Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. You and I have talked several times about the devastation that narcotics has done to the youth of our country, and simultaneously to the peace and stability of our allies in Latin America.
I also want to thank Secretary Armitage, Administrator Hutchinson, and General Jackman for agreeing to testify here today. The challenges we face from narcotics in Latin America are not new challenges, although they may wear a new face. I look forward to your testimony about our current efforts in the region.
The drug threat has not gone away, nor has it lessened since the tragic events of a year ago. This last year has seen elections in Bolivia and Colombia, the resurgence of rebels in Peru, and violence over coca eradication programs in Bolivia. Colombia, which seems to be the epicenter of coca production and regional violence, has seen a peace process fail, the fighting strength of the FARC and paramilitary terrorist groups rise, while its economy has continued to stagnate. Newspapers have printed stories of arms-for-drugs plane flights between Venezuela and Southern Colombia. Parts of Ecuador and Panama have become resting areas for the FARC, ELN, and AUC terrorist organizations.
Eradication is the cornerstone of our counter-narcotics strategy. This strategy has been based on the assumption that if, by spraying coca, we can make it unprofitable for the farmer to raise it, he will change to legitimate crops. Our alternative development strategy is built off this assumption, focused on providing farmers profitable alternatives to coca. The military equipment and training we have been providing is based on this assumption, under the argument that the coca fields must be secured on the ground so that it is safe to spray them from the air.
I have supported this strategy. If the coca farmer is the decision-maker as to whether or not coca is grown, then this logic stands up. It is a strategy that will take some time to work, particularly when we are working in hostile territory against well-funded opposition, in cooperation with governments who are too often out-manned, out-gunned, and out-funded. But despite a concentrated effort in Colombia, coca production has increased from an estimated 50,900 hectares in 1995 to over 136,000 hectares in 2001. This production expansion has offset any gains that we have made in Bolivia and Peru. We have not seen a significant change in the purity, price, or availability levels of cocaine during this time. We have watched coca production move from one area of Colombia to another, and seen an expansion into opium well.
Most recently, the President proposed, and in the Supplemental Appropriations bill Congress has consented, to expand the authorities for counter-narcotics materials provided to Colombia. In addition, we have seen some retrenchment in the process against coca production that has been made in Bolivia and Peru. We are, in effect, expanding the mission of a fixed set of resources in Colombia while facing an increased threat elsewhere.
With illegal drugs produced in these countries killing Americans every day, it is in our interest to promote the political stability, rule of law, and economic success of this region. Addressing narcotics trafficking, which is funding many of the conflicts in the Andes, is the logical place to start. But I don't think this region of the world has become any safer, or any more stable, since we significantly increased our levels of assistance to the region three years ago. While I do think our assistance has been beneficial, the fact is the supply of drugs from the Andes has not decreased. Each of us can agree that we want to do something to make a difference. I look forward to our discussion on this important topic to see if we can be more successful in the future.