May 7, 2002
The Honorable Gale A. Norton
Secretary of the Interior
1849 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
Dear Secretary Norton:
I recently had the opportunity to read Inspector General Devaney's Report, "Disquieting State of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of the Interior Law Enforcement" No. 2002-I-0014. As you may know, I have a profound interest in the administration of federal law enforcement. In my capacity as a longstanding member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Ranking Minority Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, as well as my role as Ranking Minority Member on the Senate Finance Committee, I have repeatedly called for the highest professional standards and accountability in all law enforcement organizations throughout the Federal Government. The Department of Interior certainly must be part of this oversight of federal law enforcement given that it is the third largest federal law enforcement organization with nearly 4,400 law enforcement officers assigned to seven separate organizations.
The IG's report is one of the most damning indictments of a federal law enforcement agency that I have ever read. The report is a wake-up call for reform and highlights that there has been little to no oversight of Interior's law enforcement in the past several years.
The Department of the Interior's historical failure to impose clear standards, policies, lines of authority and accountability on its law enforcement organizations impedes my continuing efforts to restore and advance public confidence in federal law enforcement. I am especially troubled by the inconsistent, decentralized management structures that often result in the alarming phenomenon of law enforcement officers reporting to non-law enforcement managers. The Report articulates this well: "With the authorities and powers attendant with law enforcement comes heightened responsibility and accountability. These demand tight reign, close supervision, clear chain of command and rigorous oversight. A centralized organization is the only management structure that provides this kind of control and accountability." Given the size and magnitude of your collective law enforcement force, I expect that prompt correction of the deficiencies addressed in the Report will rise to one of your highest priorities.
The Report's findings that are particularly troubling include the lack of response to September 11, 2001; civilian interference with criminal investigations; possible reprogramming of money appropriated for anti-drug efforts; and an internal affairs process that appears to exist in name only. Some of the report's findings are:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the serious organizational and management problems in the law enforcement components of the Department were magnified. Of particular concern was the lack of coordination among the law enforcement components and the absence of a meaningful single point of contact that the Secretary and her senior managers could depend upon for reliable information. (P. 4)
The Department was also unprepared to provide accurate and timely information regarding the number and location of law enforcement personnel that could assist in the investigation and response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. (P. 6)
More recently, when Federal law enforcement organizations nationwide were asked to supply Special Agents or officers for emergency training as Air Marshals, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) promptly provided officers as requested. National Park Service (NPS) reluctantly provided a small list of names, despite vocal opposition from the Regional Offices. As a result, NPS, the largest law enforcement entity in the Department with over 2,700 law enforcement officers, provided only three officers for this critical national effort. (P. 11)
Special Agents told the Assessment Team of countless instances in which they were precluded, by their non-law enforcement managers, from pursuing potentially serious criminal violations ? in favor of civil enforcement, or even no enforcement action at all. At best the Special Agents attribute such decisions to the managers' lack of familiarity with mainstream law enforcement administration; at worst, it is characterized as interference with or cover-up of potential criminal conduct. (P. 14, emphasis added).
The Assessment Team received several complaints that the ONDCP funds were reprogrammed for non-drug enforcement, and even non-law enforcement purposes. Given the lack of accountability, the allegations of reprogramming of these monies can neither be confirmed nor dismissed. (P. 17).
The Assessment Team heard innumerable anecdotes about incidents involving law enforcement officers that would typically be subject to an internal affairs investigation. The anecdotes ranged from excessive shooting incidents to the chronic loss of law enforcement equipment. Unfortunately, when the Assessment Team attempted to review some of the most alarming incidents, they were unable to verify the accuracy of the anecdotal reports based on the files available. In fact, in some cases, the files concerning alleged incidents were actually empty. For the matters that had some investigative information available, it appeared that the only concern addressed was that of potential criminal liability on the part of the law enforcement professional involved, completely ignoring the applicability of civil or administrative action that might be taken. (P. 27 emphasis added).
DOI crime statistics are, according to a former MRPS official, "not worth the paper they were sent in on." (P. 36).
I am convinced that the public interest is well-served by the changes envisioned by the Inspector General's recommendations, and I will be monitoring your progress in implementing them. I commend you for requesting this report, and it is unfortunate that you have the responsibility of correcting the problems ignored by your predecessors. However, I am confident that this administration will overcome the historical bureaucratic resistance to change in this arena, and will take swift and decisive action to bring professionalism and accountability to the forefront of law enforcement at the Department of Interior.
I await your prompt response on the progress you have made in fully implementing the recommendations of the Inspector General. Thank you for your time and assistance on this matter.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs