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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

June 11, 2026

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Platte B. Moring III
 Inspector General
 Department of War

Dear Inspector General Moring:

I write in response to the March 6, 2026, letter from your Principal Deputy regarding my years-long oversight of the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Procurement. I'm addressing my letter to you even though you had a subordinate respond because you're ultimately responsible for the positions your office has taken – positions that are antithetical to the purpose and spirit of Inspectors General.

Your office's letter is a textbook example of what an Inspector General's office shouldn't do, and it boils down to telling me and my Judiciary colleagues this: this Committee has no business overseeing the Department of War (DoW) or the OIG, and that the Senate Judiciary Committee lacks the jurisdictional authority to investigate activity at the Department that may implicate criminal laws or guide the committee to firm up laws within its legislative ambit.

Your office's argument is an insult to the taxpayers who expect this Committee to carry out its constitutional duty—without fear or favor—to safeguard their hard-earned tax dollars and to hold those that break our nation's laws to account.

Worse, it's an insult to the Constitution and to the principles that have guided the Republic for almost 250 years. Congress is not another institution whose oversight requests need to be managed by unelected bureaucrats who have no constitutional authority to define congressional jurisdiction. Congress is vested with “All legislative Powers.”¹ On this, the Constitution is unequivocal: *all* legislative powers are given to Congress. And the power to legislate is the power to investigate.

As the Supreme Court affirmed in *McGrain v. Daugherty*, a “legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”² This is why oversight and legislation are bound up together. Congress can't legislate wisely without information from the executive branch.

With respect, I'm also not in the business of using my oversight to conduct fishing expeditions.

¹ U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

² *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).

Throughout my career, and with the help of courageous whistleblowers, I have used my legislative and oversight authority to expose waste, fraud, abuse and misconduct within government.³ When a legitimate matter comes to my attention, I don't stop until I get to the bottom of things.

That's especially true for the rotten \$10 billion JEDI contract. For years, I've worked to uncover what really happened behind the scenes, including criminal allegations involving the JEDI matter, and have exposed how the OIG's JEDI investigation cut corners, misrepresented the full context of records they possessed, and published blatant misstatements regarding GAO's work, in substance and in effect providing false information.⁴ Your predecessor's office misled Congress and the taxpayers, and year after year, I've sent your office evidence proving that out. Yet it's ignored, which begs the essential question taxpayers ask the government with often no answer – why?

Let me also address the arguments the OIG raises in defense of its fundamentally unsound decision to improperly withhold taxpayer-funded government records from a legitimate congressional investigation and from a committee at the apex of its constitutional power, which at this point, might also be obstruction on the part of your office which would add another valid element of jurisdictional satisfaction.

First, the OIG's letter cites *Watkins v. United States* to claim that “[c]ongressional committees are restricted to the mission delegated to them and may not exercise compulsory investigative powers in connection with matters outside of their jurisdiction.”⁵ Rather than quietly footnoting this case as the OIG's letter does, I'll let the *Watkins* case speak for itself:

The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. *That power is broad.* It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws . . . It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose *corruption, inefficiency or waste.*⁶

³See e.g., Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley Helps Restore Whistleblower Following Severe Retaliation at Biden ATF*, (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-helps-restore-whistleblower-following-severe-retaliation-at-biden-atf>; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *ICYMI: Seven Leading Whistleblower Groups Praise Grassley's 'Proven' Record of Support for Whistleblowers*, (Nov. 20, 2025), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/icymi-seven-leading-whistleblower-groups-praise-grassleys-proven-record-of-support-for-whistleblowers>; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley Welcomes Resolution for 10 FBI Whistleblowers Following Years of Retaliation*, (Aug. 26, 2025), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-welcomes-resolution-for-10-fbi-whistleblowers-following-years-of-retaliation>.

⁴ Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Sean O'Donnell, Acting Inspector Gen., Dep't. of Defense, Off. of the Inspector Gen., (Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_defense_dept.inspectorgeneraljedicontract.pdf; Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, to Sean O'Donnell, Acting Inspector Gen., Dep't. of Def., Off. of the Inspector Gen., (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_defense_dept.officeofinspectorgeneraljedireportfaults.pdf; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *During Sunshine Week, Grassley Discusses Lessons Learned from the JEDI Cloud Procurement*, (March 14, 2024), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/remarks/during-sunshine-week-grassley-discusses-lessons-learned-from-the-jedi-cloud-procurement/>.

⁵ Letter from Steven A. Stebbins, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Dep't. of Def., to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (March 6, 2026). On file with Comm. staff.

⁶ *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (emphasis added) (available at <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep354/usrep354178/usrep354178.pdf>).

Congress’s power to expose corruption is at its constitutional apex, or “endowed with the full power of the Congress,” when it’s “in furtherance of a legislative purpose . . . [related to] an investigating committee[’s] . . . jurisdiction.”⁷ Crucially, *Watkins* also holds that the oversight power of Congress “encompasses inquiries concerning . . . *proposed or possibly needed* statutes.”⁸ So my request for records on a legislative basis for potential fixes to criminal statutes would satisfy the court holding, even though my investigative efforts don’t have to in order to be valid and legitimate.

Writing more than half a century after *Watkins*, Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed its holding in *Trump v. Mazars*: “[w]hen Congress seeks information ‘needed for intelligent legislative action,’ it ‘unquestionably’ remains ‘the duty of *all* citizens to cooperate.’”⁹ Let me quote the Chief Justice again to underscore the grave policy matters at stake in your office’s shameful decision to withhold records from a congressional investigation:

[Congress] is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served.¹⁰

This is why the Chief Justice affirms that “Congress’s responsibilities extend to ‘every affair of government.’”¹¹ That’s what’s at stake in congressional oversight. That’s why I’ve dedicated my career to exposing corruption.

The OIG can rest assured that my oversight of JEDI is related to and in furtherance of a legitimate, legislative purpose: shaping criminal statutes related to waste, fraud, and abuse as applied to the conduct of federal workers supported by tax dollars. There can be no dispute that the Committee on the Judiciary is operating within its jurisdiction when investigating potential criminal conduct to include obstruction of a congressional investigation. The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this principle in 2022 when it held that “in the course of (and sometimes even in furtherance of) pursuing a valid legislative aim, Congress might uncover and seek to understand wrongdoing so that it can better appreciate the nature of any gaps in existing laws.”¹²

⁷ 354 U.S. at 201. At issue in *Watkins* was the jurisdiction of the House Un-American Activities Committee. *Watkins* states that “[n]o one could reasonably deduce from the charter the kind of investigation that the Committee was directed to make.” *Id.* at 204. In contrast, the Senate Judiciary Committee has clear jurisdiction over “[j]udicial proceedings, civil and criminal, generally,” “[g]overnment information” as well as “[r]evision and codification of the statutes of the United States.” Standing Rules of the Senate, Doc. No. 113-18, at 25-6 (Jan. 24, 2013), <https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf>.

⁸ 354 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added) (available at <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep354/usrep354178/usrep354178.pdf>).

⁹ *Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP*, 591 U.S. 848, 871 (2020) (quoting *Watkins* 354 U.S. at 187) (emphasis in original). At issue in *Mazars* were four congressional subpoenas issued by three House committees for the President’s financial records, which “raises sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency.” *Id.* at 870. There are no such sensitive issues here.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 865 (quoting *United States v. Rumely*, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP*, 39 F.4th 774, 808 (2022).

As noted, you, as an Article II entity created by statute, cannot define the bounds of a congressional committee, which resides within the powers and authorities of an Article I entity created by the Constitution – the United States Senate.

Second, I've long argued that congressional oversight is a constitutional authority granted to *each* individual member of Congress, as they are elected to legislate for those who entrust them with public office.¹³ As *McGrain* dictates, each congressional member needs information from the executive branch to make informed decisions about legislation.

The letter also states the OIG is “confident your staff is aware of the DOJ OLC [Office of Legal Counsel] guidance, dated May 1, 2017, stating that Congressional oversight authority constitutionally may be exercised ... by committees and subcommittees (or their Chairs).”¹⁴

You're correct that I'm aware of the OLC guidance. It's nonsense and doesn't apply to the United States Congress.

As I've written before, the May 1, 2017, OLC guidance falsely asserts that only oversight requests from committees or their chairs are “constitutionally authorized.”¹⁵ The implications of this guidance strains common sense. In effect, it runs roughshod over the separation of powers and affords the executive branch the unenumerated power to label what information gathering activities of Congress are “authorized.” Almost ten years ago, I wrote that this argument, if followed to its absurd conclusion, would equivocate oversight inquiries from Congress with FOIA requests.¹⁶ Shockingly, this is exactly what the OIG has offered my investigation: redacted FOIA records already in the public domain.

I'm confident the OLC staff are aware of how the previous Trump administration and the former leadership of OLC responded when I raised similar arguments.

Nearly two months after the OLC guidance became public, on July 19, 2017, I met with Steven Engel, the former Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of OLC, in my office.¹⁷ Before our meeting, AAG Engel had written to me, stating that the May 2017 OLC opinion failed to address adverse legal authority and that he would personally review the May opinion and conduct a more complete legal analysis.¹⁸ Earlier, AAG Engel also agreed that “individual Members [of Congress] are ‘authorized’ to seek . . . information [from the Executive Branch] in their roles as

¹³ Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, to the Hon. Donald J. Trump, (June 7, 2017), [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20\(oversight%20requests\).pdf](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf).

¹⁴ Letter from Steven A. Stebbins, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Dep't. of Defense, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (March 6, 2026). On file with Comm. staff.

¹⁵ Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't. of Justice, *Authority of Individual Members of Congress to Conduct Oversight of the Executive Branch*, (May 1, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1085571/dl>; see also Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, to the Hon. Donald J. Trump, (June 7, 2017), [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20\(oversight%20requests\).pdf](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf).

¹⁶ Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, to the Hon. Donald J. Trump, (June 7, 2017), [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20\(oversight%20requests\).pdf](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf).

¹⁷ Statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley Before the United States Senate, (July 19, 2017), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-07-19%20CEG%20on%20Engel%20Nomination%20for%20the%20Record.pdf>; see also, Press Release, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, *Grassley Wins Commitments of Cooperation from Administration on Oversight Requests*, (July 28, 2017), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/grassley-wins-commitments-of-cooperation-from-administration-on-oversight-requests->

¹⁸ *Id.*

constitutional officers.”¹⁹ Further, AAG Engel stated that “the Executive Branch’s cooperation [with Congress] should not be simply what could be judicially mandated.”²⁰

One day later, on July 20, 2017, the White House stated the OLC guidance “does not set forth Administration policy” and merely “provides legal advice consistent with the research of the Congressional Research Service.”²¹ Further, it concluded that “[t]he Administration’s policy is to respect the rights of all individual Members.”²² In effect, the White House conceded the OLC guidance is toothless and made that clear to me in private just as it did in public. Even if it did not, an OLC opinion has no bearing on Congress.

Therefore, *Watkins, McGrain*, the previous Trump administration, and the legal conclusions of the former leadership of OLC, all lead to the obvious conclusion that the OIG’s argument fails. As affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in *Murphy v. Department of the Army*,

All Members have a constitutionally recognized status entitling them to share in general congressional powers and responsibilities, many of them requiring access to executive information . . . Each of them participates in the law-making process; each has a voice and a vote in that process; and each is entitled to request such information from the executive agencies as will enable him to carry out the responsibilities of a legislator.²³

That’s also why the OIG’s assertion that “pursuant to Senate Rule XXV” the Judiciary Committee does not exercise oversight of the Department of Defense is unreasonable.²⁴ The Senate Rules do not—and cannot—reduce the constitutional oversight authority granted to each member of Congress. Indeed, as the Senate Rule you cited notes in its plain language, jurisdiction is only relevant regarding legislation and related matters, not investigative activity, which explains why the Senate Parliamentarian refers legislation to respective committees and not congressional investigations.

In any event, in the Senate Rule you brought forth, this Committee reposes jurisdiction over matters relating to “Government information” as well as matters relating to the violation of criminal and civil laws – precisely the types of matters ensconced within the center mass of the Committee’s investigation and with which your office’s conduct is responsible for.²⁵ Accordingly, your arguments attempting to create permissive authority for you to obstruct this

¹⁹ Letter from Steven A. Engel to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (June 23, 2017), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-07-19%20CEG%20on%20Engel%20Nomination%20for%20the%20Record.pdf>

²⁰ Letter from Steven A. Engel to Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (July 12, 2017), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-07-19%20CEG%20on%20Engel%20Nomination%20for%20the%20Record.pdf>

²¹ Letter from Marc Short, Director of Legislative Affairs, The White House, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (July 20, 2017), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017.07.20%20WH-Short%20Response%20to%20CEG%20re%20Oversight.pdf>.

²² *Id.*

²³ *Timothy R. Murphy, Appellant, v. Department of the Army et al*, 613 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

²⁴ Letter Steven A. Stebbins, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (March 6, 2026). On file with Comm. staff.

²⁵ See Standing Rules of the Senate, Doc. No. 113-18, at 25-6, (Jan. 24, 2013), <https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf>.

Committee’s investigation fail by way of the very same Senate Rule you cite for your obstructive conduct.

Further, the Senate Rules also reflect the principle that some issues cut across rather than restrict—as your letter appears to argue—the jurisdiction of committees. For example, Senate Resolution 400, which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, states that

[n]othing in this resolution shall be construed as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the Senate to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.²⁶

That’s why the Judiciary Committee, while I have served as Chairman, has continued its longstanding practice of overseeing FISA courts, intelligence-gathering agencies, and related surveillance activities.²⁷ Moreover, I have obtained possession of records relating to those matters.

You’ll also note that the word “intelligence” never appears in the Senate Rules under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee and yet under my leadership my committee has obtained thousands of pages of classified intelligence, some which I’ve successfully obtained declassification of, including records and information from Defense Department component agencies.²⁸ That includes my oversight efforts declassifying the Clinton and Durham annexes.²⁹ The point being, the executive branch has recognized this committee’s reach. Of course, in some cases congressional jurisdiction is implied when issues cut across jurisdictions, which adds further weight to the Judiciary Committee’s reach, which apparently your component agencies understand better than you. As CRS has noted, “[g]iven the complexity and interdependence of many policy areas and considering how subject matter responsibilities are allocated broadly across committees, more than one committee may be involved in overseeing specific aspects of a general subject.”³⁰

²⁶ S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (available at: <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about-the-committee/s-res-400/>).

²⁷ Press Release, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, *Oversight of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Related Surveillance Authorities*, (June 13, 2023), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/oversight-of-section-702-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-and-related-surveillance-authorities>; see also Press Release, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, *Review and Reform: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Accountability*, (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/review-and-reform-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-and-executive-accountability>; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley Calls for Clean FISA Extension after Securing Key Transparency Reforms to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Proceedings*, (April 14, 2026), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-calls-for-clean-fisa-extension-after-securing-key-transparency-reforms-to-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-proceedings>.

²⁸ See Standing Rules of the Senate, Doc. No. 113-18, at 25-6, (Jan. 24, 2013), <https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf>.

²⁹ See Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Newly Declassified DOJ Watchdog Report Shows FBI Cut Corners in Clinton Email Investigation*, (July 21, 2025), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/newly-declassified-doj-watchdog-report-shows-fbi-cut-corners-in-clinton-email-investigation>; Press Release, Sen. Comm on the Judiciary, *Newly Declassified Appendix to Durham Report Sheds Additional Light on Clinton Campaign Plan to Falsely Tie Trump to Russia and FBI’s Failure to Investigate*, (July 31, 2025), <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/newly-declassified-appendix-to-durham-report-sheds-additional-light-on-clinton-campaign-plan-to-falsely-tie-trump-to-russia-and-fbis-failure-to-investigate>.

³⁰ Mark J. Oleszek, Congressional Research Service, *Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate*, (June 10, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46815/R46815.1.pdf.

In the past, your office accepted this principle. For example, on July 2, 2019, the DoD responded to my oversight related to Professor Stefan Halper and DoD's Office of Net Assessment (ONA).³¹

DoD provided internal records and contracting paperwork for Halper, showing that DoD couldn't verify that Halper actually talked to the people he cited in his work, including Russian intelligence officers, that ONA didn't maintain sufficient documentation to comply with federal contracting requirements, and, most concerning, that ONA didn't maintain sufficient documentation to prove that Halper conducted all of his work in accordance with the law.³² Those records are similar to the records I seek from you and for which you have given Congress the stiff arm. My oversight later uncovered additional records showing how ONA spent taxpayer money on studies of Scots-Irish culture and Vladimir Putin's possible Asperger's diagnosis—all of which have nothing to do with measuring our military's capabilities.³³ Thankfully, ONA has now been "downgraded" by President Trump.³⁴ That's a win for the taxpayer and that's how things are supposed to work. But, the ultimate point being, DoD has provided records to me in the past and, in the immediate examples listed here, the productions were connected to my time as Chairman of the Finance Committee.

Finally, your office's letter claims that the Privacy Act bars my request for records. As a constitutional matter, for the reasons I've already stated, this argument doesn't carry water.

As a matter of federal law, it also misses the mark. The reasons for this are plain enough. The Act makes an exception for disclosures to Congress "to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof."³⁵ My investigation into this matter, as I have already stated, relates to evidence of potential criminal activity that may have infected the JEDI procurement and on the fact that this Committee's investigation has been subject to obstruction. For years, DoD proper, its OIG, Amazon, and now former DoD officials who were involved in both DoD and Amazon employment have refused to fully comply with this congressional investigation. What is everyone trying to hide? The basis of this investigation is therefore tied to the enforcement of federal criminal and civil statutes, an area in which my

³¹ Letter from Kathie R. Scarrah, Director, Legislative Affairs & Communications, Inspector General, Dep't. of Defense, to the Hon. Charles E. Grassley, (July 2, 2019), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DoD%20OIG%20Memo%20on%20ONA%20Contracts%20with%20Professor%20Halper%20%20-%20D2019-D000AX-0104.pdf>; see also Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Finance, to the Mr. Glenn A. Fine, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Dep't. of Defense, (Jan. 16, 2019), [https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/\[Untitled\].pdf](https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/[Untitled].pdf).

³² See Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley Continues to Press DoD Over Mismanagement of Stefan Halper Contracts*, (July 12, 2019), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-continues-press-dod-over-mismanagement-stefan-halper-contracts>; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Halper Docs Raise New Questions about Office of Net Assessment's Purpose & Compliance*, (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/halper-docs-raise-new-questions-about-office-net-assessment-s-purpose-compliance#_finref1; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley: A Case in Waste, Fraud and Abuse: The Office of Net Assessment*, (July 2, 2020), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-case-waste-fraud-and-abuse-office-net-assessment>; Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley, *Grassley Pushes DoD Watchdog to Dig Deeper in its Review of the Office of Net Assessment*, (Dec. 12, 2020), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-pushes-dod-watchdog-dig-deeper-its-review-office-net-assessment>.

³³ Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to the Hon. Pete Hegseth, Secretary, Dep't. of Defense, (Feb. 7, 2025), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_dod_-_ona.pdf.

³⁴ Dan Lamothe, Noah Robertson & Ellen Nakashima, WASHINGTON POST, *Hegseth restores, downgrades Pentagon Office of Net Assessment*, (Oct. 24, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/24/hegseth-office-net-assessment-ona-pentagon/>.

³⁵ 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(9).

Judiciary Committee colleagues and I have jurisdiction and are actively shaping legislation, in the face of ongoing obstruction.³⁶

In sum, you are the only Inspector General that has asserted such improper and infirm arguments to use as a sword and shield against legitimate congressional oversight. Indeed, the very types of records I've sought from you, I've received from other Inspectors General and so too have other congressional committees. Your office, therefore, is in a league of its own that nobody wants to be part of.

Therefore, please produce to me all records I've previously requested and respond to the following with complete and unredacted records, no later than June 25, 2026:

1. The OIG's letter states that you "recused [yourself] from participating in or deciding on your request due to [your] substantial participation in JEDI-related matters, including litigation."³⁷ Provide all recusal records.³⁸ What specific litigation were you involved in related to JEDI? Did the DoW OIG produce or receive any records to substantiate the merits of this recusal? If so, provide them.

Thank you for your prompt review. Should you have questions, please contact Ross Berg on my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary

³⁶ See Standing Rules of the Senate, Doc. No. 113-18, at 25-6, (Jan. 24, 2013), <https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf>.

³⁷ Letter Steven A. Stebbins, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (March 6, 2026). On file with Comm. staff.

³⁸ "Records" include any written, recorded, or graphic material of any kind, including letters, memoranda, reports, notes, electronic data (emails, email attachments, and any other electronically created or stored information), calendar entries, inter-office communications, meeting minutes, phone/voice mail or recordings/records of verbal communications, and drafts (whether they resulted in final documents).