Dear Director Mueller:
I am writing to inquire about the Federal Bureau of Investigation's receipt and use of counterterrorism funds throughout the 1990s and more recently, and the effect of the appropriations on the FBI's performance in stopping terrorist attacks and the financial support of terrorist operations.
Questions and concerns about whether the FBI received enough money to combat terrorism, and whether it used those funds efficiently and effectively, have been a significant issue since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and during the subsequent investigations. The issue was raised before the Joint Intelligence Committee investigation, and it is likely to be discussed during this week's hearings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Resolving the discrepancies is necessary so the 9-11 Commission, the Congress and the Administration can make well-reasoned recommendations and decisions about resources for the FBI in the future. An accurate and complete assessment of the recent past is needed to chart the best course for the years ahead. The FBI obviously must succeed in its newly defined mission of preventing terrorism. If it doesn't, the security of Americans here at home will be at risk.
In particular, former Director Louis J. Freeh testified before the Joint Intelligence Committee on October 8, 2002, that in the years before the 9-11 terrorist attacks, "budgets fell far short of the counterterrorism resources we knew were necessary to do the best job." Mr. Freeh then provided some degree of detail about the FBI's counterterrorism budget requests and allocations:
"Here are the numbers: For fiscal years 2000, 2001 and 2002, FBI counterterrorism budgets, I asked for a total of 1,895 special agents, analysts, linguists and others. The final, enacted allocation we received was 76 people, over those three years.
In fiscal year 2000, I requested 864 additional counterterrorism people, at a cost of $380.8 million. I received 5 people, funded for $7.4 million."
Mr. Freeh concluded by stating, "Thus, at the most critical time, the available resources for counterterrorism did not address the known critical needs."
I found this line of argument odd in light of the huge amounts of money Congress has poured into the FBI for more than a decade, a trend confirmed by numerous independent reports and government documents.
I began examining this issue in earnest in the mid-1990s after the FBI called for and received increases in counterterrorism funds from Congress. Just as large increases in defense funding raised concerns about effective management and even waste at the Defense Department in the 1980s, huge boosts in money for the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, while important, needed careful watching and accountability. A GAO report (GGD-99-7) conducted at my request found that, from fiscal years 1995 to 1998, an estimated $1.66 billion in funds were allocated by the FBI to carry out its counterterrorism mission. The FBI more than doubled its allocation of resources for combating terrorism, increasing from about $256 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $581 million in fiscal year 1998. These estimates, necessary for Congress to hold the FBI responsible and accountable, were difficult for the GAO to make for several reasons. First, the FBI's appropriations language had not specifically identified a separate or total amount available to the FBI for counterterrorism. Second, some FBI funds were allocated to general functions that supported several FBI missions, including counterterrorism. Third, no one had ever specifically required the FBI to identify or account separately for total funds used for counterterrorism activities.
A study I requested from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) comes to a similar conclusion. Congress consistently granted the FBI huge amounts of money for its counterterrorism mission, often at levels more than the administration was requesting.
The CRS study (attached) found that from fiscal years 1993 to 2003, total FBI appropriations increased from almost $2 billion to $4.6 billion, or by 132 percent. For almost all of those years, the amounts appropriated were either 99 percent of, or greater than, the administration's request. The exceptions are fiscal years 1993 and 2000, when the appropriations were, respectively, 96 percent and 94 percent of the administration's request.
The CRS study notes that since fiscal year 1997, Congress has included a "set aside" for counterintelligence, national security and counterterrorism in the salaries and expenses appropriations language. This amount increased from $102 million to $475 million from fiscal year 1997 to 2003, or by 365 percent, while the amount appropriated for salaries and expenses increased by 115 percent.
The study found that actual obligations by the FBI, including reimbursable resources, increased from $2.3 billion to nearly $4.8 billion from fiscal years 1993 to 2002, or by 105 percent. During that decade, actual obligations were equal to, or greater than, requested budget authority for every year except fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Total obligations in those years were 98 percent and 96 percent of requested budget authority. Funded FBI positions increased from 25,000 to more than 28,000.
The study also found that there was an overall increase in the number of agents over the time period, albeit with some minor fluctuations. The FBI began in fiscal year 1993 with 10,594 agents, peaked in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 with 11,698 agents, and dropped all of 116 agents in the next two years, leaving it with 11,582 agents in fiscal year 2002.
The Justice Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) has studied the issue and also noted that the FBI benefitted from increases in counterterrorism funding. An OIG audit (Report No. 02-38) released in October of 2002 found that resources dedicated to counterterrorism and counterintelligence at the FBI from 1995 to 2002 "have increased dramatically – about threefold..." It states, "With the exception of 1996, appropriations for counterterrorism and counterintelligence increased each year." The audit also states that "the number of agents assigned to counterterrorism nearly tripled during the last seven years..."
It is important to note that in the same time period the FBI was receiving such large amounts of counterterrorism money from the Congress, terrorists were organizing, plotting, financing and in some cases, striking U.S. interests, both abroad and in this country itself, at the World Trade Center in 1993. The FBI certainly had its share of counterterrorism successes, particularly the conviction of persons responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, and for the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. Even these victories were bittersweet, in that they consisted of investigations and prosecutions after the deadly attacks.
The figures provided by the GAO, CRS and OIG provide a much bigger picture and long-term perspective on the FBI's counterterrorism funds than the very specific numbers provided by Mr. Freeh. They also present a much different picture than the one painted by Mr. Freeh, who did not disclose the source of his information during his testimony. In fact, the numbers cited by Mr. Freeh, while possibly true, seem incongruous given the overall trend of generous funding for the FBI. As the CRS study notes, detailed break-outs of the number of agents for specific uses such as counterterrorism and counterintelligence are not available in unclassified administration or Congressional budget documents, or elsewhere in the public record. The National Foreign Intelligence Plan and other sensitive or classified budget documents may contain such figures. In the OIG audit, specific numbers of agents, and specific percentage increases in numbers of agents and funding, are deleted from the public, redacted and unclassified version available on the Internet. This version notes that the full 131-page report is classified at the Secret level.
The differences between Mr. Freeh's statistics on the one hand, and Administration requests to Congress on the other hand, suggest that he may have been referring to FBI requests to DOJ, or DOJ requests to the Office of Management and Budget, according to the CRS study.
As the Congress, 9-11 Commission and the public seek a more clear picture of the events, actions and inactions leading up to that terrible attack, the issue of whether the FBI and other agencies received the appropriate amount of funds, and how those funds were used, is sure to become an issue of increasing concern and attention. So that the most full and accurate picture is available for an accounting of what happened, what did not happen, why and what reforms are needed, I ask that you provide the following information in an unclassified format and with the same level of detail provided by Mr. Freeh in his October 2002 testimony:
1) From fiscal years 1993 to the present, please state both the annual number of counterterrorism agents and funding amounts for those agents that the FBI requested from the DOJ and OMB; both the number of counterterrorism agents and the funding amounts for those agents that the administration ultimately requested from Congress; and both the number of counterterrorism agents and funding amounts for those agents that the Congress funded.
2) According to DOJ budget documents, the FBI budget (through direct and reimbursable funding) provided for 11,698 special agent positions for FY1999 and FY2000. However, the FBI budget (through direct and reimbursable funding) provided for 11,375 agents for FY2001. This accounts for a decrease of 323 funded special agent positions.
What accounted for this decrease in the number of funded special agent positions? Was it a decrease in the FBI congressional appropriation? Was it a decrease in reimbursable funding? Or was it both? Or was there some other reason for this decrease in funded special agent positions?
3) In FY2002, the number of funded agent positions provided for in the FBI budget increased to 11,582 funded special agent positions — an increase of 207 positions over FY2001.
What accounted for this increase in funded special agent positions? Was it an increase in the FBI congressional appropriation? Was it an increase in reimbursable funding? Or both? Or was there some other reason for this increase in funded special agent positions?
4) For FY2000, the Administration's request for the FBI salaries and expenses account included $3.236 billion and 26,519 positions. This amount included program increases (over base) of $100 million and 268 positions.
A) Of this amount and related positions, how many dollars and positions could be considered related to the FBI counterterrorism?
B) In the FY2000 appropriation for the FBI salaries and expenses account, did Congress provide funding for those requested counterterrorism budget increases?
C) Did Congress provide funding for other counterterrorism initiatives?
D) For FY2000, can a crosswalk be provided that shows all requested FBI budget increases by initiative and program as compared to the budget increases provided by Congress?
5) For FY2001, the Administration's request for the FBI salaries and expenses account included $3.278 billion and 25,615 positions. This amount included program increases (over base) of $164 million and 360 positions.
A) Of this amount and related positions, how many dollars and positions could be considered related to the FBI counterterrorism?
B) In the FY2001 appropriation for the FBI salaries and expenses account, did Congress provide funding for those requested counterterrorism budget increases?
C) Did Congress provide funding for other counterterrorism initiatives?
D) For FY2001, can a crosswalk be provided that shows all requested FBI budget increases by initiative and program as compared to the budget increases provided by Congress?
6) For FY2002, the Administration's request for the FBI salaries and expenses account included $3.506 billion and 24,938 positions. This amount included program increases (over base) of $171 million and 279 positions.
A) Of this amount and related positions, how many dollars and positions could be considered related to the FBI counterterrorism?
B) In the FY2002 appropriation for the FBI salaries and expenses account, did Congress provide funding for those requested counterterrorism budget increases?
C) Did Congress provide funding for other counterterrorism initiatives?
D) For FY2002, can a crosswalk be provided that shows all requested FBI budget increases by initiative and program as compared to the budget increases provided by Congress?
7) For FY2004 and FY2005, the Administration has submitted a budget request for the FBI salaries and expenses account in the form of a crosswalk (matrix). The vertical axis of the crosswalk includes the 10 traditional FBI budget program accounts (Organized Crime Enterprises through Program Direction & Administration). The horizontal axis of the crosswalk includes four major activities (National Security, Counterterrorism, Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes, and Criminal Justice Services).
A) For the FBI enacted budget for the salaries and expenses account, can similar crosswalks be provided that cross reference the program and activity budgets (in terms of permanent positions, full-time equivalents, and dollar amounts) for FY2000, FY2001, and FY2002?
B) Can similar crosswalks be provided showing the overall FBI budget in terms of final obligations (including reimbursable funding) for the same years?
8) Please provide pre-existing FBI budget documents that support or were the source of Mr. Freeh's testimony about FBI requests and allocations during his October 2002 testimony.
Because of the compelling and significant public interest in this issue, and because it is most likely readily available at the FBI, I would appreciate this information as soon as possible, preferably in advance of the testimony by Mr. Freeh and yourself Tuesday and Wednesday, April 13th and 14th. If that is not possible, please provide the information no later than Thursday, April 22, 2004, and have the relevant FBI official contact my staff to explain the cause of the delay.
Counterterrorism was obviously a priority for the FBI during the 1990s. However, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent reports and revelations make clear that counterterrorism was not a high enough priority, nor was it managed in the most effective way.
For example, the same OIG audit that found a three-fold increase in counterterrorism agents also noted that the FBI had never performed a comprehensive written assessment of the risk of the terrorist threat facing this nation. Such an assessment would have enabled the FBI to better focus and manage its counterterrorism efforts, and would have helped the Congress hold the FBI accountable for its performance. After prodding from a September 1999 GAO report (NSIAD-99-163), the FBI and Justice Department agreed to conduct "a national-level risk assessment of the terrorist threat to the United States." By September of 2001, according to the OIG report, the FBI had created a draft of a "Terrorist Threat Report." This document, however, did not assess the threat and risk of an attack on the United States, and exhibited other deficiencies, the OIG found.
The same OIG audit also faulted the FBI's strategic planning, which it said had "not been guided by an overall strategic level assessment of the threat and risk of terrorist attacks on the United States..." from at least 1993. The OIG audit noted the strategic plan had not been updated since 1998.
This is merely an example of one of the FBI's fundamental challenges over the last dozen years – it did not suffer from a starvation of resources, but rather from a lack of a concerted effort against and focus on terrorism. Merely calling for more funds is an easy and over-simplified way to avoid the much more difficult and complex responsibility of effectively and efficiently managing an agency. Moreover, money is not the true measure of effectiveness in fighting terrorism.
All this is not to say the FBI is not meeting the present challenge of preventing further terrorist attacks. In fact, in your tenure you have made important changes and reforms to the FBI, which is now much better oriented to protecting the nation from terrorists. Much more remains to be done, and one significant challenge will be ensuring the FBI does not, over time, lose focus on the terrorist threat and slip back into a reactive mindset. I remain confident at the present time that you are up to this challenge, and I look forward to working together through the oversight process to ensure this.
I thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Member