest of Miguel Angel Guzman Loera, in Culiacan, Sinaloa, under authority of a Federal warrant. Guzman is the brother of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Mexico's most-wanted narcotics trafficker. The arrest occurred without incident and Miguel Angel is now in PGR custody in Mexico City.

So Far From God (U)

10. (SBU) When Mexican officials perceive U.S. officials standing in judgment over them, their skins can get awfully thin. Mexican authorities reacted badly, for example, to congressional testimony June 12 by DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Anthony Placido. Placido told Congress that, "The single largest impediment to seriously impacting the drug trafficking problem in Mexico is corruption," and that "law enforcement in Mexico is all too often part of the problem rather than part of the solution." He called this, "particularly true at the municipal and state levels of government." While he acknowledged that, "DEA has highly productive, long-standing relationships with a number of key GOM counterparts," praising the "individual courage, personal integrity, and dedication" of these officials. Mexican officials, particularly Foreign Secretary Luis

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Ernesto Derbez, heard only the criticism. Derbez told the Mexican press June 14, "We are not worried nor interested about his opinion, which is wrong, and what we have to do is be clear that this gentleman has no reason to be talking this nonsense." The Mexican Presidency, more subtly, perhaps, simply cited the testimony that same day by Director of Office of National Drug Control Policy John Walters to the effect that U.S. officials are proud to stand with the Fox Administration in the fight against drug trafficking.

The Secretary's Comments on Mexico; Mexican Interest in Firearms Interdiction (U)

11. (U) On June 16, Secretary Rice fielded a press question about violence along the border. She noted that we have raised the issue at the highest levels of the Mexican Government and added, "We are getting cooperation but it is a very serious matter." Even this sort of commentary often raises hackles in Mexico, but the Mexican presidency has reacted constructively, simply emphasizing that security along the border remains a shared responsibility. The firmest request that Mexican authorities have gone public with in recent days has been for increased U.S. efforts along the border to help Mexican authorities interdict weapons illegally imported into Mexico from the United States.

Security for the Mission (U)

B1

Aviation Talks (U)

13. (C) On June 21-22, officials from the Mexican Secretariat for Communications and Transport (SCT) will participate in a meeting of the North American Aviation Trilateral (NAAT) in Annapolis, Maryland. On the margins of the meeting, we recommend that U.S. government officials pull aside the SCT Director General of Civil Aviation, Gilberto Lopez Meyer only, and ask him about recent developments at the airport.

14. (SBU) Suggested talking points for Lopez Meyer:

-- (SBU) The murders of Pedro Madrigal Trejo and Jose Noe Garduno Fernandez must worry Mexican Civil Aviation authorities. We worry that such violence could degrade security at Mexico's airports. What do you think? Will security officials hesitate to do their jobs, worried about retaliation by narcotics traffickers? We have noted some unease among contacts in the aviation industry. They worry that that the violence may reduce inbound air travel to Mexico. We worry that it may pose a threat to U.S. citizens flying to or through Mexico.

-- (SBU) What assistance, if any, can U.S. government agencies provide you to help push traffickers, and the violence, out of your airports?

-- (SBU) What steps are you taking to put an end to this violence and to protect airport security officials who work against the interests of drug traffickers, money launderers, alien smugglers, and arms traffickers?

What We Can Do U)

15. (C) We will meet June 20 to consider recommendations for next steps in our effort to help the Fox administration address this wave of violence

B1

[REDACTED] we do think we can identify concrete, bounded, and fiscally responsible proposals for cooperation that can help Mexico, and promote U.S. interests here. We will present these proposals SEPTEL.

Comment (U)

16. (C) [REDACTED] B1

[REDACTED] We also think it likely that this wave of violence will continue, and we doubt that Madrigal will be the last public official cut down.

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<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity>

GARZA

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NOTE: DROPPED
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1 and he explained to me that he wanted me to put up my face
2 with these people with the government.

3 Q Approximately when were you having this conversation with
4 Arturo?

5 A Well, it was probably around 2003, during Fox's
6 administration.

7 Q Where were you having this conversation?

8 A In Cuernavaca.

9 Q Can you tell us how it went?

10 A Well, he offered me work, and I told him, well, Arturo, I
11 already have connections to the government, but my connections
12 are not at your level, they are at the level of the Yankees.
13 So not what you need.

14 Q How did he respond?

15 A He told me, don't worry, I already have connections in
16 the highest levels and with all governmental entities. And so
17 I told Arturo, okay, so give me an example. And he said,
18 well, for example, I have connections with Compate [phonetic],
19 with the G friend. And so I told Arturo, I'm like, so are you
20 talking about Genaro Garcia Luna or who? He said, exactly.
21 And he said, well, those are the kind of people at that level
22 that I want for you to go see on my behalf so that we can have
23 arrangements for the cartel.

24 Q Did you take his offer?

25 A No. I told him I couldn't do that.

1 Q So you didn't take Arturo's job offer?

2 A No, no. I didn't accept it.

3 Q Do you know who served in that position for Arturo?

4 A Well, at this time, he had a person by the name Roberto
5 who was part of the attorney general's office. And some time
6 later, a young man by the name of Borrado, who was also my
7 friend, he then took over that position, as well.

8 Q Did you speak with Borrado about Arturo's payments to the
9 defendant?

10 A Yes.

11 Q What did he tell you?

12 A Well, he told me that they were paying about \$1.5 million
13 per month.

14 Q Did you have an understanding of whether Chapo and Mayo
15 were making payments along with Arturo to the defendant at
16 that time?

17 A Well, yes, because they were the same team. They worked
18 together.

19 Q What was the relationship like between Chapo, Mayo, and
20 Arturo in these early years, 2000 to 2006?

21 A Well, a very good one. They were partners, they were a
22 family, Arturo and Chapo, they were cousins.

23 Q And what was the Sinaloa Cartel like in these early
24 years, in the early 2000s?

25 A Well, it started gaining strength every single day by

1 day. In this six-year term, it became stronger.

2 Q Can you explain how it became stronger?

3 A Well, as the cartel became more powerful because of the
4 connections they had in the different governmental
5 institutions, this was known then by the Colombians who then
6 became more trusting of our work, and so they started sending
7 us smaller quantities repeatedly or larger quantities because
8 they knew that there was security.

9 Q Were your government arrangements things that were
10 explicitly discussed with your contract arrangements with the
11 Colombians?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Can you explain that?

14 A Well, when you start discussing negotiations for
15 commercial deal with the Colombians, they would then bring the
16 coke, we would import it, and we would discuss whether they
17 had certain safety measures in their own country, right. And
18 then, of course, they would ask us the same questions, and we
19 would have to tell them the reality that we were living. At
20 the time, we had a very efficient control with the government
21 and us, so that we could actually work.

22 Q Now, you said that the Sinaloa Cartel was growing
23 stronger in the early 2000s. How, if at all, did its
24 territorial control change?

25 A Oh, well, it was infamous. They started working in

1 if I am not there, just go and talk to Oscar Paredes, my
2 compadre, if I'm not there. Because he's always going to be
3 there watching out for things to come out right, and also
4 watching out for you.

5 Q Did you know the details of all of your brother's
6 arrangements with the high-levels of government?

7 A Well, yes.

8 Q Were you personally present for all of the meetings that
9 the lawyer, Oscar Paredes, had with officials?

10 A No, I had it in the sense that I was the person who would
11 give the attorney the money for him to make the payments, in
12 that sense.

13 Q Were there times when were personally involved in some of
14 the interactions between the attorney, Oscar Paredes, and
15 high-level government officials?

16 A Well, yes.

17 Q Were there times that you were personally involved in the
18 arrangements with the defendant Genaro Garcia Luna?

19 A Yes.

20 Q When?

21 A At the end of 2006, which is I believe when Fox's
22 administration was coming to an end, if I'm not mistaken.

23 Q What happened?

24 A The attorney, he told me he needed to talk to me.

25 Q Did you talk to him?

1 A We talked. And he told me, look, there is a possibility
2 that I might have a meeting with Genaro Garcia Luna. And he
3 said to have a chance to talk to him, because I have it from a
4 good, real, truthful source that he will become the federal
5 secretariate for public security in the government. And I
6 want to talk to him so we can make sure that he's going to
7 provide protection to your brother to my compadre.

8 Q How did you respond?

9 A I told him, well, what do I need to do to help you out?

10 Q What did he say?

11 A He told me, look, we have to give him \$3 million just to
12 talk to him, he said.

13 Q What did do you next?

14 A I said, go ahead, attorney. I have the money, I'll give
15 it to you, just go ahead and do what you need to do.

16 Q What happened next?

17 A He said, okay, I'm going to make the appointment and I
18 will let you know so we can have the meeting. I told him,
19 look, attorney, the only thing I request from you is that you
20 have the appointment at a place where I can see the person
21 that you will be giving the money to.

22 Q Did the appointment occur?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Where was it scheduled to be?

25 A He scheduled the meeting at a restaurant that is called

1 Champs Elysees.

2 Q What did you do to prepare for the meeting?

3 A The day came. I told him, okay, let's meet up at my
4 house that's where I have the money. It was placed in a
5 briefcase, like those that attorneys have but much wider with
6 larger capacity. And also in a bag, one of those that sports
7 people use, that are very wide.

8 Q You said it was placed, did you help place the money?

9 A Yes, of course.

10 Q After you packed the money, what happened to it?

11 A I told him, okay, attorney, we'll meet at the restaurant.
12 I will arrive first, and you get there to meet up whenever you
13 get there. And I will wait for that person who is going to
14 arrive for you to deliver the money, and for him to leave.

15 Q Did you go to the restaurant first?

16 A Yes.

17 Q Where did you sit?

18 A Downstairs, there is some sort of bar and some tables
19 there as well.

20 Q Who entered the restaurant next?

21 A The attorney.

22 Q Did he bring anything?

23 A Yes, the briefcase and the bag.

24 Q Where did he go in the restaurant?

25 A He got on the elevator. He went out to a private room

1 that there is at the restaurant on the second floor.

2 Q What did you see next?

3 A About 15 minutes later I saw Genaro Garcia Luna come in
4 with two other colleagues.

5 Q How did you know that was Genaro Garcia Luna?

6 A I might have seen him a couple times on TV.

7 Q What happened next?

8 A He went up, and about 15 to 20 minutes later he came down
9 with the same people that he had gotten upstairs with, each
10 one of those people was carrying, one the briefcase, the other
11 the bag, then they left.

12 Q Did you speak with the attorney, Oscar Paredes, after
13 this meeting?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Did he tell you what happened in the meeting?

16 A Yes.

17 Q What happened?

18 A Well, he told me that he had talked to him and that he
19 had said that there was no problem with my brother, that he
20 would make sure that he didn't have any direct persecutions
21 and no investigations. And that he was going to allow him to
22 work, to work as is. He said he already had a commitment with
23 the Beltran Leyva brothers, that's as much as he could do for
24 him.

25 Q To be clear, when you refer to "he," who said he would

1 protect your brother make sure there is no investigations,
2 allow him to operate freely? Who is the "he" you're referring
3 to?

4 A Genaro Garcia Luna.

5 Q Did the attorney, Oscar Paredes, say anything else?

6 A He told me that there was another appointment, that he
7 had agreed to meeting him again.

8 Q Did another appointment occur?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Approximately when?

11 A Maybe about three weeks later.

12 Q Where was the second meeting?

13 A It was at the same place.

14 Q How did you prepare for the second meeting?

15 A For that meeting he told me that we needed to deliver
16 \$2 million.

17 Q Did you help prepare the money?

18 A Yes.

19 Q How?

20 A It was placed in a sports bag, one like those that sports
21 people use, like a really wide one.

22 Q You said it was placed, did you help place it there?

23 A Yes, of course.

24 Q What happened to the money after you packed it?

25 A We headed once again back to the restaurant. I, once

1 again, got there first.

2 Q What happened after you got there?

3 A I saw him come in.

4 Q Who?

5 A Oscar Paredes.

6 Q Where did he go in the restaurant?

7 A He went to the same private room where he had been at the
8 first time.

9 Q What happened next?

10 A I was waiting downstairs drinking like a glass of water
11 waiting for Genaro to arrive. And the attorney called me and
12 he said, can you come up, I want to talk to you about
13 something.

14 Q Did you go up?

15 A Yes, I went up. And I said, what is going on, attorney?
16 He is, like, well, no there is about 20 minutes or so before
17 this person arrives, and I wanted to tell you something. And
18 we were talking when there was a knock on the door.

19 Q Who was at the door?

20 A Genaro Garcia Luna showed up. I was very surprised.
21 Attorney was very surprised, he was also very surprised.

22 Q Why were you surprised?

23 A Well, to start with, I didn't want him to see me. Even
24 though the attorney told him he's my co-worker, he's an
25 attorney. He said, nice to meet you, nice to meet you. I

1 said, nice to meet you, sir. And I told the attorney,
2 attorney, nice to see you. Excuse me, I'm going to leave.
3 And I got out and left.

4 Q Why did you leave?

5 A Because I was not interested in him knowing me. I didn't
6 want him to know who I was.

7 Q Why didn't you want him to know who you were when you
8 were paying him millions of dollars?

9 A Well, because out of precautions. I didn't want for him
10 to start an investigation into me. I didn't want him to know
11 who I was. I didn't want for my picture to show up in the
12 pictures and for me to become the most wanted person. I
13 really didn't want any problems whatsoever, and that's the
14 reason why.

15 THE COURT: [REDACTED], good time for a break?

16 [REDACTED]: Sure.

17 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, morning break,
18 fifteen minutes. Please come back at five after 11. Don't
19 talk about the case. See you in a few minutes.

20 (Jury exits the courtroom.)

21 THE COURT: Recess, 15 minutes.

22 (Whereupon, the witness steps down.)

23 (Brief recess.)

24 (Whereupon, the witness resumes the stand.)

25 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All Rise.

1 THE COURT: Let's take the witness off the stand for
2 a minute. Everyone be seated.

3 (Whereupon, the witness steps down.)

4 THE COURT: The jurors are frustrated because,
5 apparently, they are not being paid currently or at least some
6 of them are not. And they consider that a big deal. And they
7 said to Mr. Scott, this may affect our decision-making in the
8 case. I'm passing that on to you.

9 I don't know what is going on. I don't know why
10 they are not being paid. I'm going to tell them now to calm
11 down. I'm going to look into it and we'll find a way to solve
12 this problem quickly.

13 Any other suggestions?

14 MR. [REDACTED]: Just to be clear, you mean they are
15 not getting paid by the court, you mean the juror fee?

16 THE COURT: It's not by the employers, it's by the
17 court. I can do something about that.

18 MR. [REDACTED]: That's fine with us.

19 MS. [REDACTED]: Obviously, this very concerning,
20 your Honor, if they say it's going to affect their
21 decision-making in their case.

22 THE COURT: I think they are leveraging. They are
23 saying we got to get paid.

24 MS. [REDACTED]: Brainstorming, your Honor.

25 Yes, your Honor, I guess at an appropriate time, we

1 defer to the Court on when, we would obviously ask that it not
2 be taken out against either party. I suppose your insurance
3 that you'll look into it will be enough for now.

4 THE COURT: Okay. Let's have the witness back and
5 then the jury, please.

6 Should I address this with the jury before we get
7 the witness back?

8 MS. [REDACTED]: Yes, your Honor, we would prefer
9 that.

10 THE COURT: Anybody have a problem with me talking
11 to the jury directly during the lunch break and getting my own
12 first-hand view of what the problem is?

13 MS. [REDACTED]: No objection.

14 MR. [REDACTED]: No objection.

15 (Jury enters the courtroom.)

16 THE COURT: Everyone be seated.

17 Ladies and gentlemen, I've heard for the first time,
18 that some or all of you are having a problem getting timely
19 paid. That's news to me. It is obviously totally
20 unacceptable. I'm going to look into it during the lunch hour
21 and I'm going to get it fixed. I assure you. I don't know
22 why it's happening; I've never had it happening before.

23 Obviously it's not the fault of the parties who have
24 nothing to do with it it's the fault of the court. But I will
25 get an answer, then I'll let you know what the answer is and

1 we will get this fixed. This is not supposed to happen.

2 Let's have the witness back.

3 (Whereupon, the witness resumes the stand.)

4 THE COURT: Please continue.

5 MS. [REDACTED] Thank you, Judge.

6 BY MS. [REDACTED]:

7 Q Mr. Zambada Garcia, when we left off you were telling us
8 that you saw Mr. Garcia Luna come into the private room and
9 you left shortly afterwards. When you left that private room,
10 was the bag with the money still in that room?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Did you speak with the attorney, Oscar Paredes, after
13 this meeting?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Did he tell you what happened in the meeting?

16 A Yes.

17 Q What happened?

18 A Well, he basically told me that he had told him the same
19 thing, again that he was going to provide protection to my
20 brother, he's not going to bother him. He was going to let
21 him keep on working, just as he had been, no problem. And he
22 was going to help us, in case any people had to be moved
23 around, and once they were set up where we wanted they could
24 stay there -- they would stay there for as long as we wanted
25 them to. That was what he could help with because he had

1 other arrangements as well.

2 Q When Oscar Paredes told you about Garcia Luna's reference
3 to other arrangements, what did you understand that to mean?

4 A Well, it's what I referred to before, that he had
5 commitments with the Beltran Leyvas.

6 Q At this time, in the history of the Sinaloa cartel is
7 this when there are tensions growing between the Beltran's
8 side of the cartel and your brother Mayo and Chapo's side?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Did you have an understanding from your conversation
11 about whether the defendant was taking sides?

12 A Well, both, but he had more of a commitment to the
13 Beltran's.

14 Q You mentioned that one form of help would be placing
15 people. What do you mean by that?

16 A Well, there were times when you would need a Yankee
17 commander to be put in a particular plaza, somebody you
18 trusted. And that kind of a favor, in order for it to happen,
19 you had to ask high-ranking government officials for that.

20 Q Had you or your brother asked for someone to be placed in
21 Sinaloa recently?

22 A Slightly before then. We had asked Oscar to help us to
23 situate commander Vigueras in Sinaloa. And then that is what
24 happened, that is exactly what happened. He was sent to
25 Sinaloa, that's what the attorney told me. He said there is

1 not going to be any problem with that. He said he will help
2 us with that, that's what he told me.

3 Q The money that you took for the defendant Genaro Garcia
4 Luna at these two meetings, where did that money come from?

5 A Well, they were dollars from here, from the United
6 States.

7 Q What were they the proceeds of?

8 A Well, I was in the business of selling cocaine in Mexico
9 in dollars, so it was profits from that.

10 Q Let's talk a little more about this restaurant, what did
11 you say the name of the restaurant was?

12 A Champs Elysees.

13 Q Do you remember how many levels it had?

14 A It has three levels.

15 Q Do you remember what was on the levels that you saw?

16 A The downstairs one, there is a bar and some tables.
17 There is an elevator that takes you up to the second and third
18 floors. The second floor has a lot of tables, it's really
19 beautiful, it's a very elegant place. It also has private
20 rooms. I think the owners live on the third floor.

21 Q Where in Mexico City was this restaurant located?

22 A It's located on Avenida Reforma, more or less where the
23 angel statue is.

24 Q Any other landmarks nearby?

25 A Well, the U.S. embassy is nearby. There is a hotel

1 nearby I don't remember the name of it. There is a Sandborns.

2 Q Were you familiar with any of the individuals who worked
3 in that restaurant?

4 A Yes, I met the owner; and the captains of the servers.

5 Q Why did you meet the owner?

6 A I met the owner because I had a very large work farm and
7 I raised pigs. And in December the restaurant was very well
8 known for its suckling pigs, really delicious. So I was
9 talking to the owner this one time I said, well, if you would
10 ever be interested I would be able to sell you pork. And he
11 said, well, I would have to go and check your outfit just to
12 make sure everything is clean, and that you run your business
13 as you should. As we came to check the farm, and I started
14 selling him a certain number of the little animals. That was
15 the only time I had a relationship with him and it was for a
16 short time.

17 [REDACTED]: I want to show you what is in
18 evidence as Government Exhibit 402.

19 If I may approach, your Honor?

20 THE COURT: Yes.

21 THE WITNESS: I have to put my glasses on. Yes,
22 this is the restaurant.

23 Q Do you recognize any of the individuals in that
24 photograph?

25 A I recognize the man here at the edge, I think his name