WASHINGTON – Senator Chuck Grassley has sent a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to question her about the current Afghans National Police training programs. Grassley is concerned about the connection between the Afghans National Police and drug money.
“The United States has spent over $1 billion to train and equip more than 70,000 Afghans National Police officers since 2004 to increase security and combat drug trafficking,” Grassley wrote. “The benefits of the training program are quickly being undermined by widespread corruption which is fueled by billions in drug money.”
Grassley is the co-chairman of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.
Here is a copy of the text of Grassley’s letter.
April 28, 2008
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Secretary Rice:
According to the August 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the United Nations, the lack of security, not poverty, is the primary reason for the large increases in poppy cultivation in the south and southwest provinces. As Co-Chair of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, I am aware that the United States has spent over $1 billion to train and equip more than 70,000 Afghans National Police (ANP) officers since 2004 to increase security and combat drug trafficking. However, I am also aware that the benefits of this program are quickly being undermined by widespread corruption which is fueled by billions in drug money. I am concerned that our counternarcotics strategy will continue to struggle until a comprehensive, integrated ANP training program is implemented to provide effective security.
According to news reports, ANP officers are setting up their own checkpoints to extort money and are demanding payments for basic services from local citizens. It is my understanding that corrupt officers work closely with the Taliban to ensure the quick release of insurgent prisoners from jail. They look the other way instead of arresting opium producers and traffickers or may be directly involved in growing or trafficking themselves. Moreover, according to a 2006 State/Defense Department Inspector Generals’ (IG) Assessment, because current salaries are so low, higher ranking officers demand payment from lower ranking officers while the new officers sell their U.S.-provided equipment as soon as they receive it.
The 2006 IG Assessment provided twelve recommendations to strengthen and reform the ANP training program. Based on these some of the recommendations, the State Department designed a number of programs to combat corruption including: Regional Training Centers; the Pay and Rank Reform Initiative; management operations and coordination for Afghan justice administrators; deployment of mentors and the development of the Professional Standards Unit. However, the effectiveness of these reform programs has been minimal because many of them are only partially implemented while some of the recommendations have never been addressed.
Because of my long-standing interest in seeing the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan succeed, I have a number of questions about the current ANP training program.
1. Currently, ANP officers are only vetted through a vouching system at the beginning of their training but there is no follow-up vetting to ensure that they are not participating in drug trafficking or insurgent activities. Are follow-up programs being established for follow-up vetting to verify the continued suitability of each ANP officer?
2. The 2006 Inspector Generals’ Assessment listed an officer turnover rate of at least thirty percent. Of the over 70,000 ANP officers trained, what percentage of officers remain after their original training program? What is the average retention rate after six months?
3. Over forty percent of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police officers disappeared after their original training along with their equipment. Has this program been discontinued? If not, what safeguards have been implemented to increase retention rates and decrease the loss of equipment?
4. Reports indicated that at least half of U.S. supplies and equipment provided to the ANP have been stolen by corrupt officers. What is the total dollar amount of the supplies and equipment that have been stolen? What steps have been taken to limit the theft and ensure that the equipment is not being diverted to the Taliban? What efforts have been made to recover this equipment or to discipline corrupt officers once they have been identified?
5. Currently, new ANP recruits are only receiving two weeks of training before being sent out into the field. I believe that this short timeframe does not allow for proper training or culture of service. This deficiency also leaves new recruits open to corruption and bribery. What steps are being taken to increase training time and to provide additional training for officers who only received two weeks of training?
6. Mentors have been moved into over twenty-four provinces to provide additional training to officers. Please provide the list of provinces where these mentors are located and how many mentors are currently being utilized per each Afghan officer. How many mentors are being assigned to provinces with the highest rate of poppy cultivation, mainly those in the south and southwest?
A professional Afghan National Police force is critical to the success of our counternarcotics program in Afghanistan. Therefore, I encourage the State Department to provide comprehensive police training and reform programs so that the officers can carry out their mission of increasing security and reducing drug trafficking throughout Afghanistan.
Thank you in advance for responding to these questions by May 16, 2008. Please contact my Senate Drug Caucus staff at 202-224-6170 if you have any questions about the issues I have raised.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley