The Interior Department is home to the federal government's third largest law enforcement force, with responsibility for protecting national monuments, dams, national parks and significant portions of the U.S. border.
In a letter to Secretary Gale Norton, Grassley said that the way the department gives non-law enforcement managers control of law enforcement decisions is "seriously flawed" and called for a quicker and more effective reorganization that better responds to concerns raised by the inspector general's findings. Grassley is ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs.
A copy of his letter to Norton follows here.
October 7, 2002
The Honorable Gale A. Norton
Secretary of the Interior
849 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20240
Dear Secretary Norton,
As you know, I have remained extremely interested in the Interior Department's law enforcement force since learning about its many troubles as revealed, most recently, by the Inspector General's (IG) report in January. That report concluded that one of the primary reasons for the very troubled law enforcement system is that non-law enforcement managers oversee the work of all Department law enforcement personnel.
I appreciate that you, unlike your predecessors who received similar troubling reports, have committed yourself to reforming the Department's law enforcement functions. But I am troubled about reforms in two respects, which I will address, in turn, below. First, I remain troubled that your reforms will not correct the persistent problem of non-law enforcement managers controlling law enforcement decisions. Second, I am very concerned that high-level managers at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the National Park Service (NPS) may be thwarting your reform efforts. Despite your orders, and the recommendations of the IG and your law enforcement review panel, the directors of BLM and the NPS have decided or are intending to hire personnel who may not possess the requisite experience to manage a law enforcement force. This is unacceptable.
I.Law Enforcement Activities Should Be Controlled By Trained Law Enforcement Managers
The Interior Department's law enforcement force is the third largest in the federal government, and is responsible for protecting many of our treasured monuments, important dams, national parklands, and, in large part, our borders. As documented by the IG, one of the many problems with the Department's force is that criminal investigators, line agents and rangers report to non-law enforcement supervisors with training in such trades as conservation and biology, but not law enforcement.
These non-law enforcement managers are not always required to possess security clearances and generally have very little or no training in law enforcement. Yet they make critical law enforcement decisions, many affecting national security. The IG's report and my staff's interviews with several law enforcement personnel reveal that this structure is at the root of many of the problems with Interior's law enforcement.
The structure is flawed. The structure makes non-law enforcement managers responsible for pure law enforcement decisions such as, for example, how many rangers are needed to adequately protect national monuments, what level of training they need, how they should staff various shifts, and the like.
The structure also puts non-law enforcement managers in charge of protecting much of the southwest border. The National Park Service for example, occupies 55% of Arizona's border with Mexico. Thus, non-law enforcement park supervisors are the ultimate arbiters of how many dollars to allocate to patrol the border, what equipment rangers require to do their jobs, whether the border should be reinforced with fencing and what type of fencing, whether mechanized equipment should be used in preserve areas for the protection of rangers and the border, and similar security decisions.
In addition, non-law enforcement managers who do not possess the necessary training or security clearances are at a disadvantage ? for lack of access to all necessary information ? when making decisions. Thus, if a manager is not permitted to know secret information about deficiencies in dam security, it follows that the manager would not be able to make a fully-informed decision about improving that security.
Finally, the structure places law enforcement personnel in the position of investigating or citing the very people to whom they report. This lack of independence can be extremely disruptive to effective law enforcement. So the structure, on its face, is troubled. It is, likewise, troubled in practice.
I understand that one BLM district was understaffed with officers on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, despite the High level Threat Alert. The reason for the security problem was that the manger did not want to approve overtime pay for the officers, and so rearranged schedules to send officers to a mandatory training. The schedule change reduced available officers for September 11. So they cut corners on a security issue and at least one district was understaffed while the rest of the nation was on High level Threat Alert.
By contrast, in the weeks following the September 11 anniversary, press accounts reveal that BLM allocated almost 40 armed BLM law enforcement agents to maintain site security during a cattle seizure. Such an emphasis on grazing issues may have been appropriate, but the contrast with understaffing during the High Alert is disconcerting. I also understand that overtime was approved for this exercise.
But most troubling is that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, when federal agencies were asked to supply personnel for emergency training as air marshals, regional non-law enforcement NPS managers opposed the efforts, and dispatched just 3 officers from the 2,700-officer force. These same managers continue to control the vast majority of this 2,700-officer force and could make a similarly bad decision if faced with another national crisis.
Rather than reorganize so that all law enforcement activities are overseen by law enforcement professionals, you have chosen to make only criminal investigators (a mere 2-5% of the entire force) report to law enforcement supervisors. The vast majority of law enforcement agents, rangers and resources will continue to be controlled by non-law enforcement managers.
I have, on several occasions, advised you that I believe all law enforcement personnel should report to sworn law enforcement managers. Given the well-documented problems, I am convinced that such a reorganization is critical. As you may know, several years ago the Forest Service faced many of the same problems that now confront Interior and conducted a complete reorganization of all law enforcement because of the conclusion that effective law enforcement must report through a law enforcement authority chain. I have attached a copy of General Accounting Office testimony to the House of Representatives on this subject for your review. I again encourage you to reconsider your decision to merely restructure the chain of command for criminal investigators and, instead, create line authority for all Interior law enforcement personnel.
II.The Current Reorganization
In the interim, however, I also want to learn more about the reorganization currently underway at the Department of Interior. I am concerned that it is being met with resistence by senior Interior managers. I have learned that the various Interior agencies, such as the BLM, were asked to propose reorganization plans pursuant to your orders to reorganize. I would have expected that such plans would be created with input from law enforcement personnel, but I have learned that BLM Director Kathleen Clarke has thus far failed to meet with the agents' representative, the Federal Law Enforcement Officer's Association (FLEOA). This meeting should occur, and I ask that you intervene on behalf of FLEOA to ensure that a meaningful meeting takes place.
I am more alarmed that the BLM and NPS have each decided to hire a non-law enforcement person as the senior manager to oversee criminal investigators (1811-series employees). This contradicts the clear recommendations of the IG and your direction that each bureau hire a senior law enforcement manager to oversee all criminal investigators. As I am sure you know, this decision may dissuade seasoned Interior 1811 investigators from applying for this job ? despite their likely high qualifications ? because they may lose many benefits by converting to a civilian series. I am also worried because, in the case of the BLM, the decision to hire in the civilian series will circumvent age restrictions and requirements that the candidate have attended the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center that would otherwise apply. In addition, it is my understanding that, pursuant to BLM general orders, only employees in the 1811 or 1805 series can be delegated law enforcement authority. Thus, this new chief law enforcement officer could not even be delegated law enforcement authority in the BLM. Such circumvention of your orders violates both the spirit and letter of your reorganization decisions.
Another disturbing example concerns the NPS which, I am told, is considering hiring as its senior law enforcement official a civilian who will only devote 25% of his time to law enforcement activities. The rest of his time will be spent on various NPS activities. This is precisely the type of scenario that the IG warned about, and that you have attempted to avoid. Yet it appears that the NPS intends to proceed with business as usual.
I ask that you provide to me the following information regarding the reorganization:
1) Please provide position descriptions or position description announcements for the chief law enforcement supervisor for each Interior department, and, if any position does not lie in the 1811 series, provide an explanation for the decision to not place the position in the 1811 series. If any of these decisions were influenced by Appropriations concerns, please explain. Please also provide to me a list of all candidates certified for each of the chief law enforcement officer position in each Interior bureau, including the BLM, NPS, BOR, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
2) Please provide a timetable for the reorganization, including when you expect complete implementation of each of the recommendations made and accepted in the July, 2002 report by the Law Enforcement Review Panel.
3) Please provide copies of all reorganization documents generated by each Interior component, together with any responses by relevant headquarters entities.
4) As I noted above, non-law enforcement managers have little or no law enforcement training, and are not always required to obtain security clearances. What steps will you take to improve the training of these managers, and will you require them to obtain necessary critical sensitive background checks?
5) Please explain what consideration you have given to the ability of 1811 agents and other law enforcement officers to coordinate work once they report to different lines of authority. It is my understanding that many law enforcement officers and agents believe that splitting 1811 agents from other law enforcement personnel could be problematic.
Please provide this information by October 24, 2002. I note that you have been extremely cooperative in providing information to me about the reorganization that has resulted from the IG's report, and I thank you for that cooperation and your continued cooperation. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Dean Zerbe at 224-5315 or Mr. Matt Reed at 224-5564.
Cordially yours,
Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs
cc: Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs
Senator Robert Bryd, Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations
Senator Conrad Burns, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Interior Appropriations
Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Finance Committee
Congressman Joe Skeen, Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior